European Aviation Safety Agency

Comment-Response Document 2015-02

Systematic review and transposition of existing FAA TSO standards for parts and appliances into EASA ETSOs

CRD TO NPA 2015-02 — RMT.0206 (ETSO.011) — 28.7.2016
Related Decision 2016/013/R

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This comment-response document (CRD) contains the comments received on notice of proposed amendment (NPA) 2015-02 (published on 27.07.2015) and the responses, or a summary thereof, provided thereto by the Agency.

The proposed amendments revises the CS-ETSO in order to:
(a) modify a number of ETSOs in order to harmonise them with the corresponding FAA TSOs;
(b) introduce new ETSOs (Index 1) which are, where possible, technically similar to existing FAA TSOs; and
(c) introduce a new ETSO (Index 2), not existing in the FAA TSO series (i.e. ETSO-2C515 Aircraft halocarbon Clean Agent — Handheld fire extinguisher).

The proposed changes are expected to reduce the regulatory burden for validation of FAA TSO authorisations by EASA and vice versa, increase cost-effectiveness, and align CS-ETSO to the state of the art.

Based on the comments on NPA 2015-02 and the responses thereto, Decision 2016/013/R was developed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicability</th>
<th>Process map</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affected regulations and decisions:</td>
<td>Concept Paper: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED Decision 2003/010/RM (CS-ETSO)</td>
<td>Terms of Reference: 26.06.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected stakeholders:</td>
<td>Rulemaking group: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certification authorities, Equipment</td>
<td>RIA type: Light</td>
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<tr>
<td>manufacturers</td>
<td>Technical consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver/origin: Efficiency/Proportionality</td>
<td>during NPA drafting: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference: Article 5.6(b) of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008</td>
<td>Publication date of the NPA: 27.02.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duration of NPA consultation: 3 months</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Review group: No</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Focussed consultation: No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publication date of the Opinion: N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publication date of the Decision: 2016/Q3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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1. **Procedural information**

1.1. **The rule development procedure**

The European Aviation Safety Agency (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Agency’) developed this Comment-Response Document (CRD) in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008\(^1\) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure\(^2\).

This rulemaking activity is included in the Agency’s [Rulemaking Programme](#), under RMT.0206. The scope and timescale of the task were defined in the related [Terms of Reference (ToR)](#) (see process map on the title page).

The draft CS-ETSO Amdt 11 has been developed by the Agency based on the input of the RMT.0206. All interested parties were consulted through [NPA 2015-02](#), which was published on 27/02/2015.

79 comments were received from interested parties, including industry, national aviation authorities (NAAs).

The text of this CRD has been developed by the Agency.

The process map on the title page contains the major milestones of this rulemaking activity.

1.2. **The structure of this CRD and related documents**

This CRD provides a summary of comments and responses as well as the full set of individual comments (and responses thereto) received on NPA 2015-02. An overview of the resulting rule showing deleted, new and amended text is provided in Annex 1 of this CRD.

The final text is provided in the Annex to the ED Decision amending CS-ETSO.

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\(^2\) The Agency is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of the Basic Regulation. Such process has been adopted by the Agency's Management Board and is referred to as the 'Rulemaking Procedure'. See Management Board Decision concerning the procedure to be applied by the Agency for the issuing of Opinions, Certification Specifications and Guidance Material (Rulemaking Procedure), EASA MB Decision No 01-2012 of 13 March 2012.
2. **Summary of comments and responses**

79 comments were received from 24 commentators.

The majority of the comments were received from the following stakeholders:

- Boeing (14 comments)
- Airbus Helicopter (11 comments)
- Airbus (8 comments)
- Thales (8 comments)

The following Table 1 provides a summary of the comments received from stakeholders.

![Comments received during NPA consultation](chart.png)
The majority of the comments submitted were either accepted or partially accepted as shown in the following table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>occurrences</th>
<th>ACCEPTED</th>
<th>PARTIALLY ACCEPTED</th>
<th>NOTED</th>
<th>NOT ACCEPTED</th>
<th>Σ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the comments are interconnected; therefore, the responses provided thereto may include references to responses provided to other comments.

The nature of the comments received ranges from specific technical comments, to observations aimed to improve the wording.

The subjects which received the more significant comments are listed hereafter:

— **ETSO-C167 Personnel Carrying Device Systems (PCDS), also known as Human Harnesses**

Five stakeholders made observations against the proposal to introduce this TSO in CS-ETSO. The well-established certification practise in Europe based on STC process has been considered to be an adequate and safe process producing equal or better results than it would have been achieved by transposition of FAA TSO-C167.

The Certification Memorandum (ref. CM-CS-005 Issue 01, dated 08/12/2014) clarifies the European Aviation Safety Agency’s general course of action on this specific certification item. The Agency decided to accept these comments and decided not to publish ETSO-C167.

— **ETSO-2C515 Aircraft Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher**

With publication of ETSO-2C515 the first step is done to achieve the replacement of the Ozone depleting Halon gas from the aircraft and to comply with Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 and subsequent amendments.

Eight comments have been received from five different stakeholders addressing technical specific issues or asking for text redrafting. All comments have been answered individually and the proposed text has been amended accordingly.

— **ETSO-C116a Crewmember Portable Protective Breathing Equipment**

The Agency received few comments after publication of Draft ETSO-C116a with the intention to not adopt FAA TSO-C116a. This was also based on the rationale that the present articles which had received ETSO/TSO-C116 authorisations are safe and meet the intended purpose. Additionally it was argued that there was so far no FAA TSO-C116 authorisation granted by FAA. However, for the sake of harmonisation of rules between ETSO and FAA TSO the Agency decided to publish ETSO-C116a. To clarify the concerns Industry was advised to liaise with the related SAE Working Group responsible for the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) and, if consensus is reached, ETSO/TSO-C116a may be revised accordingly.

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— Definition of Failure Conditions
Three commenters asked to clarify that the failure condition classification generally pertains to the installation on aircraft. The Agency position is that the ETSO article manufacturer has to define assumptions regarding the installation on the aircraft and come up with failure condition classifications while specifying the equipment.

ETSO-C3e, ETSO-C5f, ETSO-C88b, ETSO-C112e, ETSO-C159b, ETSO-C166b, and ETSO-C119d have been modified to explicitly address the loss and erroneous aspects of the failure conditions.

— References to DO-160/ED-14
Several commenters asked to amend ETSO articles in order to refer to the latest revision of DO-160/ED-14.
Where appropriate, references to dedicated revisions of DO-160/ED-14 have been replaced by a reference to CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1

— Appendix 1 of ETSO-C70b Life Rafts
Based on a post NPA comment received from industry the Agency decided to amend the Appendix 1 of ETSO-C70b in order to accommodate partial ETSO authorisations for liferaft to be integrated in rotorcraft installations.
In these specific cases, certain ETSO functions are provided through the aircraft installation process by the TC/STC holder.

The above comments do not constitute an exhaustive list of the topics addressed, as various other changes were made. The full list of comments and responses is provided in Paragraph 4.

A summary of the changes made compared to the text proposed in NPA 2015-02 is provided in the Explanatory Note of the Decision on ‘CS-ETSO — Amendment 11’.
3. **Draft CS-ETSO Amendment 11**

The ETSO articles modified as per ‘accepted’ and ‘partially accepted’ comments received during consultation of NPA 2015-02 are provided in Annex I.

The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below:

(a) deleted text is marked with strike through;
(b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey;
(c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

The final resulting text is provided in the Annex to the ED Decision amending CS-ETSO.
4. **Individual comments (and responses)**

In responding to comments, a standard terminology has been applied to attest the Agency’s position. This terminology is as follows:

(a) **Accepted** — The Agency agrees with the comment and any proposed amendment is wholly transferred to the revised text.

(b) **Partially accepted** — The Agency either agrees partially with the comment, or agrees with it but the proposed amendment is only partially transferred to the revised text.

(c) **Noted** — The Agency acknowledges the comment but no change to the existing text is considered necessary.

(d) **Not accepted** — The comment or proposed amendment is not shared by the Agency.

### (General comments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Comment by: Boeing</th>
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| 22      | **COMMENT APPLIES TO:** Throughout the NPA, specifically portions addressing ETSO-C127b (Rotorcraft, Transport Aeroplane, and Small Aeroplane Seating Systems), whenever a Certification Specification is called out.  
**CONCERN:** Wherever compliance with a CS section is requested, the amendment level of the requirement is not included.  
**REQUESTED CHANGE:** We recommend adding the appropriate amendment level to section call-outs; for example, “CS 25.853(c), Amdt. No.: 25/12.”  
**JUSTIFICATION:** Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b. Not tying the appropriate regulation amendment to an ETSO revision will lead to confusion and extraneous work. This begs the question, however: Is it the agency’s intent that the latest amendment be followed, even though a change to the regulation may have considerable effect to an ETSO article? | |
| response | Not accepted.  
The current ETSO policy is not to reference the CS amendment level. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Comment by: Thales Avionics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Thales Avionics thanks EASA for such transposition of existing FAA TSO standards for parts and appliances into EASA ETSOs, allowing to ensure equivalence between the TSOs and ETSOs listed within this NPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response</td>
<td>Noted.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Comment by: Thales Avionics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Though such transposition is really appreciated, time to achieve this transposition is deemed too long (greater than 2 years) and therefore is penalizing EU applicants. Moreover in the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
meantime several FAA TSOs have been updated and now need also to be transposed. Thales do expect that a new NPA shortened process will be put in place by EASA for the next TSO transposition with an overall cycle around 6 months up to a final EASA decision in order to get the next transposition by end 2015.

response

Partially accepted.
The Agency established a revised process for future updates of CS-ETSO, which includes a generic ToR, without the need to consult a list of ETSO candidates. Furthermore, the NPA comment period will be shortened from 3 to 2 month consultation.

comment 38

comment by: THALES AVIONICS

If the mutual acceptance process is put in force by EASA and FAA in the BASA TIP, Thales would recommend that Part 21 or CS be changed to allow EU applicant to apply in Europe with EASA for a FAA TSO standard. It will provide a consequent optimization of EASA and FAA resources in preventing that each regulatory system has to copy the regulation material standards of the others, and in preventing that each regulatory system has to ensure at any time full compliance of the RTCA and EUROCAE standards referred in those TSOs / ETSOs.

response

Partially accepted
The TIP Rev. 5 includes a provision to allow, for the case where EASA has no ETSO standard, the use of Part 21.A.305. The FAA TSO standard could, in the individual case, be considered an equivalent specification.

comment 39

comment by: THALES AVIONICS

Though CS-ETSO Subpart A is not addressed within this NPA, Thales would like to recall EASA that referring to Certification memorandum, as for example for AEH, has been recognized inappropriate in a CS-ETSO. Therefore Thales is requesting its removal as soon as possible. Moreover, it introduce additional differences with FAA which should be prevented in the scope of the envisaged mutual recognition and acceptance.

response

Noted.
CS-ETSO is referring to EASA Certification Memorandum AEH as a guidance material and NOT as a requirement.
The reference to EASA Certification Memorandum AEH will be re-considered when AMC 20-152 (within RMT.0643) will be available, as mentioned to industry.

comment 44

comment by: Austro Control

page 248: Appendix 1. This Appendix prescribes the Minimum Performance Standards (MPS) for aircraft handheld fire extinguishers. The applicable standard is SAE AS6271 ‘Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher’, issued in January 2013.

Comment / Question: Has this mentioned MPS ( Minimum Performance Standard ) any relationship to the MPS mentioned in CS25, AMC 25.851 c) Alternative fire extinguishing agents . If not, what is the consequence ?

General comment : If this proposed ETSO-2C515 has no equivalent in the FAA TSO Series , it is expected that this will not be accepted for import into the US ( Eg for export )? , what will be the consequence ?
4. Individual comments (and responses)

**Comment 45**

**Comment by: Airbus Helicopters**

**Major comment**

CS-ETSO Subpart A paragraph 2.1 states about acceptability of DO-160/ED-14 from revision D change 3 to revision G (the current one).

The current revision is generally the one selected for new TC/STC and possibly for significant changes.

Accepting previous revisions for newly developed ETSO articles may make it impracticable to install such articles in new aircrafts or aircraft changes.

**Recommendation**

Amend CS-ETSO Subpart A paragraph 2.1, in order to make revision G applicable from now on for all new ETSO articles.

**Response**

Not accepted.

It is recognised that the latest revision of ED-14/DO-160 may be required at installation level, and we encourage ETSO applicants to go that path. However, old equipment going through a major change are required to use the applicable standard. If the environmental standard becomes the latest ED-14/DO-160 release, significant cost will be added for no added safety: as an example, a transponder being upgraded (most generally a software change) to match the ADS-B out mandate would have to be environmentally requalified whereas remaining installed on aircraft on which the former release was acceptable.

**Comment 48**

**Comment by: Airbus Helicopters**

**Major comment**

In several proposed ETSOs, the wording quoted below is found in section 3.2.1

"There is no standard minimum failure condition classification for this ETSO. The failure condition classification appropriate for the equipment will depend on the intended use of the equipment in a specific aircraft. The loss of function and malfunction failure condition classification for which the equipment is designed shall be documented."

The concerned ETSOs are listed below:

- ETSO-C70b
- ETSO-C76b
- ETSO-C89a
- ETSO-C99a
- ETSO-C100c
- ETSO-C113a
- ETSO-C139a
• ETSO-C173a.

This calls the following comments:
• When an equipment supplier develops an off-the-shelf article, he does not know all installation situations. Especially, failures may be mitigated by redundant and possibly dissimilar installations. Therefore, sentence “The failure condition classification appropriate for the equipment will depend on the intended use of the equipment in a specific aircraft” is of no use,
• Failure condition classification belongs to the world of the installer. A more appropriate wording is expected to state that the supplier of the article shall provide information about the failure modes, their expected probability of occurrence and / or the design assurance level to which each function / item has been developed.

Recommendation
Recommendation is to replace the presently proposed wording by the following one:
“There is no standard minimum failure condition classification for this ETSO. The failure modes, their expected probability of occurrence and / or the design assurance level to which each function / item has been developed shall be documented for use by the installer.”

NOTE: The wording might need adaptation depending on the type of article (especially, “design assurance level” may not be valid for all types).

response
Partially accepted
It is recognised that the failure condition classification generally pertains to the installation on aircraft. Nevertheless, the objective of most ETSO equipment is to design articles without a specific installation being defined. They will become off-the-shelf equipment and will subsequently be installed on many different aircraft types. The ETSO article designer has therefore to define assumptions regarding the installation on aircraft and come up with failure condition classifications while specifying the equipment. These assumptions and related classifications are then used to define the Development Assurance Levels (FDAL/IDAL) and safety objectives commensurate with the classification as per the guidance addressed in CS-ETSO subpart A section 2.4. If failure conditions are not defined and classified, the equipment design falls short of this guidance, as no classification will be defined, except solution-based requirement such as defining FDAL/IDAL and failure rates ab initio. This is particularly ill-suited for complex equipment which mixes several DAL and/or channels, as well as for articles composed of several equipment (displays, autopilot, …). The Agency expects that installation requirements are listed in the article installation manual when meeting ETSO safety objectives require specific installation architecture (such as installation of redundant equipment).
It should be noted that these ETSO requirements are minimum requirements and that additional requirements may apply when installing the article in specific installation. Aside from this position, we recognise that the generic text present in section 3.2.1 of each ETSO can be replaced by a direct reference to the subpart A when no specific classification is provided.

comment 49

comment by: Airbus Helicopters

Several proposed ETSOs use in section 3.2.1 (Failure Condition Classification) the following wording:
“Failure of the function defined in paragraph [...] of this ETSO is a [...] failure condition.”

The concerned ETSOs are listed below:
- ETSO-C3e,
- ETSO-C5f,
- ETSO-C88b,
- ETSO-C112e,
- ETSO-C119d,
- ETSO-C126b (although distinction is made between malfunction and loss),
- ETSO-C151c (although distinction is made between several types of failures),
- ETSO-C166b (although distinction is made between malfunction and loss),
- ETSO-2C515.

This calls the following comments:
- “Failure of the function” is a generic term and does not take consideration of which types of failures (especially loss of function or malfunction and, in that case, type of malfunction).
- The failure classification concept applies to a function, not to an article, and may depend on the type of aircraft. Failure condition classification belongs to the world of installers. A more appropriate wording is expected in the world of equipment suppliers.
- Failures at equipment level may be mitigated by the architecture (especially redundant and possibly dissimilar installations).

Recommendation
The following is suggested:
- Make a clear distinction between loss of function and malfunction (and, where necessary, several types of malfunctions),
- Specify in terms of probability of occurrence of events (loss, malfunctions) and, when relevant, in terms of design assurance levels,
- Clearly indicate that the specified levels are minimum expectations and that the actual performances shall be documented for use by the installer.

response
Partially accepted
See the response to comment 48.
ETSO-C3e, ETSO-C5f, ETSO-C88b, ETSO-C112e, ETSO-C159b, ETSO-C166b, and ETSO-C119d have been modified to explicitly address the loss and erroneous aspects of the failure conditions.
Note that ETSO-C126b and ETSO-2C515 are not expected to exhibit erroneous behaviour. In the case of ETSO-C151c, the erroneous behaviour is already present in the NPA text.
Documenting the design assurance level is already addressed by the AMC to 21.A.608.

comment
50
comment by: Airbus Helicopters

<Major comment>

The following proposed ETSOs are referencing specific revisions of DO-160:
- ETSO-C76b referencing DO-160E (page 38),
- ETSO-C116a referencing DO-160F (page 99, 4 occurrences),
- ETSO-2C515 referencing DO-160G (page 249).
The current revision of DO-160/ED-14 is G. This revision is generally the one selected for new TC/STC.

Accepting previous revisions for newly developed ETSO articles may make it impracticable to install such articles in new aircrafts or aircraft changes without complementary environmental qualification testing and possibly changes in the design.

Moreover, as far as a specific paragraph has been set-up in CS-ETSO Subpart A, referring to this paragraph makes CS-ETSO more easily maintainable.

Recommendation
Recommendation is to refer to CS-ETSO Subpart A paragraph 2.1 for the applicable revision of DO-160/ED-14, instead of referencing specific revisions in individual ETSO specifications.

(see also comment #45)

response
Accepted.
The reference to dedicated revisions of DO-160/ED-14 is replaced in ETSO-C76b, -C116a, -2CS15 by a reference to CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

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comment

The LBA has no comments on NPA 2015-02.

response

Noted.

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comment

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on NPA 2015-02 'Systematic Review and Transposition of existing FAA TSO Standards for Parts and Appliances into EASA ETSOs'. Please be advised that there are no comments from the UK Civil Aviation Authority.

response

Noted.

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comment

Attachment #1

EASA Comment-Response Tool (CRT)
http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/

Zurich-Airport / May 23, 2015

Regarding: NPA 2015-02 Systematic review and transposition of existing FAA TSO standards for parts and appliances into EASA ETSOs

The C 167 is a US-TSO which does not yet exist within EASA (see draft NPA 2015-02). Any DO/PO can apply it and it is also quoted under the name of TSO C 167 in the EASA CM-CS-005.
The implementation of C 167 as an ETSO might be problematic: due to its many references to US organisations and authorities, C 167 cannot be transferred to the European area governed by EASA. PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) against fall, are simple PCDS, in conformity with the harmonised EN standards, have been used for decades in the fields of air and alpine rescue and occupational health and safety.

Every single day, members of technical crews, task specialists, HHOs, loadmasters and air and alpine rescuers use such PCDS for both onshore and offshore applications. The range of experience with these devices is multiple and extremely broad, so we don’t see any reason for an obsolete TSO, which is moreover clearly meant for the US, should be transferred to the European judicial area.

Often enough it happens that C 167-certified products, such as a securing belt for hoist operators, contradict anything we have learned in the past 10 years about ergonomics, current safety standards and state-of-the-art manufacturing. One of the reasons for this might be that it is the helicopter manufacturer (TC holder) who is dealing with issues beyond its core competencies.

Due to the above mentioned reasons, the implementation of TSO C 167 as an ETSO would represent a step backwards. In other words: the implementation of an ETSO C 167 would have no noticeable impact on safety.

Moreover, we wonder why should EASA accept the TSO C 167 and, even worse, why should the Agency be ready to implement it as an ETSO when the US is not prepared to acknowledge our EN standards?

This is protectionism. All complex PCDS (cages, baskets, rescue nets, fixed ropes for 3 or more individuals, etc.) must be certified in accordance with CS-27./29. and hence undergo the STC procedure.

Patrick Fauchère
President of the ICAR
Air Rescue Commission

Franz Stämpfli
ICAR President

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response
Accepted.
Based on the comments received, EASA recognises that the present practice for certification
of PCDS, provides an adequate level of safety and that the publication of ETSO-C167 would have any added value. As a consequence, EASA will not publish the proposed ETSO-C167.

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<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>SWISS takes note of the contents of NPA 2015-02 without further comment. Noted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>DGAC France has no specific comment on this NPA. Noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>General Comment covering ETSOs C3e/C5f/C88b/C112e/C119d/C126b/C151c/C159b/C166b A 2/2C515 ETSOs should not specify the failure condition classification of the function provided by the ETSO. Failure conditions and their effects on crew/aircraft are specific to aircraft and installations and therefore require a safety analysis to determine the classification. Suggest using text similar to that found in ETSO-C70b for Section 3.2.1 - Failure Condition Classification: “There is no standard minimum failure condition classification for this ETSO. The failure condition classification appropriate for the equipment will depend on the intended use of the equipment in a specific aircraft. The loss of function and malfunction failure condition classification for which the equipment is designed shall be documented.” Not accepted – See answer to comment 48.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>General Comment Suggest remaining consistent with references to RTCA documents. Some references appear as “RTCA/DO-XXX” and others as “RTCA DO-XXX.” Suggest keeping the forward slash as this is consistent with industry standard reference and the equivalent TSOs which reference these documents. Not accepted. ‘/’ is reserved for separation between the EUROCAE and RTCA documents.</td>
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2. Explanatory Note

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<th>Response</th>
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Multipurpose Electronic Displays can also be installed at the level of Remote Pilot Station (RPS) which, according to Article 3 of Basic Regulation, is itself a "parts" of the Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS). The Agency should envisage one or more ETSOs to cover said RPS station.

response
Noted.
Thank you for this recommendation for this rulemaking activity, EASA considers this CRD not being the appropriate means to question a new rulemaking activity.

comment
"Detect and Avoid" (DAA) is an essential part of a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS). According to ICAO Doc 10019 DAA can execute one or more functions. According to the "roadmap" delivered by the European RPAS Steering Group to the EC in June 2013, the Agency should publish two ETSOs for DAA, one covering the airborne part and one covering the ground part (functionality and environmental qualification criteria may well be different). When does the Agency intend to execute its task?

response
Noted.
Thank you for this recommendation for this rulemaking activity, EASA considers this CRD not being the appropriate means to question a new rulemaking activity.

comment
ETSO-C173a covers Nickel-Cadmium and Lead-Acid batteries. Experience so far has however demonstrated that, for electrically powered RPAS, one of the most critical parts is the Lithium-Polymer (LiPo) battery pack. Does the Agency plan to issue an ETSO for LiPo batteries as well?

response
Noted.
Thank you for this recommendation for this rulemaking activity, EASA considers this CRD not being the appropriate means to question a new rulemaking activity. There are standard development activities at RTCA.

comment
In page 10:
Typo, the ETSO-C116a should be based on the FAA TSO-C116a. The current wording refers to FAA TSO-116. The last version dated 30.7.2009 is the TSO-C116a.

response
Accepted.
Reference will be made to TSO-C116a instead of TSO-C116.

comment
The equivalent ETSO to FAA TSO-C203 Fire Containment Covers has not been listed in this NPA. FAA TSO-C203 was published in July 2014 as a part of an urgent need for FCCs to improve fire safety on board freighter aircraft (main deck – Class E) with the expectation for the equivalent ETSO to soon follow. A lot of airlines and freighter companies have shown great interest in the product and are particularly keen on the TSO/ETSO status of the product. Granted that published TSO/ETSOs don’t make a product mandatory, TSO/ETSOs
provide operators with the required endorsement from authorities that the product is
standardised and is considered important to the industry. This is especially important to
operators as confirmation that the TSO/ETSO approved product meets the minimum
performance required and the necessary evidence has been assessed by the regulatory
authorities. FCCs are a huge improvement to aircraft fire safety and a TSO/ETSO would do a
considerable amount to assert that.

response
Noted.
Proposed ETSO-C203 will be part of the next update of CS-ETSO.

comment 18
comment by: Airbus

Pages 7, 15, and 86-99:

Delete change of ETSO C-116 to C-116a

RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION:
TSO/ETSO C-116 is based on Aerospace Standard SAE AS 8047. The TSO C-116a has
introduced a number of changed and additional requirements. TSO C-116a has been
effective since 2009, but currently no TSO C-116a equipment is available. All approved
Protective Breathing Equipment are still only TSO C-116 certified and most of them will not
meet the new requirements. Consequently the requirement change will lead to additional
work for approval of deviations. It is not known how the new requirements will significantly
enhance the safety.

response
Not accepted.
See the response to comment 71.

comment 59
comment by: new European Helicopter Association (EHA)

The C 167 is a US-TSO which does not yet exist within EASA (see draft NPA 2015-02). Any
DO/PO can apply it and it is also quoted under the name of TSO C 167 in the EASA CM-CS-
005.

The implementation of C 167 as an ETSO might be problematic: due to its many references to
US organisations and authorities, C 167 cannot be transferred to the European area
governed by EASA. PPE Personal Protective Equipment) against fall, are simple PCDS, in
conformity with the harmonised EN standards, have been used for decades in the fields of air
and alpine rescue and occupational health and safety.

Every single day, members of technical crews, task specialists, HHOs, loadmasters and air and
alpine rescuers use such PCDS for both onshore and offshore applications. The range of
experience with these devices is multiple and extremely broad, so we don’t see any reason
for an obsolete TSO, which is moreover clearly meant for the US, should be transferred to
the European judicial area.

Often enough it happens that C 167-certified products, such as a securing belt for hoist
operators, contradict anything we have learned in the past 10 years about ergonomics,
current safety standards and state-of-the-art manufacturing. One of the reasons for this
might be that it is the helicopter manufacturer (TC holder) who is dealing with issues beyond
Due to the above mentioned reasons, the implementation of TSO C 167 as an ETSO would represent a step backwards. In other words: the implementation of an ETSO C 167 would have no noticeable impact on safety.

Moreover, we wonder why should EASA accept the TSO C 167 and, even worse, why should the Agency be ready to implement it as an ETSO when the US is not prepared to acknowledge our EN standards?

This is protectionism. All complex PCDS (cages, baskets, rescue nets, fixed ropes for 3 or more individuals, etc.) must be certified in accordance with CS-27./29. and hence undergo the STC procedure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>response</th>
<th>Accepted. See the response to comment 68.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>comment</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comment by:</td>
<td>CAA CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 (RIA)</td>
<td>Option 1 is probably the most acceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response</td>
<td>Noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comment</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comment by:</td>
<td>CAA CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 (Overview)</td>
<td>The document does not clearly define the answer to the following fundamental question, which is: Is it true that in case of harmonized TSO-ETSO it will not be necessary to perform Equipment Qualification for TSO, although regulation Part-21, point 21.A.303 b) refers to ETSO only?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response</td>
<td>Noted. With Revision 5 of the Technical Implementation Procedures (TIP) of the EU/US bilateral agreement a reciprocal acceptance for ETSO/TSO articles was introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comment</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comment by:</td>
<td>CAA CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 (Objectives)</td>
<td>ETSO and TSO harmonization and validation is good way in reduction of certification costs. But instead of proposed rising safety and saving certification costs some „new“ E/TSO contain links to paid SAE documents („old“ TSO references in our specialization was oriented to MIL standards or other public accessible documents). This may lead to practical falling of safety (practical using of unamended and/or unofficial copies) and cultureless environment. Safety requirements addressed in E/TSO requirements should be accessible and should be open-source. CAA CZ has access to SAE documents – but only limited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| response | Noted. Neither EASA nor FAA have the resources to write and coordinate technical standards. Therefore, EASA and FAA do task recognised standardisation bodies (SAE, EUROCAE, RTCA,
Dear Sirs,

we have reviewed the a.m. NPA and with respect to the planned adaptation of TSO-C116a we would like to state the following:

Generally, B/E Aerospace Systems supports the harmonisation of regulations between EASA and the FAA; nevertheless, the regulations adapted must be mature and consistent in itself and must promote the increase in safety and reliability of the equipment described within.

TSO-C116a in general adapts SAE Standard AS 8047, Performance Standard for Cabin Crew Portable Protective Breathing Equipment for Use During Aircraft Emergencies, but includes multiple FAA modifications or add-ons.

Per se this proceeding deviates from the common practice of using available SAE standards to define minimum performance standards as a part of technical standard orders. SAE standards are prepared by the SAE A10 committee, which is a group of representatives of the aviation industry and includes authorities and user representatives. SAE standards represent state of the art and accordingly may be used as reference documents without further modifications.

The actual TSO-C116a has been reviewed against ETSO-C116 and a comparison including full AS 8047 has been established (see attachment ‘Comparison of Minimum Performance Standards of ETSO-C116 and TSO-C116a’, dated 27.05.15).

As major key points to disapprove the adaptation of TSO-C116a we identified the following FAA add ons

§ 2.1 Applicable Documents
Reference to OEM specific documents, here Airbus ATS 1000.001 (which also not valid anymore). Authority documents should not refer to OEM documents, unless they are de facto industry standards and publicly available.

§ 3.1.4 (FAA modified)
Failure of the unit to operate or to cease operation must be apparent to the user. This must be accomplished with aural and/or visual warning that also must activate at gas supply exhaustion.

Enforcement of this requirement would exclude specific established design solutions from use; for example, PBE’s with oxygen generated by potassium superoxide (KO₂). This chemical is extremely sensitive to humidity and accordingly must be packed in a manner to prevent ingress of humidity (here a vacuum packaging).
A potential realisation of an optical and acoustical warning could be the use of an LED flashlight and a buzzer driven by a battery. Besides the fact that additional electronic components already would have an impact on the overall reliability of the entire equipment, vacuum packaging of batteries is a controversial approach. Furthermore, the use of batteries on board of aircraft has been identified as a critical item and it should not be mandated by a minimum performance standard without an essential need.

Typically, the useful life of PBE’s is 10 years without scheduled maintenance, except for visual inspection. Equipment on the market in various configurations is in service since the end of the 1980’s and has shown its reliability during storage, as well as operation, over the years to date.

Accordingly, the inclusion of new design features is not considered to promote the increase of safety of passenger, crew or aircraft and should not be adapted.

§ 3.2.1 (FAA modified)
Average inspiratory limits must be within the following:
Detailing an average also must include a time or other basis for the average. Without this the requirement is ambiguous and of limited value.

§ 6.3 Environmental Qualification
(FAA added)
The environmental requirements have been formulated in more detail by the FAA, which is generally to be welcomed, but some of the temperature tests seem to follow OEM specific scenarios and not the requirements as detailed in RTCA DO-160.
The test scenarios should be harmonised with RTCA DO-160.

FAR 25.1439 Protective breathing equipment
FAR 25.1441 Oxygen equipment and supply.
FAR 121,337 Protective breathing equipment
Reference to aircraft certification requirements within a ETSO/TSO is quite unusual. The requirements listed include installation and operation requirements, which should not be part of a minimum performance standard.

Typically, the use of ETSO / TSO approved equipment is used as means of compliance to demonstrate compliance with certification requirements. Accordingly including these already in the ETSO/TSO would lead to an infinite loop. Accordingly these references must be deleted.

Based on the rationale above, B/E Aerospace Systems does not consider that this adaptation of TSO-C116a to ETSO-C116a is mature enough to promote increase of safety of passenger, crew or aircraft.
Accordingly, we request EASA not to adapt TSO-C116a to ETSO-C116a before the presented concerns have been addressed.

B/E Aerospace Systems GmbH
Sönke Semmelhaack
Director of Engineering

B/E Aerospace Systems GmbH
Harald Friedrichs
Office of Airworthiness

response
Not accepted.
The comment goes beyond the intent of NPA 2015-02 which aims at harmonising the FAA and EASA regulations. The content of both TSO C116a and ETSO C116a may have to be revised in the future, on the initiative of an appropriate working group, but this is not the subject of the NPA 2015-02.
3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Certification Specifications (Draft EASA Decision),
SUBPART B — LIST OF ETSOs (INDEX 1 AND INDEX 2) — INDEX 1

comment 11 comment by: AmSafe Bridport

The equivalent ETSO to FAA TSO-C203 Fire Containment Covers has not been listed in this NPA. FAA TSO-C203 was published in July 2014 as a part of an urgent need for FCCs to improve fire safety on board freighter aircraft (main deck – Class E) with the expectation for the equivalent ETSO to soon follow. A lot of airlines and freighter companies have shown great interest in the product and are particularly keen on the TSO/ETSO status of the product. Granted that published TSO/ETSOs don’t make a product mandatory, TSO/ETSOs provide operators with the required endorsement from authorities that the product is standardised and is considered important to the industry. This is especially important to operators as confirmation that the TSO/ETSO approved product meets the minimum performance required and the necessary evidence has been assessed by the regulatory authorities. FCCs are a huge improvement to aircraft fire safety and a TSO/ETSO would do a considerable amount to assert that.

response Noted.
See the response to comment 12

comment 18 comment by: Airbus

Pages 7, 15, and 86-99:

Delete change of ETSO C-116 to C-116a

RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION:
TSO/ETSO C-116 is based on Aerospace Standard SAE AS 8047. The TSO C-116a has introduced a number of changed and additional requirements. TSO C-116a has been effective since 2009, but currently no TSO C-116a equipment is available. All approved Protective Breathing Equipment are still only TSO C-116 certified and most of them will not meet the new requirements. Consequently the requirement change will lead to additional work for approval of deviations. It is not known how the new requirements will significantly enhance the safety.

response Not accepted.
See the response to comment 71.

comment 43 comment by: THALES AVIONICS

Several FAA TSOs have evolved after the start of this rulemaking task (June 2013) which resulted in this NPA. therefore it would be desirable to address in the short term transposition of the following FAA TSOs in EASA ETSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TSO-C1e</th>
<th>Cargo Compartment Fire Detection Instruments</th>
<th>08/19/2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TSO-C123c</td>
<td>Cockpit Voice Recorder Equipment</td>
<td>12/19/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSO-</td>
<td>Flight Data Recorder Systems</td>
<td>12/19/2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
response

Partially accepted.
The mentioned ETSO standards are considered with the next amendment of CS-ETSO.

comment 46

The following ETSOs correspond to obsolete equipment:
- ETSO-C65a, Airborne Doppler Radar Ground Speed and/or Drift Angle Measuring Equipment (for Air Carrier Aircraft)
- ETSO-C68a, Airborne Automatic Dead Reckoning Computer Equipment Utilizing Aircraft Heading and Doppler Ground Speed and Drift Angle Data (for Air Carrier Aircraft)

The corresponding FAA TSOs have been cancelled, as being obsolete (see Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 171 / Tuesday, September 4, 2012).
Recommendation
Cancel ETSO-C65a and ETSO-C68a.

response
Noted.
Based on the cancellation of the FAA TSOS, EASA may consider cancelling these ETSOs for the next amendment of CS-ETSO.

4. Individual comments (and responses)

47 comment by: Airbus Helicopters

<Major comment>
Whereas regulation 748/2012 ("Part 21") makes a specific case of ETSO authorisations for APU, CS-ETSO is missing an ETSO for APU.

Recommendation
Transpose FAA TSO-C77b (Gas Turbine Auxiliary Power Units)

response
Not accepted
The EASA requirements for APU are laid down in CS-APU. Due to this difference in regulatory structure, the Agency will not transpose FAA TSO-C77b.


15 comment by: Airbus

The TSO refers to AS 8027 with a number of changes as stated in Appendix 1 (Minimum Performance Standard). EASA and FAA should initiate at SAE changes of the AS based on MPS, as the involved SAE A-10 Committee may be not aware about necessary revision of the document.

Lack of harmonization and communication in particular between EASA, FAA and SAE complicates equipment qualification and lead to confusion.

response
Not accepted
SAE A-10 Committee is an industry body providing technical standards for equipment qualification. Generally the FAA and EASA are involved in the creation of the standards but not all comments from the regulatory bodies are considered by the SAE Committee. Therefore, it is sometimes considered necessary to delete or modify requirements from the SAE standards.

16 comment by: Airbus

SI units, which are internationally agreed, should be used.

response
Noted.

4. Individual comments (and responses)

comment 20  comment by: Airbus
The TSO refers to AS 8031A with a number of changes as stated in Appendix 1 (Minimum Performance Standard). EASA and FAA should initiate at SAE changes of the AS based on MPS, as the involved SAE A-10 Committee may be not aware about necessary revision of the document.

Lack of harmonization and communication in particular between EASA, FAA and SAE complicates equipment qualification and lead to confusion.

response
Not accepted
Refer to the response to comment No. 15

MPS FOR FLIGHT DECK (SEDENTARY) CREWMEMBER PROTECTIVE BREATHING EQUIPMENT

comment 10  comment by: Christophe BESSET INTERTECHNIQUE
Page 59

Last line of the matrix, the proposed revision of the §10.1 of the AS8031A mentions that "The microphone must meet the requirements of ETSO-C139"

- We should add: "or any further revision". Indeed the ETSO-C139a is part of this present NPA
- We should add: "or any microphone already mounted into an already approved crewmember protective breathing equipment". On legacy aircraft, A/C manufacturers and operators would like to replace their old PBE by a new one ETSO-C99a agreed, without changing the type of microphone: the original microphone fitting well with the legacy A/C communication system. In addition, the DO-214a (Tech. spec of the ETSO-C139a) is based on one type of communication circuit (the one used on Boeing and Airbus AMU), which is very different from the communication circuit used onto Falcon or Gulfstream legacy A/C: a ETSO-C139a microphone could not operate properly.

response
Partially accepted
The remarks are relevant. The retained wording is ‘The microphone must be approved or meet the requirements of ETSO-C139a or later’.

comment 52  comment by: Airbus Helicopters
The proposed text revising AS8031A section 10.1 refers to a microphone meeting the requirements of ETSO-C139.
As a matter of fact, the present NPA also amends ETSO-C139 to ETSO-C139a, superseding ETSO-C139 (see paragraph 1 of ETSO-C139a).

Recommendation
Recommendation is to reference ETSO-C139a instead of ETSO-C139.

**Response**

Partially accepted. Refer to the response to comment No. 10.


**Comment 69**

**Comment by: EUROCONTROL**

ETSOC112e - Page 77

EUROCONTROL makes a supportive comment:

The proposed ETSO-c112e text is in line with what exists in the original TSO-c112e and with the proposed modifications to ICAO Annex 10 - Volume 4 concerning the management of the Comm-B broadcast in order to avoid problems with ACID in Europe. This change is therefore fully supported by EUROCONTROL as it ensures good operation of ELS in Europe.

EUROCONTROL raises a question followed by a recommendation:

FAA TSO-c112e explicitly indicates that the Overlay Command Capability described in the transponder MOPS is mandatory for Level 2 transponders. Is this function still mandatory according to ETSO-c112e and ED73-E? EUROCONTROL recommends to ensure that there is no confusion here since this function is required to cope with the Transponder Register swap (Comm-B Data Selector (BDS) swap) that is happening in Europe.

**Response**

Accepted. A note has been added to clarify this issue.


**Comment 4**

**Comment by: Jeffrey GREESON**

Appendix 1, first paragraph under Note 2, 2nd sentence: Is "...by transmitting RR=16 with DI3 or 7...". There should be a not equals sign between the DI and the 3.

**Response**

Accepted. The ETSO has been updated accordingly.

**Comment 5**

**Comment by: Jeffrey GREESON**

On page 80, 5.5.8.23.1, a(3): If the intention is to match the DO-181E text for this item (I do not have access to ED-73), the phrase "for all integrators" should be added to the end of the last sentence.
response Not accepted.
It is recognised that requirements are sometimes phrased differently between DO-181E and ED-73E. However, it is not the intent of the transposition of the FAA TSO to address all these differences. The text introduced in ETSO-C112e regarding section 5.5.8.23.1 is unchanged from the ED-73E, except for adding the reference of the procedure to keep a consistent document.

3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Certification Specifications (Draft EASA Decision) — ETSO-C113a 'Airborne Multipurpose Electronic Displays'

comment 75

ETS0-C113a
Section 3.1.1
Page 84

Suggest removing the following requirement:

“To be eligible to this ETS0 standard, the equipment shall at least contain a Display Unit providing the visualisation function.”

SAE AS 8034B allows for non-display units which would be specifically excluded from ETS0-C113a (from SAE AS 8034B section 1 Scope):

“Electronic Displays can include one or more of the following interconnected components. Other configurations are possible.

• Symbol Generator/Processor Unit (SG) containing display processing and symbol generation processing and symbol generation capability, power supplies, interface logic/buffer circuits and Display Unit interface capability. The SG receives data from external sources, produces symbols as electronic signals, and transmits the symbols to the Display Units(s).”

It is not clear what ETS0 would be claimed for a Symbol Generator/Processor Unit as defined in SAE AS 8034B if they are specifically excluded from ETS0-C113a applicability.

Additionally, it appears that this ETS0 is not functionally equivalent to FAA TSO-C113a with this exclusion statement and would need to be placed in the Index 2 as ETS0-2C113a.

response Partially accepted
It is recognised that AS 8034B section 1 specifically includes the Symbol Generators. However, the standard AS 8034B does not provide requirements permitting to assess the minimum performance of such equipment. The ETSO-C113a is referring to 'Airborne Multipurpose Electronic Displays'. As such ETSO-C113a is applicable for equipment presenting a Display function, and it is accepted that AS 8034B describes the requirements for a display function. Hence, EASA excluded the equipment being only symbol generators/processing unit to correspond to the scope of ETSO-C113a.

There are no difference in technical requirements for TSO-C113a, therefore the ETS0 is maintained as ETS0-C113a. The comment is related on the applicability and the applicability
3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Certification Specifications (Draft EASA Decision) — ETSO-C113a 'Airborne Multipurpose Electronic Displays' — Appendix 1: Colour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Comment by:</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jeffrey GREESON</td>
<td>In Table A1, there is a &quot;Note 1&quot; listed next to Amber/Yellow for the third item. Instead the &quot;Note 1&quot; should be listed next to &quot;Red&quot; for the second item.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accepted. The text has been modified accordingly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>THALES AVIONICS</td>
<td>TSO-C113A is refering to AS8034B in which it is stated that Head Up Displays are out of scope, and that minimum performance standards for Head Up Displays are provided in AS8055. Since there are no specific TSO / ETSO to address Head Up Displays on the basis of AS8055, it is a pity that Head Up Displays are excluded of C113A conversely to C113.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Noted. EASA will consider the industry request for Head-Up Display.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 41      | THALES AVIONICS | ETSO C113a Appendix 1 is not equivalent for the "color" item as a result of an improper copy & paste from TSO C113A. As a result :
- Reference to Note 1 should be corrected in table A1 : Flight Enveloppe and system limits could be red colour-coded but also Amber/Yellow colour coded as defined in TSO C113a.
- Note 1 reference should also be removed for Scales and associated figures colour coding. |
|         |             | Accepted. See the response to comment 6. |
| 77      | Garmin International | ETSO-C113a Table A1 Page 85 Suggest consistency with TSO-C113. In ETSO-C113a Appendix A, Table A1, row “Cautions, non-normal sources” The “Note 1” superscript should be in the row above, the “Flight envelope and system limits”. This note should be moved up in order to be consistent with the TSO. |
|         |             | Accepted. See the response to comment 6. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
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| 17 | The TSO refers to AS 8047 with a number of changes as stated in Appendix 1 (Minimum Performance Standard). EASA and FAA should initiate at SAE changes of the AS based on MPS, as the involved SAE A-10 Committee may be not aware about necessary revision of the document. 
Lack of harmonization and communication in particular between EASA, FAA and SAE complicates equipment qualification and lead to confusion. | Not accepted. See the response to comment 15. |
| 18 | Pages 7, 15, and 86-99: Delete change of ETSO C-116 to C-116a 
RATIONALE / REASON / JUSTIFICATION: TSO/ETSO C-116 is based on Aerospace Standard SAE AS 8047. The TSO C-116a has introduced a number of changed and additional requirements. TSO C-116a has been effective since 2009, but currently no TSO C-116a equipment is available. All approved Protective Breathing Equipment are still only TSO C-116 certified and most of them will not meet the new requirements. Consequently the requirement change will lead to additional work for approval of deviations. It is not known how the new requirements will significantly enhance the safety. | Not accepted. See the response to comment 71. |
| 72 | Attachment #3 Ref. NPA 2015-02 Systematic review and transposition of existing FAA TSO standards for parts and appliances into EASA ETSOs, here ETSO-C116 Dear Sirs, 
we have reviewed the a.m. NPA and with respect to the planned adaptation of TSO-C116a we would like to state the following: 
Generally, B/E Aerospace Systems supports the harmonisation of regulations between EASA and the FAA; nevertheless, the regulations adapted must be mature and consistent in itself and must promote the increase in safety and reliability of the equipment described within. TSO-C116a in general adapts SAE Standard AS 8047, Performance Standard for Cabin Crew |
Portable Protective Breathing Equipment for Use During Aircraft Emergencies, but includes multiple FAA modifications or add-ons.

Per se this proceeding deviates from the common practice of using available SAE standards to define minimum performance standards as a part of technical standard orders. SAE standards are prepared by the SAE A10 committee, which is a group of representatives of the aviation industry and includes authorities and user representatives. SAE standards represent state of the art and accordingly may be used as reference documents without further modifications.

The actual TSO-C116a has been reviewed against ETSO-C116 and a comparison including full AS 8047 has been established (see attachment ‘Comparison of Minimum Performance Standards of ETSO-C116 and TSO-C116a’, dated 27.05.15).

As major key points to disapprove the adaptation of TSO-C116a we identified the following FAA add-ons

§ 2.1 Applicable Documents

Reference to OEM specific documents, here Airbus ATS 1000.001 (which also not valid anymore). Authority documents should not refer to OEM documents, unless they are de facto industry standards and publicly available.

§ 3.1.4 (FAA modified)

Failure of the unit to operate or to cease operation must be apparent to the user. This must be accomplished with aural and/or visual warning that also must activate at gas supply exhaustion.

Enforcement of this requirement would exclude specific established design solutions from use; for example, PBE’s with oxygen generated by potassium superoxide (K\textsubscript{2}O\textsubscript{2}). This chemical is extremely sensitive to humidity and accordingly must be packed in a manner to prevent ingress of humidity (here a vacuum packaging).

A potential realisation of an optical and acoustical warning could be the use of an LED flashlight and a buzzer driven by a battery. Besides the fact that additional electronic components already would have an impact on the overall reliability of the entire equipment, vacuum packaging of batteries is a controversial approach.

Furthermore, the use of batteries on board of aircraft has been identified as a critical item and it should not be mandated by a minimum performance standard without an essential need.

Typically, the useful life of PBE’s is 10 years without scheduled maintenance, except for visual inspection. Equipment on the market in various configurations is in service since the end of the 1980’s and has shown its reliability during storage, as well as operation, over the years to date.

Accordingly, the inclusion of new design features is not considered to promote the increase of safety of passenger, crew or aircraft and should not be adapted.

§ 3.2.1 (FAA modified)

Average inspiratory limits must be within the following:

Detailing an average also must include a time or other basis for the average. Without this the requirement is ambiguous and of limited value.

§ 6.3 Environmental Qualification

(FAA added)

The environmental requirements have been formulated in more detail by the FAA, which is generally to be welcomed, but some of the temperature tests seem to follow OEM specific scenarios and not the requirements as detailed in RTCA DO-160.
The test scenarios should be harmonised with RTCA DO-160.
FAR 25.1439 Protective breathing equipment
FAR 25.1441 Oxygen equipment and supply.
FAR 121,337 Protective breathing equipment

Reference to aircraft certification requirements within a ETSO/TSO is quite unusual. The requirements listed include installation and operation requirements, which should not be part of a minimum performance standard.

Typically, the use of ETSO / TSO approved equipment is used as means of compliance to demonstrate compliance with certification requirements. Accordingly including these already in the ETSO/TSO would lead to an infinite loop.

Accordingly these references must be deleted.

Based on the rationale above, B/E Aerospace Systems does not consider that this adaptation of TSO-C116a to ETSO-C116a is mature enough to promote increase of safety of passenger, crew or aircraft.

Accordingly, we request EASA not to adapt TSO-C116a to ETSO-C116a before the presented concerns have been addressed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B/E Aerospace Systems GmbH</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sönke Semmelhaack</td>
<td>Harald Friedrichs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Engineering</td>
<td>Office of Airworthiness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**response**

Not accepted.
See the response to comment 71.


**comment** 19 **comment by: Airbus**

**Page 94 ETSO C116 Paragraph 3.1.4:**

The requirement for a visual or aural warning to the user in case of PBE failure shall be deleted.

Currently, there is no redundancy for a PBE required (the combination of a fire event and a PBE failure is already a double failure). Consequently there is no procedure for the case of a PBE failure and such warning is not necessary. A warning without a procedure complicates the equipment, leads to due to potential wrong warnings to delays and does not improve the safety. Currently available PBEs do not meet this requirement and no unsafe situation has been reported.

Implementation of a reasonable visual/aural warning significantly complicates the equipment design and introduces additional fire risk. The implementation of batteries and electrical circuit for such function is a potential ignition source.

comment 7

3.1.1, 2nd paragraph: The latest TSO-C119d requires that Hybrid Surveillance be implemented, it is no longer optional.

response

Not accepted.
See the response to comment 71.

comment 53

§ 3.2.1:
“Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is a hazardous failure condition.”

In line with comment #49, such a specification does not give any precision concerning the unexpected events and does not take any consideration from the architecture (contributions from each item of the functional chain, including position sensors, possible redundant equipment ...).

“Hazardous failure condition” may lead to over-dimensional article, depending on what is considered (ACAS equipment only or complete functional chain), especially if architecture is simplex.

Recommendation
It should be clarified that quantitative safety results at equipment level shall not take credit from intruder probability which is to be considered by the aircraft manufacturer.

response

Partially accepted.
See the response to comment 49.

comment 78

ETSO-C119d
Section 3.1.1
Page 100

ETSO-C119d, Section 3.1.1 states:
“The optional functionality set forth in EUROCAE Document ED-221, Minimum Performance Standards for Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) Hybrid Surveillance, dated 2006 April 2013, Sections 2 and 3, as modified by Appendix 2 to this ETSO may be included.”

response

Not accepted.
See the response to comment 71.
This is inconsistent with FAA TSO-C119d that states that new models “...must meet the MPS qualifications and documentation requirements in these RTCA, Inc. documents: RTCA/DO-185B, ... and RTCA/DO-300A, ...” (emphasis added).

The quoted TSO-C119d text makes it clear that both the requirements of RTCA/DO-185B and the requirements of RTCA/DO-300A are expected to be met in order to obtain TSO-C119d.

In order to maintain a harmonized ETSO-C119d / TSO-C119d, suggest changing ETSO-C119d to require EUROCAE Document ED-221, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) Hybrid Surveillance, dated April 2013, Sections 2 and 3, as modified by Appendix 2.

Otherwise, suggest that ETSO-C119d should be published as ETSO-2C119d.

**response**

Accepted.
See the response to comment 7.

---

### 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Certification Specifications (Draft EASA Decision) — ETSO-C127b 'ROTORCRAFT, TRANSPORT AEROPLANE, AND SMALL AEROPLANE SEATING SYSTEMS'

**comment**

23

Page:118 of 254
Paragraph: n/a

**CONCERN:** Guidance on end-user data package content is not provided.

**REQUESTED CHANGE:** We recommend that a paragraph similar to TSO-C127b, Section 7, be included.

**JUSTIFICATION:** Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b.

Paragraph 5-7 of the FAA TSO defines the content of data package that must be submitted to regulators and the article end-user.

Of interest to the installer is the data package, known as “Furnished Data,” that the TSO holder should be obligated to provide. Inclusion of this requirement will eliminate unnecessary communication and coordination between the installer and ETSO holder.

**response**

Noted.
Part 21, subpart O does specify the type of documents to be provided to EASA for receiving an ETSO authorisation.
However, future changes to Part 21 will mandate for ETSO applications a dedicated certification plan in which all required documents will have to be agreed between the applicant and EASA. Guidance material will also be published to specify the content of the certification plan.

comment 21

On 20 March 2015 the SAE published draft AS8049C Performance Standard for Seats in Civil Rotorcraft, Transport Aircraft, and General Aviation Aircraft for ballot. This draft AS8049C contains the following wording:

Magnesium alloys may be used in aircraft seat construction provided they are tested to and meet the flammability performance requirements in the FAA Fire Safety Branch document: Aircraft Materials Fire Test Handbook – DOT/FAA/AR-00/12, Chapter 25, Oil Burner Flammability Test for Magnesium Alloy Seat Structure.

The draft ETSO-C127b that is here under discussion contains the following wording:

Magnesium alloys shall not be used unless they are tested to and meet the flammability performance requirements in the FAA Fire Safety Branch document: Aircraft Materials Fire Test Handbook – DOT/FAA/AR-00/12 or equivalent.

The intend to both is assumed to be equivalent. Consequently it is recommended that EASA follows the letters choosen during the SAE consultations after it will have been finally published.

response Not accepted. However, ETSO C-127 be will be revised to align it with the FAA TSO –C127.

comment 24

Page:124 of 254
Paragraph: 3.2.18

The proposed text states:

“3.2.18 Design seat stowage compartments to prevent the contents becoming a hazard by shifting under the load conditions identified in Table 4 and subsection 5.3.1. Specify the maximum weight of the contents allowed in each stowage compartment.”

REQUESTED CHANGE: Revise the text as follows:

“3.2.18 Design seat stowage compartments to prevent the contents becoming a hazard by shifting under the load conditions identified in Table 4 and subsection 5.3.1. Specify the maximum weight of the contents allowed in each stowage compartment and report it in the document containing installation instructions and limitations.”

JUSTIFICATION: Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b.

response Noted. See the response to comment 23.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Page of 254</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>comment 25</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>Note (2) in Table 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proposed text states:</td>
<td></td>
<td>“(2) Elective: ... Document the increased load factors. They must also be marked on the ETSO placard (see Appendix 2).”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REQUESTED CHANGE:</td>
<td>Revise this text as follows:</td>
<td>“(2) Elective: ... Document the increased load factors and report it in the document containing installation instructions and limitations. They must also be marked on the ETSO placard (see Appendix 2).”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSTIFICATION:</td>
<td>Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response</td>
<td>Noted.</td>
<td>See the response to comment 23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comment 26</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Subsection 5.1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proposed text states:</td>
<td></td>
<td>“NOTE: ... However, the retention of items of mass for the side, up and aft static conditions must still be demonstrated.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REQUESTED CHANGE:</td>
<td>We recommend removing up loads from this requirement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSTIFICATION:</td>
<td>Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response</td>
<td>Not accepted.</td>
<td>The Agency believes that the requirement should remain as is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comment 27</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Subsection 5.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proposed text states:</td>
<td></td>
<td>“NOTE: ... However, the retention of items of mass for the side, up and aft static conditions must still be demonstrated.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REQUESTED CHANGE:</td>
<td>We recommend removing up loads from this requirement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSTIFICATION:</td>
<td>Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response</td>
<td>Not accepted.</td>
<td>See the response to comment 26.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comment</td>
<td>comment by: Boeing</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 28 | Page: 133 of 254  
Paragraph: Subsection 5.3.9.9  
**The proposed text states:**  
1<sup>st</sup> paragraph, last sentence:  
“5.3.9.9 Femur Load (Type A Seats): ... However, appropriate limitations must be documented.”  
2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph, last sentence:  
“... However, the rational analysis must show that the testing applies to the seat design, and must include appropriate limitations which must be documented.”  
**REQUESTED CHANGE:** We recommend the following text be added to the end of each of those sentences:  
… “and report it in the document containing installation instructions and limitations.”  
**JUSTIFICATION:** Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b.  
**response** | Noted.  
See the response to comment 23. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>comment</th>
<th>comment by: Boeing</th>
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</table>
| 29 | Page: 134 of 254  
Paragraph: 5.3.10.1.1.f.  
**CONCERN:** The text of paragraph 5.3.10.1.1.f of AS8049B is crossed out in the NPA (i.e., proposed deletion of it).  
**REQUESTED CHANGE:** We recommend re-instating that paragraph.  
**JUSTIFICATION:** Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b.  
If the rationale for removing that paragraph is that all deviations are addressed by a separate document (EU 748/2012), then a supplementary note referencing the document should be added here.  
**response** | Not accepted.  
The requirements of Part 21, subpart O describe the general process how deviations have to be addressed. Consequently all deviation related requirements are removed from industry standards and individual ETSOs. |

### Comment 30

**Comment by:** Boeing  
**Page:** 141 of 254  
**Paragraph:** Appendix 2

**Concern:** Reporting of meeting the elective MPS in Furnished Data is missing from the proposed text.

**Requested Change:** We recommend adding the following to this section:

> "List the specific elective MPS complied with under this appendix in the document package supplied to the user (operator or repair station) of the article."

**Justification:** Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b.

This will be in line with Paragraph 5.a of TSO-C127b, which is a required documentation for the end-user of the article (as noted in paragraph 7, Furnished Data).

**Response:** Noted.  
See the response to comment 23.

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### Comment 31

**Comment by:** Boeing  
**Page:** 141 of 254  
**Paragraph:** Appendix 2, paragraph e.

**Concern:** We note that the reporting of parts meeting CS 25, Appendix F, parts IV and V, in Furnished Data is missing.

**Requested Change:** We recommend adding the following text to this paragraph:

> "Report which parts meet the requirements of CS 25 Appendix F parts IV and V in the document package supplied to the user (operator or repair station) of the article."

**Justification:** Harmonization with FAA TSO-C127b.

**Response:** Noted.  
See the response to comment 23.

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### 3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Certification Specifications (Draft EASA Decision) — ETSO-C151c ‘Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)’

**Comment 8**

**Comment by:** Jeffrey GREESON  
**Paragraph:** 3.1.1: TSO-C151c has an additional phrase "This equipment is intended for fixed-wing aircraft only." added at the end of the paragraph.

**Response:** Accepted.  
The proposed sentence has been added.
3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Certification Specifications (Draft EASA Decision) — ETSO-C166bA2 'EXTENDED SQUITTER AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE-BROADCAST (ADS-B) AND TRAFFIC INFORMATION SERVICES-BROADCAST (TIS-B) EQUIPMENT OPERATING ON THE RADIO FREQUENCY OF 1090 MEGAHERTZ (MHz)'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>54</th>
<th>Comment by: Airbus Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Major comment&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

§ 3.2.1
"Note: The major failure condition for transmission of incorrect ADS-B messages is based on use of the data by other aircraft or Air Traffic Control for separation services."

The note does not bring any added value to an equipment supplier, who is not supposed to know what will be the future usage of the article by ATC. The expected integrity level should be in line with SPI regulation (1207/2012) and CS-ACNS.

Recommendation
Remove the note and precise the data on which a “Major” integrity level is expected, consistently with CS ACNS.D.ADSB.100 (or, alternatively, reference CS ACNS.D.ADSB.100).

Response
Partially accepted
See answer to comment 49
The note is maintained as the failure condition classification is not derived from an aircraft safety assessment (which could result in different implementations depending on the class of aircraft), but on airspace constraint.

3. Proposed amendments — 3.1. Draft Certification Specifications (Draft EASA Decision) — ETSO-C167 'Personnel Carrying Device Systems (PCDS), also known as Human Harnesses'  

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<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>55</th>
<th>Comment by: Airbus Helicopters</th>
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</thead>
</table>

TSO-C167, “Personnel Carrying Device Systems (PCDS), also known as Human Harnesses”, does not correspond to the types of harnesses typically used for human external cargo. It is only related to a type of harness manufactured by a unique US supplier, typically for military usage. Consequently, there is no need to create ETSO-C167.

Also notice that the text should not be simply transposed, as it contains mistakes (e.g. 0.22 kN and 5 lbs are not equivalent).

Recommendation
Recommendation is not to create ETSO-C167.

Response
Accepted.
Refer to the response to comment 68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>Comment by: KONG ITALY PCDS Manufacturer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This ETSO-C167 provides requirements very similar to the ones of the TSO-C167 and both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
refer to two other requirements, the NFPA 1983 and the SAE AS 8043.

The recent CM-CS-005 dated 01.12.2014 on Personnel Carrying Device Systems provides today guidelines on how to deal with SIMPLEX and Complex Design Systems and suggest mainly the compliance with a series of EN Standards currently utilized by the most part of the PCDS manufacturers.

The Italian Company KONG SPA suggests to transform these guidelines materials into requirements, maintaining the same indications and, may be, introducing some specific test coming from the Appendices of TSO C167 (most of them are already required by the EN Standards).

The main reasons to support this proposal are:

- Define an ETSO in accordance with the qualification/certification processes utilized in the past and currently in use by the most part of the PCDS's manufacturers in the countries associated in the EASA.
- Use as requirements, the EN Standards more appropriate for European countries, avoiding references to american requirements (in any case requesting almost the same type of compliances).
- Minimize the costs of qualification/certification for obtaining an ETSO by PCDS's manufactures which have often small businesses and revenues due to the low number of components annually produced.

response

Accepted.

Refer to the response to comment 68.


comment 14

comment by: ecms Aviation Systems

It seems strange that EASA considers adopting this TSO just after opening a new path to CPDS approval with CM-CS-005.

The TSO refers to NFPA1983 regulations as only accepted way to approve a PCDS for helicopter applications. This is a standard derived from US American firefighting equipment and is not in common use in Europe. Europe has a well-defined, efficient and comprehensive set of PCDS standards for harnesses, connecting elements etc., which may be introduced to helicopter aviation by application of the certification memo CM-CS-005.

- A brief market survey in Europe has lead to the opinion that few (if none) of the major European PCDS manufacturers have a suitable portfolio of PCDS approved to the NFPA1983 standard required within the TSO. Most of them don’t have ANY products in this sector.

- In order to be allowed to manufacture harnesses approved in accordance with this standard, the manufacturer requires approval and must be regularly audited by an NFPA
representative. In other words: basing an ETSO on this and using this in Europe would mean that the manufacturer requires auditing by an American agency, even if the equipment is used in a European helicopter within the EASA domain. We have serious doubts that being answerable to an US based entity is legally reconcilable with EU regulations.

- Although the NFPA1983 is technically sometimes even more stringent than the EN standards, the two might be mutually exclusive in several testing aspects, thus eliminating the possibility to re-qualify proven EN standard equipment in accordance with NFPA1983.

- Since the “pure” aviation market is too small, the European manufacturers would probably not take the effort to re-certify, and thus leave the market completely to the American OEMs. Already established and proven harnesses would suddenly be impossible to use.

- The very large field of “dual use” harnesses used in big numbers in voluntary rescue organisations (Mountain rescue, water rescue etc.) must not be neglected. In Germany alone, we have tens of thousands of harnesses alone, currently qualified to EN standards, used by voluntary services. Many of these (such as the “Bergwacht” mountain rescue) occasionally or regularly work and train with associated HEMS operators. While the CM-CS-005 offers a fantastic opportunity to integrate their equipment (which hitherto lurked in grey-semi-legal corners) into this loop, the ETSO does not, since it is totally out of the question that these organisations will switch to an American standard not really available on the market, and not proven to be compliant with the personal protective equipment directive of the EU (89/686/EWG).

- The NFPA1983 does not necessarily cover the full scope of equipment (karabiners, lanyards, length adjustment devices etc.) covered by the EN standards and would therefore vastly limit configurations and variety. It is questionable if the full load chain from hook to person can be fully closed with NFPA1983 products at all - which must be the ultimate goal of PCDS certification.

- Some of the rescue techniques currently practiced would not be possible, as there is no NFPA1983 counterpart for some of the EN approved equipment currently used. Major operational limitations and no-gos would have to be introduced, at the possible cost of lives.

- From the point of view of HEC systems manufactures (such as us), we would have to re-investigate our systems towards NFPA compatibility and integrate the ETSO requirements into our documentation. That would mean (probably major) changes for a lot of STCs and manuals.

- The switch from minor change to ETSO eliminates the compatibility checking step between PCDS, connecting elements and HEC provisions of the helicopter. This step is essential for safety and can only be performed by an entity experienced in the helicopter and PCDS sector - such as a design organisation with corresponding scope of approval.

- The ETSO solution lacks representation of non-HEC harness-based operations, such as securing of hoist operators, open-door camera work etc. This aspect is covered by CM-CS-005.

We therefore invite EASA to follow the path begun with CM-CS-005 by not pursuing an adoption of TSO C167 into an ETSO, and by further developing the processes of CM-CS-005.
4. Individual comments (and responses)

**Comment 57**

Comment by: KONG ITALY PCDS Manufacturer

This ETSO-C167 provides requirements very similar to the ones of the TSO-C167 and both refer to two other requirements, the NFPA 1983 and the SAE AS 8043.

The recent CM-CS-005 dated 01.12.2014 on Personnel Carrying Device Systems provides today guidelines on how to deal with SIMPLEX and Complex Design Systems and suggest mainly the compliance with a series of EN Standards currently utilised by the most part of the PCDS manufacturers.

The Italian Company KONG SPA suggests to transform this guideline material into requirements, maintaining the same indications and, maybe, introducing some specific test coming from the Appendices of TSO C167 (most of them are already required by the EN Standards).

The main reasons to support this proposal are to:

- define an ETSO in accordance with the qualification/certification processes utilized in the past and currently in use by the most part of the PCDS’s manufacturers in the countries associated in the EASA.
- use as requirements, the EN Standards more appropriate for European countries, avoiding references to american requirements (in any case requesting almost the same type of compliances).
- minimize the costs of qualification/certification for obtaining an ETSO by PCDS’s manufactures which have often small businesses and revenues due to the low number of components annually produced.

**Response**

Accepted.  
See the response to comment 68.


**Comment 42**

Comment by: THALES AVIONICS

ETSO C201, § 3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard:

FAA TSO C201 equivalent paragraph gives additional requirements regarding applicability of RTCA/DO-334 which could be different depending on the capability of the AHRS (§ 3 REQUIREMENTS) and applicability of the TSO depending on the type of equipment (§ 3.a. Functionality).

Those informations should be added in the CS-ETSO C201, § 3.1.1 in order to give less field to interpretation and to be strictly equivalent with FAA TSO one.

More precisely:

**FAA TSO C201 § 3 REQUIREMENTS:**

New models of AHRS identified and manufactured on or after the effective date of this TSO must meet the MPS qualification and documentation requirements in sections 2.1, 2.2.1, and 2.2.2 of RTCA Document No. RTCA/DO-334, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Solid-State Strap-Down Attitude and Heading Reference Systems (AHRS), dated March 21, 2012.
If your AHRS provides heading, turn and slip, degraded mode, uses aiding, includes a display, or provides information generated by the AHRS to a stand-alone display, then you must also meet the requirements as listed in the table below.

### Optional Functions/Mode/Source Requirement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optional Function</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heading</td>
<td>2.2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn and Slip</td>
<td>2.2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degraded Mode</td>
<td>2.2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiding</td>
<td>2.2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FAA TSO § 3.a. Functionality:**

This TSO applies to solid state strap-down AHRS intended to output pitch and roll attitude that does not use gimbaled sensors. It also addresses the optional functions of heading, turn, slip and the display of information provided by an AHRS.

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**Comment 79**

**Comment by:** Garmin International

ETSO-C201
Section 3.1.1
Page 242

FAA TSO C201 states that “New models of AHRS identified and manufactured on or after the effective date of this TSO must meet the MPS qualification and documentation requirements in sections 2.1, 2.2.1, and 2.2.2 of RTCA Document No. RTCA/DO-334, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Solid-State Strap-Down Attitude and Heading Reference Systems (AHRS), dated March 21, 2012.”

ETSO C201, section 3.1.1 does not specify the specific sections of 2.1, 2.2.1, and 2.2.2 of RTCA/DO-334 as the minimum operational performance. This makes it appear that the optional functions; Heading, Turn and Slip, Degraded Mode, Aiding, and Display is required for minimum performance.

To maintain a harmonized ETSO-C201/TSO-C201, suggest changing section 3.1.1 to only include the required Sections of 2.1, 2.2.1, and 2.2.2 of RTCA/DO-334, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Solid-State Strap-Down Attitude and Heading Reference Systems (AHRS) and listing the other functions and associated sections as required only if the AHRS provides the function. This is consistent with section 2.4, Overview of the proposed Amendments, page 9, that states the change should be consistent with the “Newly designed Attitude and Heading Reference Systems must meet the requirements of Sections 2.1, 2.2.1, and 2.2.2 of RTCA Document No RTCA/DO-334, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Solid-State Strap-Down Attitude and Heading Reference Systems (AHRS), dated 21 March 2012.”

**Response**

Partially accepted. The ETSO has been revised to clarify the optional aspects as per comment 42, however, the Agency does not generally specify the applicable subparts of the MPS but refers to the complete MPS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Page: 248 of 257 Paragraph: Appendix 1, item 2, re: para. 4.1.1.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The proposed text states:</strong></td>
<td>“... A fitting factor of 1.33 as specified in C2X.561 shall be included to address wear and tear through frequent removal of the fire extinguisher from its mounting bracket. ...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REQUESTED CHANGE:</strong></td>
<td>We recommend deleting this text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JUSTIFICATION:</strong></td>
<td>Fire extinguishers only need to be removed for use in a fire, or every 6 years for inspection. More frequent inspections to verify the gage reads in the green may be done without removing the fire extinguisher from the bracket. These inspections by the cabin crew are simple visual inspections of the gage and making sure the extinguisher is secured.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Not accepted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The attachment of fire extinguishers in their bracket is required to be designed as a quick-release mechanism to enable easy and quick access to the fire extinguisher if needed. Therefore, the design provides the possibility for frequent removal even if in practice the fire extinguishers may not be frequently removed. A similar requirement for a fitting factor of 1.33 exists for the attachment fittings of seat legs to aircraft floor structures. Here also a capability for frequent removal is provided, whereas
in practice the seats are in most cases not frequently removed (ref. CS-25.562(c)(2),
25.785(f)(3)).

comment 65  
comment by: Kidde Graviner

Section 2, referring to para 4.1.1 of SAE 6271
The reference to “frequent removal” not appropriate as cabin portable extinguishers are
largely left in place and not removed on a regular basis. Therefore suggest removing the use
of fitting factor.

response  
Not accepted
See the response to comment 32


comment 33  
comment by: Boeing

Page: 249 of 254
Paragraph: Appendix 2, Item 1 re: para. 6.8

The proposed text states:
“An extinguisher shall operate as intended at temperatures from – 54°C to + 85°C (refer to
RTCA DO-160G, ground survival temperature).”

REQUESTED CHANGE: We recommend deleting this text.

JUSTIFICATION: The UL 2129 temperatures -40°C to 49°C are industry standard fire
extinguisher operating temperatures, not to be confused with DO-160 storage
temperatures. The fire extinguishers must be shown by test to operate at -40°C and 49°C,
per UL 2129. All U.S. fire extinguishers use the UL 2129 standard temperatures of -40°C and
49°C; so, requiring different operating temperatures will cause U.S. manufacturers to either
have to retest their extinguishers, or not meet the ETSO.

Realistically, it is very unlikely to need the use of a fire extinguisher on board an airplane
when it is cold soaked to a temperature less than -40°C.

response  
Accepted.
The operational temperature range shall be -40°C to 49°C as per UL2129. The ground survival
temperature of the unit shall be -54°C up to 85°C as per DO-160G.
The ETSO standard has been revised accordingly.

comment 34  
comment by: Boeing

Page: 249 of 254
Paragraph: Appendix 2, Item 2 re: para. 12.4

The proposed text states:
"The maximum indicated gauge pressure shall be between 150 and 250 per cent of the indicated charging pressure specified by the manufacturer (20° C or 21° C)."

**REQUESTED CHANGE:** We recommend deleting this text.

**JUSTIFICATION:** The UL 2129 requirement specifies the temperature (21° C) at which the mark is made on the pressure gage to ensure that all gages, regardless of manufacturer, are accurate and read the same. If a standard temperature range is specified, then every gage could read slightly differently, depending on the temperature used to calibrate the gage.

**response**

Partially accepted.

The revised requirement for the temperature value for gauge calibration to either use 20°C or 21°C is based on input from European industry as present extinguishers which are qualified in accordance with EN 4649:2009 (resp. EN 3-7) use a temperature of 20°C for gauge calibration.

Language is revised to emphasise that the requirement is not confused with a temperature range and that either 20°C or 21°C shall be used for gauge calibration.

---

**comment**

35  
**comment by:** Boeing

Page: 249 of 254  
Paragraph: Appendix 3, Item 3 re: para. 12.5

**The proposed text states:**

"The mark used to indicate the charging pressure at the charging temperature as specified by the manufacturer shall be a minimum 0.6 mm and not more than 1.0 mm wide."

**REQUESTED CHANGE:** We recommend deleting this text.

**JUSTIFICATION:** The UL 2129 requirement specifies the temperature (21° C) at which the mark is made on the pressure gage to ensure that all gages, regardless of manufacturer, are accurate and read the same at a standardized temperature of 21° C. If a standard temperature is not specified, then every gage could read differently, depending on the temperature used to calibrate the gage. Deleting the 21° C requirement could result in inaccurate gages, and fire extinguishers with different charge pressures.

**response**

Partially accepted.

Refer also to comment 34. Language will be revised to:

‘The mark used to indicate the charging pressure at the charging temperature (at either 20°C or at 21°C) as specified by the manufacturer shall be a minimum 0.6 mm and not more than 1.0 mm wide.’

---

**comment**

60  
**comment by:** Embraer - Indústria Brasileira de Aeronáutica - S.A.

At Appendix 2, item 1 states that "an extinguisher shall operate as intended at temperatures from – 54 °C to + 85 °C (refer to RTCA DO-160G, ground survival temperature)".

However, as stated in RTCA DO-160G section 4.4, "These are the lowest and highest ground temperatures that equipment is normally expected to be exposed to during aircraft storage or exposure to climatic extremes. The equipment is not expected to operate within..."
specification limits at these temperatures, but is expected to survive without damage”.

Equipment installed in an aircraft cabin is typically required to operate as intended at temperatures from –15°C to +70°C (as per RTCA DO-160G, Section 4, Category A3). Therefore, Embraer proposes the text to be re-written as follows:

1. Page 9, replace paragraph 6.8 with:
   An extinguisher shall survive without damage at temperatures from -54°C to +85°C (refer to RTCA DO-160G, ground survival temperature).

| response | Partially accepted.  
|          | See the response to comment 33. |

<table>
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<tr>
<th>comment</th>
<th>66</th>
<th>comment by: Kidde Graviner</th>
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| Section 1, referring to P9 of ANSI / UL 2129:  
The revised temperature usage limits suggested are not appropriate for a Cabin Portable Extinguisher.  
EASA needs to clearly differentiate between storage and usage temperatures.  
The current Kidde unit is qualified to the existing limits specified in ANSI /UL2129 (-40°C à +49°C)  
Therefore suggest that these existing limits are retained. |
| response | Accepted  
|          | See the response to comment 33. |
4. Individual comments (and responses)

Appendix A - Attachments

1. C167-ETSO_ICAR_comments.pdf
   Attachment #1 to comment #68

2. ETSO-C116_TSO-C116A_Comparison.pdf
   Attachment #2 to comment #71

3. ETSO-C116_TSO-C116A_Comparison.pdf
   Attachment #3 to comment #72
## ANNEX I to CRD 2015-02

### SUBPART B — LIST OF ETSOs (INDEX 1 AND INDEX 2)

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4 Correction of typo in the title to align it with the title of the CS-ETSO article
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European Technical Standard Order

Subject: TURN AND SLIP INSTRUMENT

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which new models of turn and slip instruments Turn And Slip Instruments that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

3.2 — Specific
None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

Failures of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO resulting in misleading or loss of information are minor failure conditions.
4 — Marking

4.1 — General
   Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
   None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
   See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: DIRECTION INSTRUMENT, NON-MAGNETIC (GYROSCOPICALLY STABILIZED)

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which new models of Direction instruments, Non-Magnetic (Gyroscopically Stabilized) that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
None.
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO resulting in misleading information is a major failure condition. Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO resulting in loss of information is a minor failure condition.
4 — Marking

4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
Subject: LIFE RAFTS

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which life rafts that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in SAE International Aerospace Standard AS1356, Life Rafts, dated July 2012, as modified by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
As specified in AS1356, Life Rafts, dated July 2012, as modified by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
None
3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
None
3.2 — Specific
None
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking is detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
As specified in SAE AS1356, subsection 7.9.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
## APPENDIX 1

### MPS FOR LIFE RAFTS

The applicable standard is SAE AS1356, Life Rafts, dated July 2012. It shall be modified as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS1356 section</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>All subsections shall be applied unless disregarded or modified as below:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.1</td>
<td>To be replaced:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1 Applicable Documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The following publications form a part of this document to the extent specified herein. The applicable issue of cited publications shall be the issue in effect on the date of the publication of this document, unless otherwise specified. In the event of conflict between the text of this document and references cited herein, the text of this document takes precedence. Nothing in this document, however, supersedes applicable laws and regulations unless a specific exemption has been obtained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.2</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.3</td>
<td>Shall be applied as written, the definitions of the following terms shall be replaced with the following text:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPROVED: The status of equipment that meets EASA standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NOMINAL OPERATING PRESSURE: The median of the Normal Conditions Pressure Range.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORMAL CONDITIONS PRESSURE RANGE: The range of pressures attained during all types of inflations conducted at Normal Temperature Conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>READILY ACCESSIBLE: Capable of being quickly obtained for operation without requiring removal of obstacles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On page 10, Section 2.3, the following definition shall be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRIMARY BUOYANCY CHAMBER: Any buoyancy chamber which independently provides sufficient buoyancy (at Minimum Operating Pressure) to achieve the minimum required freeboard around the entire periphery of the life raft with the life raft loaded at both rated and overload capacity. A minimum of two primary buoyancy chambers are required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 1

MPS FOR LIFE RAFTS *(continued)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS1356 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.4</td>
<td>The definition of ‘should’ shall be replaced as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHOULD: Indicates a criterion for which an alternative, including non-compliance, may be applied if an equivalent level of safety is documented, justified, and approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3.1.3(a)</td>
<td>To be replaced by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type I Marking: INTENDED FOR USE IN OPERATIONS REQUIRING A LIFE RAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type II Marking: NOT INTENDED FOR USE FOR EXTENDED OVER-WATER OPERATIONS NOR IN TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRCRAFT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3.2.4.2</td>
<td>To be replaced by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.4.2 Extended Marine Exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The life raft shall be demonstrated by a test and/or analysis based on the test to meet the pressure retention requirements of 5.2.1 and the canopy protection of 6.5.5.1 and 6.5.7 after exposure of the fully-inflated life raft to a saltwater marine environment for at least 15 days. Installed/attached features such as the overpressure protection mechanism (e.g., pressure relief valve), manual inflation means, boarding means, sea anchor, and lifeline attachments shall retain their full functionality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3.2.5</td>
<td>To be replaced by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The life raft assembly shall be constructed of material meeting the requirements of CS-25 Appendix F, Part I. Survival kit contents need not meet this requirement provided that they are fully enclosed within a container that passes the 12 s vertical burn test in Appendix F. A listing of all the survival kit equipment that does not meet the requirements of CS-25 Appendix F, Part I, must be documented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3</td>
<td>The following note shall be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note: The deflation of each of the primary buoyancy chambers must be evaluated with the remaining primary buoyancy chamber(s) inflated to minimum operating pressure. Secondary compartments and inflatable floor, if present, are not considered ‘buoyancy chambers’ and, therefore, must also be deflated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 1

**MPS FOR LIFE RAFTS (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS1356 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 5.1.4</td>
<td>The following note shall be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note: This standard was developed for mechanically activated life raft inflation systems. Electric, electro/mechanical, or software based actuation systems are not adequately addressed by this standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 7.6</td>
<td>To be replaced by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The text, OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, shall be marked, adjacent to the inflation instructions, in letters of 2 inches (5.1 cm) tall, followed by the below three instructions, or their equivalent, rendered in letters at least 0.5 inches (12.7 mm) tall:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. ATTACH TO AIRCRAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. THROW/PUSH AWAY FROM AIRCRAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. PULL UNTIL INFLATION OCCURS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensibility of any variation(s) to these instructions shall be demonstrated in accordance with 2.3: Comprehensible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life rafts stowed remotely and deployed automatically from the remote location are eligible for partial approval under this ETSO. Any specific design features related to these kind of life rafts will not be covered by this ETSO approval and must be approved at installation level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 7.7</td>
<td>To be replaced by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.7 Identification in Stowage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The text, LIFE RAFT, shall be marked in block letters at least 2 inches (5.1 cm) tall, and FOR EMERGENCY USE ONLY shall be marked in block letters at least 1 inch (2.54 cm) tall, on all surfaces of the Container/Valise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life raft assemblies intended to be stored in a dedicated compartment or location may be marked only on the surfaces that will be visible when accessed if the installation instructions and limitations provided with the life raft provide that level of detail.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 1

**MPS FOR LIFE RAFTS (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS1356 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 8.8.4</td>
<td>To be replaced by:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.8.4 Lithium-containing batteries used in any emergency device shall meet the requirements of ETSO-C142a or equivalent.

*Note:* An ETSO authorisation does not constitute an installation approval on an aircraft. However, special conditions may be required to gain installation approval if the design includes non-rechargeable (i.e. primary) lithium batteries.

| Section 9.3     | The first sentence shall be replaced by: |

9.3 Content
Survival information should be prioritised and shall contain the following, at a minimum:

| Section 10      | To be disregarded. |
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: FUEL DRAIN VALVES Fuel Drain Valves

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Fuel Drain Valves that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in the attached 'Federal Aviation Administration Standard, Fuel Drain Valves' dated October 1, 1962, Appendix 1, MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD (MPS) FOR FUEL DRAIN VALVES, dated 18 april 2012.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
As specified in Section 3 of Appendix 1.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
None.
3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
None.
3.2 — Specific
None.
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking is detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific

None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
FAA Standard associated with ETSO-C76

October 1, 1962

FAA STANDARD—FUEL-DRAIN VALVES

1. PURPOSE: To specify minimum requirements for fuel drain valves that are intended to drain fuel or water from low points in aircraft fuel systems. Fluid discharge from the valve is intended to be drained to a container for inspection.

2. SCOPE: This standard covers the requirements for acceptance of fuel drain valves used as a quick means of draining fuel or water from aircraft fuel systems. These valves are intended to be used in fuel tank sumps, strainers, and gascolators.

3. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS:

3.1 Materials. Materials shall be of a high quality which experience and/or tests have demonstrated to be suitable for use with aviation fuels having an aromatic content from 0 to 30 percent. Synthetic rubber parts shall be age dated in accordance with ANA Bulletin No. 438. All metals used in the construction of fuel drain valves shall be of corrosion-resisting type or shall be suitably protected to resist corrosion during the normal service life of the valve.

3.2 Design and Construction.

3.2.1 Fuel Spillage. The drain valve shall be designed to permit operation without spillage or leakage of fuel on operating personnel.

3.2.2 Position Indication. Indication shall be provided for the open and closed position of valves. The valve shall utilize detents or other suitable means to retain the valve in the full-closed position. When manually released from the open position, the valve shall automatically return to the closed position.

3.2.3 Self-locking. The valve shall be provided with a means to prevent accidental opening or opening due to vibration or air loads.

3.2.4 Seals. The valve shall be designed so that the inlet pressure does not tend to open the valve, and so that the inlet pressure keeps the valve in the closed and sealed condition.

3.2.5 Loss of Parts. Fuel drain valves shall be designed to preclude the loss of parts. Design consideration shall be given so that the main seal will remain in place and prevent fuel leakage in the event of possible damage to or loss of the valve stem from operational loads to be anticipated in service. If threaded fittings are employed to support the valve, positive design provisions shall be included to prevent operational loads from rotating the valve body out of its boss.

3.2.6 Screens. The design of the valve shall include no features, such as screens or baffles, which could impair the valves effectiveness in draining fuel containing water and other contaminants.

4. TEST CONDITIONS:

4.1 Atmospheric Conditions. Unless otherwise specified, all tests required by this standard shall be conducted at an atmospheric pressure of approximately 29.92 inches of mercury and at an ambient temperature of approximately 25°C.

4.2 Fluids. Unless otherwise specified, commercial grade aviation fuels shall be used for all tests.
5. TEST METHODS AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS:

5.1 Functional. This test shall demonstrate the ability of the valve to meet the design requirements specified in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, and 3.2.5.

5.2 Flow Test. The drain valve shall be connected to a suitable container and the time required to pass a 1 quart quantity of fuel shall be determined when conducted with a maximum head of six inches of fuel. The time to flow 1 quart shall not take longer than 1 minute.

5.3 Leakage Tests.

5.3.1 Fuel Leakage. The fuel leakage test shall be conducted at pressures of four inches of fuel, one p.s.i., 20 p.s.i., and 60 p.s.i. The pressure shall be applied to the drain valve inlet with the valve in the closed position; there shall be no leakage.

5.3.2 Air Leakage. The air leakage test shall be conducted with the valve installed in a suitable test setup so that the valve inlet port is covered by fuel. Air pressure varying from 0 to five p.s.i. shall be applied to the valve outlet port with the valve in the closed position. There shall be no air leakage evident.

5.4 Fuel Resistance and Extreme Temperature. The fuel resistance and extreme temperature tests shall be conducted in accordance with the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Fuel-Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component configuration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drained and blown dry, normal condition as would be expected under service conditions, ports open.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounted as would be expected under normal service conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Fluid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIL-S-3136, type III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>MIL-S-3136, type I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period duration</td>
<td>96 hours (4 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambient and test fluid temperature.</td>
<td>158° ±2° F., or the normal operating temperature of the system in which the component is used, whichever is higher.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Operation or tests during period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation or tests during period</th>
<th>Actuate component at least 4 cycles per day in a normal manner</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Operation or tests immediately after period

| Operation or tests immediately after period | Conduct leakage test, using MIL-S-3136, type III fluid. | (a) Actuate components for 5 cycles.  
(b) Conduct functional and leakage tests, using MIL-S-3136, type I fluid. | With temperature not higher than 65° F., conduct functional and leakage tests, using MIL-S-3136, type I fluid. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3/</td>
<td>3/</td>
<td>3/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Each period shall follow immediately after the preceding one in the order noted.

2/ The component shall be maintained in such a manner as to insure complete contact of all nonmetallic parts with the test fluid as would be expected under normal service conditions.

3/ No leakage is allowed at any time during the test except for the first 15 minutes of the leakage test of the dry cycle.

### 5.5 Vibration

#### 5.5.1 Resonance

The valve shall be subjected to a resonant frequency survey of the range specified in the following table in order to determine if there exists any resonant frequencies of the parts. If resonance is encountered, the valve shall be successively vibrated along the three axes for four hours at the critical frequency.

#### 5.5.2 Cycling

The valve, in the closed positions shall be mounted on a vibration device. Fluid pressure shall be applied to the inlet port. The valve shall be subjected to the three vibration scanning cycle tests contained in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vibration Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scanning cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axis of vibration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluid pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scanning cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of scanning cycles per test</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Procedure**

The vibration test shall be conducted on the valve along three mutually perpendicular axes herein referred to as the X, Y, and Z axes; the X axis being defined as lying along center lines of the valve. The frequency shall be uniformly increased with respect to time through a frequency range from 10 to 500 c.p.s. with an applied double amplitude of 0.036 inch up to 75 c.p.s. and from there an applied vibration acceleration not less than ±10g. The frequency shall be similarly decreased such that the complete cycle is accomplished in the specified cycle time.

The test shall also be conducted at pressures of 1/2 p.s.i. and five p.s.i. There shall be no fluid leakage during the test.

The test shall also be conducted with air pressure varying from 0-5 p.s.i. gage at the outlet port. Air leakage shall not exceed 10 cc. per minute of free air during the five p.s.i. air suction test.

There shall be no evidence of damage to the valve or loosening of parts as a result of the test.

5.6 **Proof Pressure.** The valve shall be in the closed position and shall be subjected to a fuel pressure of 100 ±2 p.s.i. for a period of one minute at the inlet port, with the outlet port open to atmospheric pressure. There shall be no evidence of permanent distortion or other damage to the valve. There shall be no external leakage when the pressure is reduced to 60 p.s.i.

5.7 **Reliability Tests. (Cycling Operations)**

5.7.1 **Dry.** The valve shall be dried in an oven at 158° ±2° F. for four hours and then, in the dry condition, be subjected to 2,000 complete cycles of operation.

5.7.2 **Wet.** The valve shall be moistened with fuel, supplied with a six inch head of fuel and then be subjected to 6,000 complete cycles of operation.

5.7.3 **Post Reliability Test.** Upon completion of the cycling operations, the valve shall be subjected to the Leakage Test. There shall be no leakage from any portion of the valve as the result of the Reliability Test.
APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD (MPS) FOR FUEL DRAIN VALVES

1. PURPOSE: This Appendix provides the MPS for fuel drain valves that are intended to drain fuel or water from low points in aircraft fuel systems. Fluid discharge from the valve is intended to be drained into a container for inspection. Depending on the intended application and configuration of specific equipment the performance may be enhanced, or made superior to this specification. The number of test samples shall be completed in accordance with Table 1.

2. SCOPE: The MPS covers the requirements for acceptance of fuel drain valves used as a quick means of draining fuel or water from aircraft fuel systems. These valves are intended to be used in fuel tank sumps, strainers and gascolators.

3. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

a. Materials

(1) High-quality materials that are suitable for use with aviation fuels having an aromatic content from 0–30 % shall be used.

(2) Synthetic rubber parts age-dated in accordance with the SAE International’s Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 5316C ‘Storage of Elastomer Seals and Seal Assemblies Which Include an Elastomer Element Prior to Hardware Assembly’, dated 6 December, 2010, shall be used.

(3) The fuel drain valve shall be designed by using corrosion and galling resisting metals or metals protected to resist corrosion and galling during the normal service life of the valve.

(4) The use of magnesium or any magnesium alloy is prohibited.

b. Design and Construction

(1) Fuel Spillage. The drain valve shall be designed to allow operation without spilling or leaking fuel on personnel. The valve shall be designed to a ‘Fail-Closed’ condition.

(2) Position Indication.

(a) An indication for the open and closed position of valves shall be provided.

(b) A legend for position indication marking shall be used.

(c) Detents or other suitable means to keep the valve in the full-closed position shall be used.

(d) The valve must automatically return to the closed position when manually released from the open position.

(3) Self-locking. A means to prevent accidental opening or opening of the valve due to vibration or air loads shall be provided.

(4) Seals. The valve shall be designed so that:

(a) The inlet fuel pressure does not open the valve, and

(b) The inlet pressure keeps the valve in the closed and sealed position.
APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (MPS) FOR FUEL DRAIN VALVES (continued)

(5) Loss of Parts.
(a) Fuel drain valves shall be designed to prevent the loss of parts.
(b) The valve shall be designed so the main seal will remain in place to prevent fuel from leaking in the event of possible damage or loss of the valve stem from operational loads anticipated in service.
(c) If threaded fittings are used to support the valve, the fittings shall be designed to prevent operational loads from rotating the valve body out of its boss or closed position.

(6) Screens. The valve shall be designed so that fuel tank features, such as screens or baffles, do not impair the valve's effectiveness in draining fuel containing water and other contaminants.

c. Test Conditions.

(1) Atmospheric Conditions. Unless otherwise specified, all tests required by this standard shall be conducted at an atmospheric pressure of approximately 29.92 inches of mercury, ± 2 inches, and an ambient temperature of approximately 25 °C, ± 2 °C. When testing with atmospheric pressure or temperature different from these values, any variation due to the test setup shall be accounted for. The reason for varying from the specified conditions must be justified.

(2) Fluids. The type of fluid used must be specified unless commercial grade aviation fuels are used for all tests.

d. Test Methods and Performance Requirements.

(1) Functional. The ability of the valve to meet the design requirements specified in paragraphs 3.b.(1) through 3.b.(6) of this Appendix shall be demonstrated.

(2) Flow Test. The drain valve shall be connected to a suitable container and the time required to pass 1 quart of fuel with a maximum head of 6 inches of fuel shall be determined. The time to flow 1 quart must not take longer than 1 minute.

(3) Leakages Tests.
   (a) Fuel Leakage. The fuel leakage test shall be conducted at pressures of 4 inches of fuel, 1 psi ± 0.1 psi, 20 psi ± 2 psi, and 60 psi ± 2 psi. The pressure to the drain valve inlet shall be applied with the valve in the closed position. The fuel drain valve must not leak any fuel from discharge or outlet port. Refer to Figure 1 for test profile.
   (b) Air Leakage. The air leakage test shall be conducted with the valve installed in a suitable test setup so the valve inlet port is covered by fuel. Air pressure shall be applied varying successively from 0.0 to 5.0 psi, with a tolerance of ± 10% in each applied pressure, to the valve outlet port with the valve in the closed position. The fuel drain valve must not leak any air into the valve inlet. Refer to Figure 2 for test profile.

(4) Fuel Resistance and Extreme Temperature. The fuel resistance and extreme temperature tests shall be conducted as specified in Table 2.
APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (MPS) FOR FUEL DRAIN VALVES (continued)

(5) Vibration
(a) Resonance. The valve shall be subjected to a resonant frequency survey of the range specified in Table 3 to determine if there are any resonant frequencies of the parts. If resonance is encountered, the valve shall be vibrated successively axis by axis along the three axes for four hours at the critical frequency.
(b) Cycling. The valve shall be mounted on a vibration device and fluid pressure shall be applied to the inlet port in the closed position. The valve shall be subjected to the three vibration scanning cycle tests in accordance with Table 3.
(c) With pressures of 0.5 psi ± 0.1 psi and 5.0 psi ± 0.5 psi, the valve shall be subjected to vibration cycle tests listed in Table 3. There must not be any fluid leaking during the tests.
(d) With air pressure varying successively from 0.0 to 5.0 psi gauge at the outlet port, the valve shall be subjected to vibration cycle tests listed in Table 3. Air leakage must not exceed 10 cc per minute of free air during the 5.0 psi air suction test.
(e) The valve must not have damaged or loose parts as a result of the vibration tests.

(6) Proof Pressure
(a) With the valve in the closed position, a fuel pressure of 100 ± 2 psi for one minute at the inlet port shall be applied, with the outlet port open to atmospheric pressure.
(b) The valve must not show any evidence of permanent distortion or other damage. The valve must not have any external leaking when the pressure is uniformly reduced to 60 psi. Refer to Figure 3 for test profile.

(7) Flammability. All materials used must be self-extinguishing when tested in accordance with applicable requirements of RTCA/DO-160E or later as defined in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1., Section 26, Category C, Flammability Test. This requirement does not apply to small parts (where the greatest dimension of equipment (L) is less than 50 mm, such as knobs, fasteners, seals, grommets and small electrical parts) that would not propagate a fire.

(8) Reliability Tests. (Cycling Operations)
(a) Dry Test. The valve shall be dried in an oven at 158° ±2° F for four hours. Then the valve shall be subjected to 2,000 complete cycles of operation in the dry condition.
(b) Wet Test. The valve shall be moistened with fuel, supplied with a 6-inch head of fuel and then subjected to 6,000 complete cycles of operation. The fuel head must remain at six inches during the test.
(c) Post Reliability Test. After the cycling operations, the leakage test shall be performed. The valve must not leak as a result of the reliability test.

e. Test Samples.
## APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (MPS) FOR FUEL DRAIN VALVES (continued)

**Table 1 - Test Samples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tests</th>
<th>Paragraph 2 of this Appendix</th>
<th>Samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>d.(1)</td>
<td>Valve 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flow Test</td>
<td>d.(2)</td>
<td>Valve 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Leakage</td>
<td>d.(3)</td>
<td>Valve 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Leakage</td>
<td>d.(3)</td>
<td>Valve 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Resistance and Extreme Temperature</td>
<td>d.(4)</td>
<td>Valve 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resonance</td>
<td>d.(5)</td>
<td>Valve 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycling</td>
<td>d.(5)</td>
<td>Valve 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof Pressure</td>
<td>d.(6)</td>
<td>Valve 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Flammability Test</td>
<td>d.(7)</td>
<td>Valve 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability Test, Dry</td>
<td>d.(8)</td>
<td>Valve 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability Test, Wet</td>
<td>d.(8)</td>
<td>Valve 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Reliability Test</td>
<td>d.(8)</td>
<td>Valve 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (MPS) FOR FUEL DRAIN VALVES (continued)

Figure 1 – Fuel Leakage Test

Notes:
- T0 to T1: No time restriction
- T1 to T2: 5 minutes minimum
- T2 to T3: No time restriction
- T3 to T4: 5 minutes minimum
- T4 to T5: No time restriction
- T5 to T6: 5 minutes minimum
APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (MPS) FOR FUEL DRAIN VALVES (continued)

Figure 2 – AIR Leakage Test

Notes: T0 to T1 -- no time restriction
       T1 to T2 -- 1 minute, minimum.
       T2 to T3 -- no time restriction.
       T3 to T4 -- 1 minute, minimum.
       T4 to T5 -- no time restriction.
       T5 to T6 -- 1 minute, minimum.
       T6 to T7 -- no time restriction.
       T7 to T8 -- 1 minute, minimum.
       T8 to T9 -- no time restriction.
       T9 to T10 -- 1 minute, minimum.
       T10 -- end of test.
### APPENDIX 1

**MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (MPS) FOR FUEL DRAIN VALVES (continued)**

**Table 2 - Fuel Resistance and Extreme Temperature Test Schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Fuel Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period <strong>Note 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase I — Soak</td>
<td>Phase I — Dry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component configuration <strong>Note 2</strong></td>
<td>Drained and blown dry, normal condition as expected under service conditions, ports open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Fluid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*ASTM D471 Reference Fuel B</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period duration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96 hours (4 days)</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambient and test fluid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>temperature</td>
<td>158° ±2° F (70° ±2° C) or the normal operating temperature of the system where the component is used, whichever is higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation or tests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during period</td>
<td>Component actuated at least 4 cycles per day in a normal manner <strong>Note 3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation or tests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediately after period</td>
<td>Leakage test shall be conducted, using *ASTM D471 Reference Fuel B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. Each period shall be followed immediately (45 minutes maximum) after the preceding one in the order noted.
2. The component shall be maintained to ensure complete contact of all non-metallic parts with the test fluid as would be expected under normal service conditions.
3. There is no restriction in the actuation of the valve.
### APPENDIX 1

**MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (MPS) FOR FUEL DRAIN VALVES (continue)**

**Table 3 — Vibration Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scanning cycle test</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Axis of vibration</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluid pressure</td>
<td>60 psi ± 2 psi</td>
<td>60 psi ± 2 psi</td>
<td>60 psi ± 2 psi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scanning cycle time</td>
<td>15 min</td>
<td>15 min</td>
<td>15 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of scanning cycles per test</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Procedure**

1. The valve shall be tested along three mutually perpendicular X, Y, and Z-axes; the X axis lies along centre lines of the valve.

2. The frequency time shall be increased uniformly through a range from 10 to 500 c.p.s. with an applied double amplitude of 0.036 inch up to 75 c.p.s. and an applied vibration acceleration not less than ±10g.

3. Double amplitude indicates the total displacement from positive to negative maximum.

4. The frequency shall be decreased so the complete cycle is accomplished in the specified cycle time.

4. There is no restriction in the circulating velocity of air or mass flow.

* ASTM: American Society for Testing of Materials, International
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: AUTOMATIC PRESSURE ALTITUDE REPORTING CODE GENERATING EQUIPMENT

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Automatic Pressure Altitude Reporting Code Generating Equipment that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

3.2 — Specific
None.

3.2.1 Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO resulting in misleading information is a major failure condition. Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO resulting in loss of information is a minor failure condition.
4 — Marking

4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: CREW MEMBER OXYGEN REGULATOR, DEMAND

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Crew Member Oxygen Regulator, Demand type that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in the attached Federal Aviation Administration Standard ‘Oxygen Regulators, Demand’.

Standards set forth in the SAE AS 8027, Crew Member Oxygen Regulator, Demand, dated 1 June 2004, as modified by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.

Crew member oxygen regulators are separated into four types:
Type I: Remote-mounted, panel or portable,
Type II: Man-mounted, not mask-mounted,
Type III: Mask-mounted, less valving, and
Type IV: Mask-mounted, with integral valving.

The four types of oxygen regulators are further separated into five classes:
Class A: Straight demand,
Class B: Diluter demand,
Class C: Straight demand, pressure breathing,
Class D: Diluter demand, pressure breathing to 40 000 ft, and
Class E: Diluter demand, pressure breathing to 45 000 ft.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
   As specified in Federal Aviation Administration Standard ‘Oxygen Regulators, Demand’.
   Refer to SAE AS 8027, paragraph 4.5

3.1.3 — Computer Software
   None.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
   None.

3.2 — Specific
   None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
   See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

4 — Marking
4.1 — General
   Marking is detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
   None.
   Type and class (refer to paragraph 3),
   Maximum altitude (per AS8027, paragraph 1.2.3),
   Inlet supply pressure range (per AS8027, paragraph 3.1.7).

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
   See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
1. Purpose.

This standard contains minimum performance and quality control standards for the manufacture of demand oxygen system regulators.

2. Classification.

The term “demand regulator” includes all of the following classes of regulators:

(a) Straight demand regulators designed to deliver oxygen only.
(b) Diluter demand regulators designed to deliver a mixture of oxygen and air, and oxygen only.
(c) Straight demand pressure breathing regulators (straight demand regulations designed to deliver undiluted oxygen under positive pressure).
(d) Diluter demand pressure breathing regulators (diluter demand regulators designed to deliver undiluted oxygen under positive pressure).


To be eligible for approval under a TSO authorization, the regulator must possess the following design and construction characteristics:

3.1 Demand regulators designed to be mounted directly upon an oxygen mask or the crewmember’s clothing or safety harness must include a flexible oxygen supply tube connecting the regulator inlet with the oxygen supply system.

3.2 Demand regulators must be constructed of materials that:

(a) Do not contaminate air or oxygen;
(b) Are not adversely affected by continuous contact with oxygen; and
(c) Are at least flame resistant.

3.3 (a) Demand regulators must be equipped with a 200 mesh screen, or equivalent filter, at the oxygen inlet port or at the oxygen inlet hose assembly.

(b) Diluter demand and diluter demand pressure regulators must be equipped with screening or not more than 100 mesh and not less than 30 mesh, or equivalent filter, at the air inlet port.

3.4 Diluter demand and diluter demand pressure breathing regulators must be provided with a means for manually selecting a delivery of undiluted oxygen. If the selection means is controlled by a rotating handle or lever, the travel must be limited to not more than 180 degrees from the “normal oxygen” position to the “100 percent oxygen” position. The dilution position of the selection means must be designated “normal oxygen” and the nondilution position must be designated “100 percent oxygen.” The selection means must be such that it will not assume a position between the “normal oxygen” and “100 percent oxygen” positions.

3.5 Straight demand pressure breathing and diluter demand pressure breathing regulations must be designed to provide oxygen at a positive pressure of 11.0 ± 3.0 inches H2O to determine mask peripheral leakage at altitudes below which positive pressures are hereinafter required. The means of obtaining this pressure must be by push, pull, or toggle control appropriately marked to indicate its purpose.

3.6 Diluter demand and diluter demand pressure breathing regulators must incorporate means to indicate when oxygen is and is not flowing from the regulator outlet. This requirement does not apply to mask mounted regulators.


Two demand regulators of each class for which approval is sought must be shown to comply with the minimum performance standards set forth in paragraphs 4.1 through 4.10 in any position which the regulators can be mounted. Tests must be conducted at ambient atmospheric conditions of approximately 30 inches Hg and 70°F., except as otherwise specified. It is permissible to correct gas flow rates and pressures to STPD conditions by computation.

4.1 (a) Demand regulators must supply the following oxygen or oxygen-air flows at not more than the specified outlet pressures. These characteristics must be displayed at all altitudes, with the oxygen supply pressure at all values within the design inlet pressure range, and with the diluter valve open and closed.

MAXIMUM OUTLET FLOW, LPM, ATPD: SUCTION PRESSURE, INCHES OF WATER
Demand regulators must not flow more than 0.01 LPM, STPD, when the outlet suction pressure is reduced to 0 inches of H₂O under the conditions specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

Diluter demand and diluter demand pressure breathing regulators must supply the following percentages of cylinder oxygen, by volume, at the specified atmospheric pressures and corresponding altitudes. These oxygen percentages must be delivered at regulator outlet gas flows of 20, 70, and 100 LPM ATPD, with the oxygen supply pressure at all values within the design inlet pressure range.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pressure mm Hg</th>
<th>Altitude feet</th>
<th>Diluter demand</th>
<th>Diluter demand pressure breathing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>760</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>632.4</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>522.8</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>429.1</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>349.5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>282.4</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>226.1</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179.3</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178.5</td>
<td>35,100</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141.2</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111.1</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Straight demand and straight demand pressure breathing regulators must supply not less than 98 percent oxygen, by volume, at all altitudes under the conditions specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

4.3 (a) Diluter demand pressure breathing regulators with the diluter valve open or closed, and straight demand pressure breathing regulators, must provide positive breathing pressure at a flow of 20 LPM, ATPD, in accordance with the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Altitude</th>
<th>Positive Outlet Pressure H₂O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000 FEET</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.0 ± 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.5 ± 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>6.0 ± 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>10.0 ± 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>12.0 ± 1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The positive pressure at 100 LPM, ATPD, must not increase by more than 0.8 inches H₂O from the positive pressure at 20 LPM, ATPD.
(c) The positive pressure at 0.01 LPM, ATPD, must not decrease by more than 0.8 inches H2O from the positive pressure at 20 LPM, ATPD.

4.4(a) The inward leakage of air through the regulator at sea level must not exceed 0.1 LPM, STPD, with a suction pressure of 1.0 inches H2O applied to the outlet port, the oxygen supply inlet port sealed, and the diluter valve closed.

(b) The outward leakage of air through the regulator at sea level must not exceed 0.1 LPM, STPD, with a positive pressure of 12 inches H2O applied to the outlet port, the oxygen supply inlet port sealed, and the diluter valve open and closed.

(c) The regulator outlet leakage must not exceed 0.01 LPM, STPD, with the regulator outlet port open and any oxygen supply pressure within the specified operating range applied at the regulator inlet port.

(d) The regulator overall leakage must not exceed 0.01 LPM, STPD, with the regulator outlet port sealed and the regulator inlet port pressurized to a value equal to the maximum specified oxygen supply pressure.

4.5(a) Straight demand pressure breathing and diluter demand pressure breathing regulators must comply with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.4 after a negative pressure of 29 inches H2O and a positive pressure of 24 inches H2O are applied to the outlet port for a period of 2 minutes. The diluter valve and the regulator inlet port must be closed during these two pressure tests.

(b) Straight demand and diluter demand regulators must comply with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.4 after a negative pressure of 29 inches H2O and a positive pressure of 12 inches H2O are applied to the outlet port for a period of 2 minutes. The diluter valve and the regulator inlet port must be closed during these two pressure tests.

(c) Demand regulators must comply with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.4 after a positive pressure of 1.5 times the maximum oxygen supply pressure is applied to the inlet port, or to the inlet of the oxygen supply in the case of mask mounted regulators, for a period of 2 minutes. The positive pressure must be applied rapidly to simulate rapid opening of the supply valve. The diluter valve must be closed and the outlet port must be sealed during the test.

4.6(a) Straight demand and diluter demand regulators must comply with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.4 after being subjected to a change in pressure from not less than 12.2 p.s.i.a. to not less than 2.7 p.s.i.a. in not more than one second.

(b) Straight demand pressure breathing and diluter demand pressure breathing regulators must comply with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.4 after being subjected to a change in pressure from not less than 12.2 p.s.i.a. to not less than 2.1 p.s.i.a. in not more than one second.

4.7 Demand regulators must comply with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.4 under each condition specified in subparagraphs (a) through (d) of this paragraph with the maximum oxygen supply pressure applied to the regulator inlet.

(a) At a temperature of approximately 70° F. after being stored at a temperature of not less than 100° F. for 12 hours.

(b) At a temperature of 70° F. after being stored at a temperature of not warmer than 67° F. for 2 hours.

(c) At a temperature of not less than 130° F.

(d) At a temperature of not more than 20° F.

4.8 Demand regulators must comply with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.4 after being subjected to the tests specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

(a) The regulator must be vibrated along each mutually perpendicular axis for one hour (three hours total), at a frequency of 5 to 500 cps, and at a double amplitude of 0.036 inches or an acceleration of 2 g, whichever occurs first. Mask mounted regulators need not be subjected to this vibration test.

(b) The regulator must be subjected to an endurance test of a total of 250,000 breathing cycles. The peak breathing rate must be 30 LPM, STPD, for 200,000 cycles, and 70 LPM, STPD, for 50,000 cycles. The dilution valve must be open during one half of the 200,000 cycles and one half of the 50,000 cycles, and it must be closed during the remaining cycles. During the nonflow portion of the 30 LPM and 70 LPM breathing cycles, a back pressure of 0.3 and 1.0 inches H2O, respectively, must be applied to the regulator outlet.

4.9 Demand regulators must be free of vibration, flutter, or chatter that will prevent compliance with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.3 when subjected to the following simulated flow conditions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycles</th>
<th>Peak-flow per-cycle LPM, STPD</th>
<th>Back pressure at 0.1 LPM, inches H2O</th>
<th>Diluter valve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.10 Demand regulators, when subject to accelerations up to 3 \textit{g} in any position, must comply with paragraph 4.1(a) except that the specified suction pressures may be exceeded by not more than 0.6 inches H\textsubscript{2}O.

5. Maximum Environmental (Cabin) Altitude.

The minimum pressure to which the regulator has been shown to comply under paragraph 4.6(a) or (b) of this standard determines the maximum environmental (cabin) altitude of the regulator, except that the maximum environmental (cabin) altitude must not exceed the value shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>FEET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Straight or diluter-demand</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure demand</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Quality Control.

6.1 Each production regulator must be shown to comply with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.4.

6.2 One regulator selected at random from each lot must be shown to comply with paragraphs 4.1 through 4.10. The lot size may be selected by the applicant subject to the approval of the Federal Aviation Administration on the basis of evaluation of the quality control system of the applicant (see FAR, §37.5).

7. Abbreviations and Definitions.

- LPM: Liters per minute.
- STPD: Standard temperature and pressure, dry (0°C, 760 mm Hg, P H\textsubscript{2}O = 0).
- ATPD: Ambient temperature and pressure, dry (70°F; ambient pressure; P H\textsubscript{2}O = 0).
- c.p.s.: Cycles per second.
- p.s.i.a.: Pounds per square inch absolute.
- g: Acceleration of gravity, 32 feet/second/second.
**APPENDIX 1**

**MPS FOR CREW MEMBER OXYGEN GENERATORS, DEMAND**

The applicable standard is SAE AS8027, Crew Member Oxygen Regulator, Demand, dated 1 June 2004. It shall be modified as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 8027 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 1.1, Scope</td>
<td>Shall be disregarded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.1</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Materials of a type, grade and quality shall be used where experience and/or tests have shown their suitability for the purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Materials contaminating oxygen or materials that are adversely affected by continuous service with oxygen must not be used. Except for small parts like knobs, triggers, fasteners, seals, and electrical parts that do not contribute significantly to fire propagation, materials including packaging must comply with CS 25.853, Appendix F, Part 1 (a)(1)(iv).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.2</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Filters have to be provided at oxygen inlet ports to prevent entrance of particles, which may be hazardous to the user or impair the function of the device. Filters must be equivalent to that of a 200 mesh screen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.3</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For Class B, D, and E devices (diluter demand) an air inlet port has to be provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The port shall be designed to prevent entrance of particles, which may impair performance of the device. A 100 mesh screen or equivalent filter shall be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2.1.2</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outlet Proof Pressure (Class A and B except Type IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2.1.3</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outlet Proof Pressure (Class C, D and E except Type IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.4, Applicability Matrix, Table 7</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.1.2 Outlet Proof Pressure (Except Type IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.1.3 Outlet Proof Pressure (Except Type IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.8 Relief Valve (Except Type IV)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 1

MPS FOR CREW MEMBER OXYGEN GENERATORS, DEMAND (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 8027 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 4.5.1</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High-temperature exposure:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The device shall be soaked for 12 hours at not less than 160° F (71.1°C). Then the device shall be transferred to 70° F (21.1°C), ambient temperature. Within 30 minutes of doing this, the device shall be tested to the requirements of paragraphs 4.4.3 through 4.4.9.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Paragraph 4.5.2 | To be revised: |
|                | Low temperature exposure: |
|                | The device shall be soaked for 2 hours at not less than -65° F (-54°C). Then the device shall be transferred to 0° F (-17.8°C) for 2 hours to stabilise it. After this, the device shall be transferred to 70° F (21.1 °C), ambient temperature. Within 30 minutes of doing this, the device shall be tested to the requirements of paragraphs 4.4.3 through 4.4.9. |

| Paragraph 5.1, Identification | To be disregarded. |
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Cargo Pallets, Nets and Containers (Unit Load Devices)

1 — Applicability

This ETSO provides the requirements which Cargo Unit Load Devices that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures

2.1 — General

Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific

None.

3 — Technical Conditions

3.1 — Basic

3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard


When using NAS 3610 Revision 10, the following errors must be corrected:

— in lieu of Figure 31, sheet 87, substitute Figure 31, sheet 88;
— in lieu of Figure 31, sheet 88, substitute Figure 32, sheet 87 of NAS 3610 Revision 8 dated April 1987 for Figure 32 (missing from NAS 3610 Revision 10), use Figure 32 of NAS 3610 Revision 8 dated April 1987, or Revision 9 dated September 1987.

For new models of Type II ULDs standards set forth in the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. (SAE) Aerospace Standard (AS) 36100, “Air Cargo Unit Load Devices - Performance Requirements and Test Parameters”, Revision A, dated April 2006.

For Type I and II ULDs, the standards set forth in SAE AS 36102, Air Cargo Unit Load Devices - Testing Methods, dated March 2005 are applicable.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
None.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
None.

3.2 — Specific

Environmental degradation due to ageing, ultra-violet (UV)-exposure, weathering, etc. for any non-metallic materials used in the construction of pallets, nets and containers must be considered.

In lieu of NAS 3610 Rev. 10, paragraph 3.7 and SAE AS 36100 Rev. A, paragraph 4.7 use the following paragraph which provides the fire protection requirements for ULDs:

The materials used in the construction of pallets, nets and containers must meet the appropriate provisions in CS-25, Appendix F, Part I, paragraph (a)(2)(iv).

Textile Performance: See SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) 1490B, Environmental Degradation of Textiles, dated December 2007, for available data for textile performance when exposed to environmental factors. These data shall be taken into account for consideration of the effects of environmental degradation on nets commensurate with the expected storage and service life to satisfy SAE AS 36100 Rev. A, paragraph 4.11.

Note: Environmental degradation data other than that documented in AIR1490B may be used if substantiated by the applicant and approved by EASA.

None

3.2.1 Failure Condition Classification
N/A

4 - Marking

4.1 - General

Marking is detailed in CS-ETSO Subpart A paragraph 1.2.

4.2 - Specific

In addition, the following information shall be legibly and permanently marked on the ULD:

1. The identification of the article in the code system explained in
   a. NAS 3610, Revision 10, paragraph 1.2.1, for Type I ULDs.
   b. SAE AS 36100, Rev. A, paragraph 3.5 for Type II ULDs.

2. The nominal weight of the article in kilogram and pound in the format: Weight: ...
   .kg (...lb)

3. If the article is not omni-directional, the words ‘FORWARD’, ‘AFT’, and ‘SIDE’ must be conspicuously and appropriately placed.

4. The manufacturer’s serial number of the article, with the option to add the date of manufacture.

5. The burning rate determined for the article under paragraph 3.2 of this ETSO.

6. If applicable, the expiration date in the format ‘EXP YYYY-MM’ must be marked on the ULD.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
European
Aviation
Safety
Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Flight Deck (Sedentary) Crew Member Protective Breathing Equipment

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Flight Deck (Sedentary) Crew Member Protective Breathing Equipment that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) 8031A, Personal Protective Devices for Toxic and Irritating Atmospheres Air Transport Flight Deck (Sedentary) Crew Members, dated June 3/1/1999 as amended by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
As given in AS 8031, Section 8. To be tested in accordance with the procedures in SAE AS 8026A, Crewmember Demand Oxygen Mask for Transport Category Aircraft, dated July 1996, paragraph 4.5.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
None.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
None.

3.2 — Specific
None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
4 — Marking

4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific

(1) Each component of equipment having multiple facial sizes must be marked to indicate its relative size and whether it will seal on beards e.g. “Beards will not seal”.

(2) Each smoke goggle/oxygen mask component, full-face mask and hood must be marked to indicate the average oxygen usage rate measured during contaminant leakage testing for each combination or full-face mask.

In addition to 4.1, the mask assembly shall be marked with the following:
(1) Size (if more than one size is manufactured),
(2) Type (as specified in ETSO-C89a, paragraph 3), and
(3) ‘Beards will not seal’, if applicable.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
FAA report N°FAA-AM-78-41 may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA 22161 Catalogue N°ADA064678.
## APPENDIX 1

### MPS FOR FLIGHT DECK (SEDENTARY) CREWMEMBER PROTECTIVE BREATHING EQUIPMENT

The applicable standard is SAE AS8031A, Personal Protective Devices for Toxic and Irritating Atmospheres Air Transport Flight Deck (Sedentary) Crewmembers, dated March 1999. It shall be modified as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS8031A section</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1, SCOPE</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 7.1 a. Resistance to Flammability</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The device shall be designed, including packaging, (except small parts like knobs, triggers, fasteners, seals, and electrical parts) of materials that don’t contribute significantly to the propagation of a fire, and that comply with CS 25.853(a), Appendix F, Part I(a)(1)(iv).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 7.1j</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 7.1k</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 8.1</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Cleaning and Sterilising: Except for non-reusable or disposable systems, it must be ensured that cleaning and sterilising the device is possible without major disassembly and adverse effects on operation and performance. The cleaning method must be either manufacturer-recommended, or according to SAE ARP 1176, Oxygen System Component Cleaning and Packaging. Cleaning and sterilising procedures shall be included in the CMM.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 1

MPS FOR FLIGHT DECK (SEDENTARY) CREWMEMBER PROTECTIVE BREATHING EQUIPMENT
(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS8031A section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 8, IDENTIFICATION</td>
<td>To be disregarded except of paragraph 8h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 9.1</td>
<td>The following values shall be used:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X=.05, Y=.10 and Z=.05.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 10.1 For Flight deck Crewmembers</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An integral microphone shall be included in the protective device when it is necessary to allow the user to communicate (speak) through the aircraft’s communication system. The microphone must be approved or meet the requirements of ETSO-C139a or later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Child Restraint System (CRS) Aviation Child Safety Device (ACSD)

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Child Restraint System (CRS) Aviation Child Safety Devices (ACSD) that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in applicable standard is the SAE AS 5276/1, Performance Standard for Child Restraint Systems in Transport Category Airplanes, dated October 11/1/2000, as modified in attached APPENDIX 1 “MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR CRS” and APPENDIX 2 “TEST CONDITIONS”, amended by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO Subpart A paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
None.

3.2 — Specific
None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification

4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
None. In addition, the ACSD shall be marked with the ACSD type designation (reference SAE AS52761, paragraph 2.5, as amended by Appendix 1).

Also, any applicable limitations or restrictions shall be marked to allow aircraft-specific or operational-specific installation limitations, such as: ‘FOR USE ON [insert aircraft type or serial number] ONLY’; ‘FOR USE ON AIRCRAFT USED IN PART [insert number] OPERATIONS ONLY’; ‘FOR MILITARY USE ONLY’; or ‘SEE DRAWING NO. [insert number] FOR INSTALLATION LIMITATIONS.’

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.

49CFR571 and 49CFR572 may be obtained from U.S. Government Printing Office (web-site:...
APPENDIX 1.

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD (MPS) FOR CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEM (CRS)

This appendix prescribes the MPS for CRS, modified by the Agency in this ETSO. The applicable standard is SAE AS5276/1, “Performances Standard for Child Restraint Systems in Transport Category Airplanes” dated November 2000, and is modified with additions in **bold** _italics_, as follows:

1. Page 1, paragraphs 1. (SCOPE), 1.1 (PURPOSE), and 1.2 (APPLICABILITY), page 2, paragraph 2. (REFERENCES), 2.1 and 2.1.1. Disregard these paragraphs as similar text appears in TSO.

2. Page 2, paragraph 2.1.2 reads as follows:
   
   ETSO C22g, Safety Belts
   DOT/FAA/AAM/-94/19, The Performance of Child Restraint Devices in:

3. Page 4, replace paragraph 3.2 as follows:
   
   To secure a CRS in an airplane passenger seat, the device shall rely upon the passenger seat lap belt (pelvic restraint) or possibly rigid bar lower anchorages if the airplane seat is so equipped, as prescribed by 49 CFR § 571.225-59. The latter would require the CRS to be equipped with lower anchorage hardware per 49 CFR § 571.213 S5.9(a), that is, adjustable webbing attachments or retractable/stowable rigid prongs.

4. Page 5, paragraph 3.2.5 reads as follows:
   
   Where a CRS is equipped with prongs that attach the CRS to a rigid bar anchorage system in automobiles, as referenced in 49 CFR § 571.225 those prongs shall be retractable, in order to ensure proper positioning of the CRS in the airplane passenger seat and to avoid damage to the airplane seat.

5. Page 5, paragraph 3.3, Fire Protection, with modification reads as follows:
   
   Cushions, upholstery, and all other exposed materials except small parts (knobs, triggers, fasteners, seals, and electrical parts) that would not contribute significantly to the propagation of a fire shall meet the fire protection provisions of CS 25.853(a)
   [Appendix F, Part I (a)(1)(ii)] Seat belts and shoulder harnesses shall meet [Appendix F, Part I(a)(iv)]

6. Page 5, replace paragraph 4, Performance Test Specifications, as follows:
   
   The dynamic test described in this section is used to evaluate the performance of the CRS in a horizontal impact where the force is applied against the longitudinal axis of a forward facing airplane passenger seat that holds the CRS. The structural adequacy of the CRS, the effectiveness of the CRS attachments and the adequacy of restraint of the child occupant, as prescribed in 4.1, are the issues evaluated. One dynamic impact test shall be performed, with the CRS secured using the passenger seat lap belt, for each category of child-occupant, as defined in paragraph 2.3 of this AS, for which the CRS is intended for use. In addition, CRS that are equipped with lower anchorage attachment hardware per 49 CFR § 571.213 S5.9(a) may be tested with each category of child-occupant when secured using the rigid bar lower anchorages.

7. Page 6, paragraph 4.2, Test Fixtures, reads as follows:
4.2.1 Passenger Seat Restraints: Airplane passenger seat lap belts shall be installed on the test fixture as the primary means of attaching the CRS to the seat fixture depicted in Appendix A of this AS. The buckle shall be a lift-latch type release mechanism. The belts shall meet the requirements of ETSO-C22g and conform to the length dimensions shown in Appendix A, Figure A5 of this AS. The webbing shall be made of nylon or any suitable material that has been shown to be equivalent.

4.2.2 Rigid Bar-Lower Anchorages: Alternatively, CRS equipped with lower anchorage attachment hardware may be tested using the aforementioned modified test procedure.

5.1.1 Passenger Seat Restraint: The CRS shall be installed in the test fixture and secured using the passenger seat lap belt in the manner specified by the manufacturer’s instructions provided with the CRS. The maximum force applied to the free end of the lap belt webbing being pulled through the belt buckle tension retention mechanism shall not exceed 67 N (15lb) and the maximum force shall be applied for a period no longer than 3s. No other force may be applied to the CRS during the adjustment of the passenger seat lap belt. The CRS shall not be repositioned after the passenger seat lap belt has been tightened.

5.1.2 Rigid Bar-Lower Anchorages: The CRS may be installed in the modified test fixture and secured to the rigid bar lower anchorages as follows:

5.1.2.1 Flexible Lower Anchorage CRS Attachment: CRS equipped with adjustable webbing and latch plates may be secured to the rigid bar lower anchorages on the passenger seat. The maximum force applied to the free ends of the CRS’s lower anchorage attachment webbing when pulled through the tension retention mechanism shall be the same as paragraph 5.1 of this AS. These types of CRS may also be secured to the passenger seat by attaching them to the passenger seat lap belt anchorage in the manner specified by the manufacturer’s instructions provided with the CRS.

5.1.2.2 Rigid Lower CRS Attachment: CRS equipped with rigid prongs may be secured to the rigid bar lower anchorages in the manner specified by the manufacturer’s instructions provided with the CRS.

6.1.2 CRS Installations: For the test specified by this AS, the back cushion, seat cushion, lap belts and belt anchor points are different from the standard FMVSS-213 seat configuration. Appendix A of this AS presents the locations, dimensions, and materials used to configure the FMVSS-213 fixture for the test specified by this AS.
All portions of the Anthropophic Test Dummy (ATD) torso shall be retained within the CRS. The centre point of the target points on either side of the ATD head shall pass through the transverse orthogonal planes whose intersection contains the forward-most and top-most points on the CRS surfaces.

16. Page 10, new paragraph 6.5.1 reads as follows:

6.5.1 Post Test Release of Integral Restraints on the CRS: The force to release the buckle on the CRS integral restraints (see 5.4) shall not exceed 7.3 kg (16 pounds).

17. Page 10, disregard paragraphs 7.1a through e. Marking of the article shall be in accordance with paragraphs 7.1f through 7.1h, and the paragraph 4 of this ETSO.

18. Page 11, disregard paragraphs 7.1h through m. New paragraph 7.1h reads as follows:

h. The following statement on yellow background with black text, regarding the installation and use of CRS:

“WARNING! DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY CAN OCCUR. Follow all instructions on this child restraint and in the manufacturer’s written instructions located ______________.
- Do not place this device behind any wall or seat back in an airplane that has an airbag.
- Do not use in any passenger seat that has an inflatable seat belt.
- Use only in a forward facing seat. Do not use in a rear facing seat or a side facing seat.
- Attach this child restraint with the airplane passenger seat lap belt or rigid bar anchorage system if so equipped. This child restraint is not designed to be used with a shoulder strap or any other tether strap to the seat or airplane.
- Snugly adjust the belts provided with this child restraint around your child.

19. Page 12, paragraph 7.1l. Disregard this paragraph, as it has been included in the new paragraph 7.1h.

20. Page 16, Figure A6. Disregard this Figure, as it no longer applies. The substance of this warning is now in paragraph 7.1h.
APPENDIX 2.

TEST CONDITIONS

SAE AS 5276/1 incorporates, as references, the following test standards:

- SAE RP J211, Instrumentation for Impact Tests;
- SAE AS8049A, Performance Standard for Seats in Civil Rotorcraft, Transport Aircraft and General Aviation Aircraft;
- SAE ARP4466, Dimensional Compatibility of Child Restraint Systems and Passenger Seat Systems in Civil Transport Airplanes;
- 49 CFR Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test Dummies;
- CS 25.853(a) [Appendix F, Part I(a)(iv)].
APPENDIX 1

MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE

The applicable standard is SAE AS 5276/1, ‘Child Restraint Systems in Transport Category Airplanes’, dated November 2000, with the following modifications:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entire document:</td>
<td>Throughout the document, ‘Aviation Child Safety Device (ACSD)’ shall be used instead of ‘CRS’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAE AS5276/1 incorporates, as references, the following test standards:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. SAE RP J211, Instrumentation for Impact Tests.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 49 CFR part 572, Anthropomorphic Test Dummies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CS 25.853(a) (Appendix F, Part I(a)(iv)).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 2.1</td>
<td>To be replaced with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Documents:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The following publications form part of this AS to the extent specified herein. Other publications are provided for reference. In the event of conflict between the text of this document and the references cited herein, the text of this document takes precedence. Nothing in this document, however, supersedes applicable laws and regulations unless a specific exemption has been obtained.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 2.1.1</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 SAE Publications:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP J211, Instrumentation for Impact Tests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS8049B, Performance Standard for Seats in Civil, Rotorcraft and Transport Aircraft and General Aviation Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP4466, Dimensional Compatibility of Child Restraint Systems and Passenger Seat Systems in Civil Transport Airplanes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 1

### MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 2.1.2</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Regulations, Advisory Circulars, European Technical Standard Orders and Reports:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASA Part-21, Certification Procedures for Products and Parts CS-25, Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 2.1.3</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Regulations and Documents:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 2.1.4</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4 ANSI Publications: ANSI Z535.4 -1998 Product Safety Signs and Labels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 1

MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 2.3</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Classification of Children: The physical characteristics of small children govern the proper ACSD for use. Mass, standing height, and developmental maturity (i.e. age) are important for proper ACSD configuration and orientation. As children develop at different rates, combined application of these characteristics in selecting an ACSD may be difficult. To assist in this process, Table 1 defines three stages of child development each with a single dominant characteristic underlined. Where an occupant falls between categories, the dominant characteristic is used to determine the proper ACSD configuration and orientation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Table 1 — Definitions of Child Categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newborn</td>
<td>Birth to 5 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant</td>
<td>5–10 (11–22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toddler</td>
<td>10–18 (22–40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 2.5d</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Any child that has attained his or her first birthday, with a mass greater than 10 kg (22 lb) and having a standing stature of less than 110 cm (44 in.) in height is considered a ‘toddler’ and should be seated in a forward-facing ACSD with both upper and lower torso restraint (Type III).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 2.6</td>
<td>New paragraph to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.6 Definitions: Refer to 49 CFR 571.213 S4. for aircraft child safety device definitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 ACSD Design/Functional Performance:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2.5</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.5 If an ACSD is equipped with a means of attaching to a rigid bar anchorage system, as prescribed by 49 CFR 571.225 S9, then the provided attachment hardware must comply with the requirements of 49 CFR 571.213 S5.9(a). If rigid prongs are provided for that attachment, they shall be retractable to the extent necessary to ensure proper positioning of the ACSD in an airplane passenger seat not equipped with rigid bar lower anchorages to avoid damage to the airplane seat or injury to nearby seat occupants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 1

**MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2.6</td>
<td>New paragraph 3.2.6 to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Except for components designed to attach to a child restraint anchorage system, an ACSD must not have any means designed for attaching the system to an aircraft seat cushion or aircraft seat back and any component (except belts) that is designed to be inserted between the aircraft seat cushion and the aircraft seat back. An ACSD shall be capable of meeting the requirements of this standard when installed solely by the passenger seat lap belt (pelvic portion of the restraint). If the ACSD is equipped with a child restraint anchorage system, then it shall also be capable of meeting the requirements of this standard when installed solely by attachment to rigid bar lower anchorages as prescribed by 49 CFR 571.225 S9. No passenger seat belt may contact the child-occupant of the ACSD. Each belt that is part of an ACSD and that is designed to restrain the child using the system, shall, when tested in accordance with Section 4 of this standard, impose no loads on the child as a result from the mass of the system or from the mass of the standard seat assembly specified therein.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2.7</td>
<td>New paragraph 3.2.7 to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.7 An ACSD shall comply with the force distribution requirements of 49 CFR 571.213 S5.2.1.1, S5.2.1.2, S5.2.2.1 (a), (b) and (c), S5.2.2.2, and S5.2.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2.8</td>
<td>New paragraph 3.2.8 to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.8 ACSD belt systems shall comply with the requirements of 49 CFR 571.213 S5.4.1.2, S5.4.1.3, S5.4.2, S5.4.3.1, S5.4.3.3, S5.4.3.5. References to paragraph S6.1 therein shall be considered to refer to Section 4 of this standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.3</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 Fire Protection: Cushions, upholstery, and all other exposed materials used in the ACSD except small parts (knobs, triggers, fasteners, seals and electrical parts) that would not contribute significantly to the propagation of a fire shall meet the fire protection provisions of CS 25.8S3(a) (Appendix F, Part I (a)(1)(ii)). Seat belts and shoulder harnesses shall meet the provisions of CS 25 (Appendix F, Part I (a)(iv)).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 1

**MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paragraph 4</strong></td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To be revised:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PERFORMANCE TEST SPECIFICATIONS: The dynamic test described in this section is used to evaluate the performance of the ACSD in a horizontal impact where the force is applied against the longitudinal axis of a forward-facing airplane passenger seat that holds the ACSD. The structural adequacy of the ACSD, the effectiveness of the ACSD attachments, and the adequacy of restraint of the child occupant, as prescribed in paragraph 4.1 of this AS, are the issues evaluated. One dynamic impact test shall be performed, with the ACSD secured using the passenger seat lap belt, for each category of child occupant, as defined in paragraph 2.3 of this AS, for which the ACSD is intended for use. ACSD equipped with lower anchorage attachment hardware per 49 CFR 571.213 S5.9(a) must be tested with each category of child occupant when secured using the rigid bar lower anchorages, except when the ACSD is in full compliance with 49 CFR 571.213.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paragraph 4.1</strong></td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To be revised:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Child-Occupant Simulation: One or more ATD representing the child categories for which the ACSD is intended for use shall be used to simulate a child-occupant in the dynamic test. Selection of the ATD shall be based on compliance with the following requirements:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. A newborn infant ATD, per 49 CFR part 572, Subpart K, shall be used to test a Type I ACSD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. A newborn infant ATD and a 12-month-old child ATD, per 49 CFR part 572, Subpart R, shall be used to test a Type II ACSD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. A 12-month-old child ATD and a 3-year-old child ATD, per 49 CFR part 572, Subpart P, shall be used to test a Type III ACSD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paragraph 4.1.2</strong></td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To be revised:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2 ATD Preparation and Clothing: All three types of ATDs used shall have a target point marker on each side of the head that is located on the transverse axis passing through the centre of mass of the ATD’s head and perpendicular to the head’s midsgittal plane. The 12-month-old and 3-year-old ATD’s must also have target points located on each knee pivot axis. ATDs must be clothed and prepared for use, as prescribed in 49 CFR 571.213 S9.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 1

MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 4.2</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Test Fixtures: The fixture on which the ACSD is installed for the dynamic test is based on the FMVSS-213 standard seat assembly test fixture defined in 49 CFR 571.213 S6.1.1(a)(1)(i). For the test specified by this AS, the back cushion, seat cushion, lap belts and belt anchor points are different from the FMVSS-213 standard seat test fixture configuration. Appendix A to this AS presents the locations, dimensions, and materials used to reconfigure the FMVSS-213 standard seat assembly test fixture for the test specified by this AS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 4.2.1</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1 Passenger Seat Restraints: Airplane passenger seat lap belts shall be installed on the seat test fixture as the primary means of attaching the ACSD to the seat test fixture depicted in Appendix A to this AS. The buckle shall be a lift latch type release mechanism. The belts shall meet the requirements of ETSO-C22g and conform to the length dimensions shown in Appendix A, Figure A5, to this AS. The webbing shall be made of nylon.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 4.2.2</td>
<td>New paragraph 4.2.2 to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2 Rigid Bar Lower Anchorages: If testing ACSD equipped with lower anchorage attachment hardware, the aforementioned modified seat test fixture must have rigid bar lower anchorages installed per Figures 1A and 1B of 49 CFR 571.213.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 4.5</td>
<td>The last sentence of paragraph 4.5 Photometric Instrumentation shall be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The resolution of the images shall be sufficient to enable accurate measurements of the maximum excursion of the head and knee of the ATD in Type III ACSD tests, or the maximum rotation of the ACSD in aft-facing Type I and Type II ACSD tests.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 4.6</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 Test Severity: The dynamic impact pulse shall meet the requirements specified for Type A seats in AS8049B, i.e. the 16 g, 13.4 m/s (44 ft/s) horizontal test condition for transport category airplane seats. The pulse described in Figure 2A of 49 CFR 571.213 is acceptable to show compliance with this requirement. The yaw and floor deformation specified in AS8049B are not required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 1

**MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 4.7</td>
<td>New paragraph 4.7 to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.7 Test Conditions: During the test, maintain the environmental conditions specified in 49 CFR 571.213 S6.1.1(d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 5.1</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.1 ACSD Installation: Install the ACSD at the centre of the seating position of the modified FMVSS-213 standard seat assembly test fixture in accordance with the manufacturers instructions provided with the system except that no tether strap shall be used. For the belted test condition, use only the aircraft lap belt. For tests with a child restraint anchor system, use only the lower anchorages of the child restraint anchor system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 5.2</td>
<td>New paragraph 5.2 to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 ATD Installation: The ATD shall be placed in the ACSD. Position it, and attach the child restraint belts, if appropriate, per 49 CFR 571.213 S10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 5.3</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3 ACSD Integral Restraint Adjustment: The ACSD integral restraint system shall be routed through the ACSD and fastened over the ATD as called for by the manufacturer’s instructions and per 49 CFR 571.213 S6.1.2(d)(1)(i).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 5.4</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4 ACSD Attachment Adjustment: The aircraft lap belt or child restraint anchor system straps attaching the ACSD to the standard seat assembly test fixture shall be adjusted per 49 CFR 571.213 S6.1.2(d)(1)(ii) or (iii) as appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 6.1</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.1 Excursion Limits: The ATD and ACSD excursions and initial positions described below shall be obtained by measuring the high-speed film or video images recorded during the test, or in the case of initial position, measured directly prior to the test.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 1

**MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AS 5276/1 section</strong></th>
<th><strong>Action</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 6.1.1</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.1 Test of Forward-Facing ACSD: The ACSD shall retain the ATD’s torso within the system. No portion of the ATD head shall pass through a vertical transverse plane passing through a point 813 mm (32 in.) forward of the seat back pivot axis on the standard seat assembly test fixture shown in Appendix A, Figure A2. This limit is referred to as the head excursion limit.

| Paragraph 6.1.2       | The second paragraph shall be revised: |

6.1.2 Test of Aft-Facing ACSD: The angle between the ACSD back child support surface and the vertical transverse plane shall not exceed 70 degrees at any time during the test. The initial (pre-test) angle between the ACSD back child support surface and the vertical transverse plane shall not be less than 45 degrees.

All portions of the ATD torso shall be retained within the ACSD. The centre of the target points on either side of the ATD head shall not pass through the transverse orthogonal planes whose intersection contains the forward-most and top-most points on the ACSD surfaces.

| Paragraph 6.2         | To be revised: |

The Head Injury Criterion (HIC36) is calculated according to the following equation:

\[
HIC = \left( \frac{(t_1 - t_2) \int \left[ \frac{1}{(t_2 - t_1)} \right] a(t) dt}{t_1} \right)^{2.5} \text{ Max}
\]

Where:
- \( t_1, t_2 \) = Any two points in time during the head impact which are not separated by more than a 36 millisecond time interval
- \( a(t) = \) The resultant head acceleration at the centre of gravity of the ATD head expressed as a multiple of \( g \) (the acceleration of gravity).

The maximum value of the HIC36 computation from data acquired during the impact test, including rebound motion of the ATD and ACSD, shall not exceed a value of 1 000.
## APPENDIX 1

### MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 6.4</td>
<td>A new second paragraph shall be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The ACSD shall also meet the requirements of 49 CFR 571.213 S5.1.1. References to paragraph S6.1 therein shall be considered to refer to Section 4 of this standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraphs 7.1a through 7.1e</td>
<td>Paragraphs 7.1a. through e. shall be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marking of the article shall be in accordance with paragraphs 7.1f. through 7.1h., and paragraph 4 of this ETSO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 7.1g</td>
<td>The second paragraph shall be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Place this Type I, II and III child restraint in a rear-facing position when using it with an infant weighing less than _____ pounds (_____Kg).’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraphs 7.1h through 7.1m</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 7.1h</td>
<td>New paragraph 7.1h to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.1h The following statement on yellow background with black text, regarding the installation and use of ACSD:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘WARNING! DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY CAN OCCUR. Follow all instructions on this aviation child restraint and in the manufacturer’s written instructions located [insert location].’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Do not place this device behind any wall or seat back in an airplane that has an airbag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Do not use in any passenger seat that has an inflatable seat belt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use only in a forward-facing seat. Do not use in a rear-facing seat or a side-facing seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Attach this aviation child restraint with the airplane passenger seat lap belt or rigid bar anchorage system if so equipped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• This aviation child restraint is not designed to be used with a shoulder strap or any other tether strap to the seat or airplane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Snugly adjust the belts provided with this aviation child restraint around your child.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 1

### MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 7.1i</td>
<td>New paragraph 7.1i to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.1i Additional label for ACSD that do not meet FMVSS-213. Any ACSD that meets the MPS of this TSO, but does not meet the requirements of FMVSS-213, the label in new Figure A6 must be permanently affixed to the webbing of the ACSD so that it is clearly visible when the ACSD is installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A1</td>
<td>Figure A1 shall be revised as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The horizontal distance between the seat back pivot axis to the lap belt anchor axis shall be changed from 269 (10.6) to 246 (9.7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A2</td>
<td>Figure A2 shall be revised as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The horizontal distance between the seat back pivot axis to the lap belt anchor axis shall be changed from 269 (10.6) to 246 (9.7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A new item 9 shall be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aluminium rod: 25.4 (1.0) Dia. welded to the front edge of item 1 such that the rod surface is tangent to the plane of the bottom of the aluminium plate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A3</td>
<td>Figure A3 shall be revised as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The vertical dimension of the anchor pivot shall be changed from 47.8 (1.88) to 50.8 (2.0), and the vertical dimension of the anchor height from 60.5 (2.38) to 63.5 (2.5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure A4</td>
<td>Figure A4 shall be revised as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A depiction of the 25.4 (1.0) Dia. rod defined in Figure A2 shall be added.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX 1

**MPS FOR AVIATION CHILD SAFETY DEVICE (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS 5276/1 section</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure A6</td>
<td>Figure A6 shall be replaced as follows:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE A6 — Label for ACSD Not Meeting FMVSS-213**

**WARNING!**

**NOT SAFE FOR USE IN MOTOR VEHICLES**

Could result in serious injury

- Box outline of label is red, 6-point line width.
- Box is 4.75 inches long by 1.25 inches high.
- Interior of box is yellow background.
- Text is Arial bold black letters.
- Large text is 18 point.
- Smaller text is 16 point.
European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Secondary Surveillance Radar Mode S Transponder

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Secondary Surveillance Radar Mode S Transponder that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in the EUROCAE ED-73E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Secondary Surveillance Radar Mode S Transponders, dated May 2011 as amended by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.

Note: Level 2 transponders are expected to comply with the Overlay Command Capability as per ED-73E section 3.23.1.12 and 3.18.4.40.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne-Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

3.2 — Specific
None.
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO resulting in misleading information is has been determined to be a major failure condition. Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO resulting in loss of function is a minor failure condition. The applicant must develop the system to at least the design assurance level commensurate with this failure condition.

4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
The marking must also include the transponder’s functional level and optional additional features as provided in ED-73E, Section 1.4.2.2, as well as minimum peak output power identified by the transponder class as defined in ED-73E, Section 1.4.2.4.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
APPENDIX 1

SECONDARY SURVEILLANCE RADAR MODE S TRANSPONDER

AMENDMENT TO EUROCAE ED-73E REQUIREMENTS

This Appendix lists the EASA modification to MPS for Secondary Surveillance Radar Mode S Transponder.

The applicable standard is EUROCAE ED-73E Secondary Surveillance Radar Mode S Transponder, dated May 2011, amended as described below.

Text from EUROCAE ED-73E is provided here as needed to provide context. Text to be added is underlined. Text to be removed is lined through.

1. EUROCAE ED-73E, page 59, Section 3.23.1.12.d, is modified here to ensure multiple Comm-B message changes are processed properly.

   d. Comm-B Broadcast

   NOTE 1: A Comm-B broadcast is a message directed to all active interrogators in view. Messages are alternately numbered 1, 2, and are available for 18 seconds unless a waiting air-initiated Comm-B interrupts the cycle. Interrogators have no means to cancel the Comm-B broadcast.

   NOTE 2: If there is more than one Comm-B message waiting for transmission, the timer is only started once the message becomes the current Comm-B broadcast.

   A Comm-B broadcast starts, when no air-initiated Comm-B transaction is in effect, with the loading of the broadcast message into the Comm-B buffer, insertion of DR codes 4, 5, 6 or 7 into downlink transmissions of DFs 4, 5, 20, 21 and with the starting of the B-timer for the current Comm-B message. On receipt of the above DR codes, interrogators may extract the broadcast message by transmitting RR=16 with DI≠3 or 7 or with DI=3 or 7 and RRS=0 in subsequent interrogations. The change of the DR value is used by the interrogator to detect that a new Comm-B broadcast is announced and to extract the new Comm-B message. A new Comm-B broadcast shall not interrupt a current Comm-B broadcast. When the B-timer runs out after 18 ± 1 seconds, the transponder will reset the DR codes as required, will discard the previous broadcast message, and changes the broadcast message number from 1 to 2 (or vice versa).

   If an air-initiated Comm-B transaction is initiated during the broadcasting interval (i.e., while the B-timer is running), the B-timer is stopped and reset, the appropriate code is inserted into the DR field, and the Comm-B transaction proceeds per Figure 3-18. The previous Comm-B broadcast message remains ready to be reactivated for 18 ± 1 seconds after conclusion of the air-initiated Comm-B transaction.

   Waiting Comm-B broadcasts shall be retained for transmission once the current Comm-B broadcast is finished. If the contents of a waiting Comm-B broadcast changes, only the most recent value shall be broadcast. This prevents multiple changes from generating a sequence of broadcasts. Currently only BDS registers 1,0, Downlink Capability Report and, 2,0, Flight ID, make use of the Comm-B Broadcast protocol.
2. A test procedure is added here to ensure the modified requirements in Section 1 of this Appendix are met. This test is intended to be introduced in EUROCAE ED-73E, Section 5.5.8.23, on pages 253 and 254.

5.5.8.23 Procedures #21A and #21B Comm-B Broadcast

5.5.8.23.1 Test Procedure #21A Comm-B Broadcast

NOTE 1: The command to the transponder that a Comm-B broadcast message shall be sent originates in a peripheral device or in the device that holds the extended capability report.

NOTE 2: The Comm-B broadcast does not affect the existing Comm-B protocol, air- or ground-initiated. The existing test procedures remain unchanged.

NOTE 3: Verification of interface patterns is already part of the Comm-B test procedures and need not be repeated for the Comm-B Broadcast.

This test procedure verifies that the DR code command and the MB field of the Comm-B broadcast protocol is carried out correctly.

a. STEP 1 — General Broadcast Protocol Test

During the Comm-B protocol test procedure (Procedure #18) insert the appropriate DR Code command and the MB field of the Comm-B broadcast into the transponder.

Verify that:

(1) The transponder can correctly show the DR codes 4, 5, 6, 7 when NO air initiated Comm B is in progress and that it cannot show DR codes 4, 5, 6, 7 when an air initiated Comm B is in progress.

(2) The Comm-B broadcast message can be extracted by the interrogator for 18 ± 1 seconds.

(3) The Comm-B broadcast annunciation (DR = 4, 5, 6, or 7) and the Comm-B broadcast MB field are interrupted by an air-initiated Comm-B and reappear when that transaction is concluded. For transponders implementing the enhanced air-initiated Comm-B protocol, the transponder will be independently interrupted by up to 16 Comm-B messages that are assigned to each II code. After the Comm-B is concluded for each II code, the Comm-B broadcast is again available to that interrogator. Verify that the next waiting broadcast message is not announced to any interrogators until the current broadcast message has timed out.

(4) After interruption another 18 ± 1 seconds of broadcast time is available to the interrogator. For transponders implementing the enhanced air-initiated Comm-B protocol, the transponder will be independently interrupted by up to 16 Comm-B
messages that are assigned to each II code. After interruption, another
18 ± 1 seconds of broadcast time is available for each II code.

(5) A subsequent and different Comm-B broadcast message is announced with the
alternate DR code and that this DR code also follows the verifications above. For
transponders implementing the enhanced air-initiated Comm-B protocol, the
transponder will be independently interrupted by up to 16 Comm-B messages
that are assigned to each II code. The subsequent Comm-B broadcast is
announced only after each Comm-B is broadcast timer has expired for all II codes.

b. STEP 2 — Transponder-Initiated Broadcast

(1) Enter an AIS Flight Identification into the transponder.

Verify that a broadcast is automatically initiated by the transponder.

Extract the broadcast and verify the correct flight ID.

Wait 20 seconds to allow the broadcast timer to time out and enter the same AIS
value again.

Verify that no new broadcast is initiated by the transponder.

Repeat the test with a different AIS flight identification.

(2) Enter a datalink capability report into the transponder.

Verify that a broadcast is automatically initiated by the transponder.

Extract the broadcast and verify the correct datalink capability report.

Wait 20 seconds to allow the broadcast timer to time out and enter the same
datalink capability report again.

Verify that no new broadcast is initiated by the transponder.

Repeat the test with a different datalink capability report.

5.5.8.23.2 Test Procedure #21B Processing of multiple Comm-B messages

NOTE 1: The command to the transponder that a Comm-B broadcast message shall be sent
originates in a peripheral device or in the device that holds the extended capability
report.

NOTE 2: The Comm-B broadcast does not affect the existing Comm-B protocol, air- or ground-
initiated. The existing test procedures remain unchanged.

NOTE 3: Verification of interface patterns is already part of the Comm-B test procedures and
need not be repeated for the Comm-B Broadcast.
This test procedure verifies that multiple Comm-B broadcast messages are queued and processed correctly.

Generate one flight identification change followed by a data link capability report change and 2 more flight identification changes in less than 18 seconds.

Verify that:

1. The first Flight ID change is available as a Comm-B Broadcast.
2. The data link capability report change is made available as a Comm-B broadcast after the Flight ID Broadcast times out.
3. The last flight ID change is made available as a Comm-B Broadcast after the Data Link Capability Broadcast times out.
4. All three Comm-B Broadcasts are available for 18 ± 1 seconds each.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Airborne Multipurpose Electronic Displays

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides gives the requirements which Airborne Multipurpose Electronic Displays that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in the SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) document 8034B, Minimum Performance Standards for Airborne Multipurpose Electronic Displays, dated 6/1/2011. Additional requirements on colour can be found in Appendix 1 to this document; dated December 30, 1982 as amended by this ETSO in particular, add the following information to paragraph 4.3.3 of AS 8034:

"the following depicts acceptable display colours related to their functional meaning for electronic display systems:

(a) Display feature should be colour coded as follows:

- **Warnings** .................................................. Red
- **Flight envelope and system limits** ....................... Red
- **Cautions, abnormal sources** .......................... Amber/Yellow
- **Earth** .................................................. Tan/Brown
- **Scales and associated figures** ........................ White,
- **Engaged modes** ........................................ Green
- **Sky** .................................................. Cyan/Blue

(b) Precipitations and turbulence areas should be coded as follows:
Precipitation up to 4 millimeter per hour (mm/h) Green

- 0 – 4 mm/h Orange
- 4 – 12 mm/h Amber/Yellow
- 12 – 50 mm/h Red
- above 50 mm/h Magenta

Turbulence

- White or Magenta

(c) Background colour (Grey or other shade) Background colour may be used to enhance display presentation

Colours must track brightness so that chrominance and relative chrominance separation are maintained as much as possible during day-night operations.

To be eligible to this ETSO standard, the equipment shall at least contain a Display Unit providing the visualisation function.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

3.2 — Specific
None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

4 — Marking

4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
Appendix 1 — Colour

SAE AS 8034B, Section 4.3.4, requires colour-coding requirements. This Appendix provides additional guidance on colour.

1. Display features, precipitation, and turbulence areas should be colour-coded as depicted in Table A1 and Table A2 respectively, unless otherwise specified by the ETSO application being displayed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Display Feature</th>
<th>Colour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warnings</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight envelope and system limits</td>
<td>Red Note 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cautions, non-normal sources</td>
<td>Amber/Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scales and associated figures</td>
<td>White Note 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>Tan/Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sky</td>
<td>Cyan/Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged Modes/normal conditions/safe operation</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note 1:** Use of Amber/Yellow as appropriate is also acceptable.

**Note 2:** Use of the colour green for tape elements (for example, airspeed and altitude) has also been found acceptable if the colour green does not adversely affect flight crew alerting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precipitation and Turbulence</th>
<th>Colour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Precipitation up to 4 millimeters per hour (mm/hr)</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precipitation 4–12 mm/hr</td>
<td>Amber/Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precipitation 12–50 mm/hr</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precipitation Above 50 mm/hr</td>
<td>Magenta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbulence</td>
<td>White or Magenta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Background colour (gray or other shade) may be used to enhance display presentation.

3. Colours should track brightness so that chrominance and relative chrominance separation are maintained as much as possible during day-night operations.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Crewmember Portable Protective Breathing Equipment

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements that new models of crewmember protective equipment must meet in order to be identified with applicable ETSO marking. Which Crewmember Portable Protective Breathing Equipment that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in the attached "Federal Aviation Administration Standard for Crewmember Protective Breathing Equipment" and the SAE AS 8047, Performance Standard for Cabin Crew Portable Protective Breathing Equipment for Use During Aircraft Emergencies, dated 6/1/2002, as modified by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.
Crew member portable PBE are separated into four classes suitable for use by crew members during the following scenarios:

Class 1: For an in-flight cabin or accessible compartment smoke/fire conditions at normal cabin altitude (up to 8000 ft equivalent).

Class 2: In addition to the requirements of Class 1, protection against a subsequent depressurisation to 40 000 ft while wearing the unit.

Class 3: Emergency ground evacuation of the aircraft during fire/smoke conditions, operating escape systems and assisting passengers.

Class 4: In-flight emergency and ground evacuation during smoke/fire conditions (as per
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See paragraph 6.3 of Appendix 1 to this ETSO.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
None.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
None.

3.2 — Specific
None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
None. In addition, the crew member’s portable PBE shall be marked permanently and legibly with the class (see paragraph 3.1.1 above).

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
APPENDIX 1. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION STANDARD PROTECTIVE BREATHING EQUIPMENT DATED

1.0 Purpose. This appendix provides minimum standards for crewmembers protective breathing equipment.

2.0 Scope. These standards apply to protective breathing equipment that provides any crewmember with the ability to locate and combat a fire within the airplane cabin or any other accessible compartment at normal cabin altitudes (up to 8000 feet equivalent).

3.0 Minimum Performance Standards.

3.1 The PBE unit must contain a supply of breathable gas (allows the use of any breathable gas instead of requiring only oxygen and does allow the use of a chemical oxygen generator).

3.2 The unit shall adequately protect any adult, within the 5th percentile female (neck size circumference 11.1 inches) and 95th percentile male (neck size circumference 16.4 inches) body dimensions (including spectacle users). Any recommendations addressing long hair and/or beards shall be included in the instructions furnished with the manufactured units.

3.3 The unit shall have a means for any crewmember to determine the serviceability of the unit in its stowed condition.

3.4 Failure of the unit to operate or to cease operation shall be readily apparent to the user.

3.5 The supply of breathable gas shall meet the applicable SAE gas standard for purity.

3.6 The unit shall not result in a hazard when stored, in use, or during an inadvertent operation.

3.7 The stowed unit shall not be adversely affected by environmental extremes. The applicable sections of RTCA DO-160C shall be used to demonstrate unit compliance.

3.8 The unit shall have a stated reliability with an appropriate confidence level to establish any shelf life, operational limit and/or maintenance interval.

3.9 The unit shall wear comfortably in use leaving both hands free. It shall not be displaced during the normal tasks of locating and combating a fire (i.e., crawling, kneeling, running actions, etc.).

3.10 The unit shall provide adequate vision capability for its intended use, including the consideration of fogging and/or condensation.

3.11 The unit must allow intelligible two-way communication, including the use of airplane interphone and megaphone. The user must be able to communicate with a user or nonuser at a distance of at least four meters. A background noise of 65db and a user communication sound level of 85db or equivalent method is recommended.

3.12 The unit shall be capable of being easily donned and activated, after gaining access to the stowed unit within 15 seconds. It must be easy to doff.
4.0 Performance Requirements. The following shall apply to the approval of any crewmember PBE design to be identified and manufactured to this TSO:

4.1 The unit shall provide the required protection for the following work load profile, at an ambient temperature of 21°C for adults within the 5th percentile female (107 lbs) and 95th percentile male (220 lbs) body weight, at sea level and 8000 feet altitude:

- 0 to 05 minutes at 0.33 watts per lb. body weight.
- 5 to 07 minutes at 0.66 watts per lb. body weight.
- 7 to 12 minutes at 0.50 watts per lb. body weight.
- 12 to 14 minutes at 0.66 watts per lb. body weight.
- 14 to 15 minutes at 0.33 watts per lb. body weight.

NOTE: This test is to be performed in sequence.

4.2 The mean inspiratory values shall be within the following limits:

- 4.2.1 The carbon dioxide concentration level at mouth/nose shall not exceed 4 percent at sea level. The concentration may increase to 5 percent at sea level for a period not to exceed 2 minutes.
- 4.2.2 The carbon monoxide level shall not exceed 50 ppm, time weighted average.
- 4.2.3 The chloride level shall not exceed 1 ppm, time weighted average.

4.3 Upon donning, the unit shall be self purging by a sufficient supply of breathable gas to ensure one complete dead volume displacement within 20 seconds of initial operation.

4.4 The unit shall protect the user against toxic fumes and smoke. The eyes, nose, and mouth must be protected to 0.05 mean contaminant protection factor during the work profile stated as item 1 of this paragraph. Aerospace Standards (AS) 8031 and 8047 (Class 1) may be used as references, as applicable. AS 8031, states that the test contaminant must be n-pentane or similar gas having a molecular weight less than 100. The use of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) is an acceptable alternative. The use of aerosols such as sodium chloride (NaCl) or corn oil are not considered acceptable as an alternative for a challenge gas. Component sensitivity to particle size and the potential to precipitate on the unit surface are considerations that make aerosols unacceptable to measure a contaminant protection factor.

4.5 The internal temperature of the unit shall not exceed 40° wet bulb at an ambient temperature of 21°C.

4.6 The internal temperature of the unit shall not exceed 50°C wet bulb, for a 2 minute exposure, at an ambient temperature of 100°C.

4.7 Breathing inspiration/expiration resistance shall not exceed ±3 1/2 inches of water from sea level to 8000 feet altitude, as measured at the mouth.

4.8 The unit shall operate at a mean positive pressure and shall incorporate relief valve(s) to prevent overpressure of the unit.
4.9 The unit shall be designed for peak breathing flows of 250 liters per minutes (LPM) and shall be capable of 80 liter-minute volume for a 30 second period at any time throughout its operation.

NOTE:
The test protocol to establish the combined performance requirement of the work load profile and contaminant levels shall be based upon the testing of 24 persons representative of the stated population range.

5.0 Construction Requirements. The following shall apply to the approval of any subject PBE design to be identified and manufactured to this TSO:

5.1 The unit and any stowage container/case shall be constructed of materials that are flame resistant that satisfy the requirements of FAR Section 25.853 and tested in accordance with Appendix F Part I (a) through (d) Vertical Test.

5.2 Any exposed portions of the unit and stowage case shall withstand and remain functional when exposed to a radiant heat flux of 1.0 BTU/ft² per second for 60 seconds. The unit shall also protect the head and neck of the user from dripping 200°C plastic materials and withstand a 1000°C flame for 5 seconds without material penetration while operational.

NOTE:
(1) The 1.0 BTU/ft² per second for 60 seconds criteria. A radiant heat source of sufficient size to expose the stowage case containing a PBE unit and any exposed portions of the unit in a manner to obtain the stated heat flux at the case surfaces, in a typical as installed arrangement, will be acceptable.

(2) Protection from dripping 200°C plastic material may be accomplished by a number of methods. One method is to ignite a polypropylene rod and allow the drops to impinge on the various external materials, seams, transparency, etc. The drop height should be adjusted so that the drop contact temperature is at least 200°C.

(3) The 5 second 1000°C test. This test is meant to protect a crewmember wearing the PBE from an unexpected flame lick. The two main concerns are failure of the unit that would injure the wearer and any leakage of the breathable atmosphere that could produce an explosion or hazard. The test rig shall expose the unit, while operating, to a 1000°C flame envelope. One company has used German Teknu burners with a flow rate of about 21 liters per minute. The flow rate and distance of the burner to the surface of the PBE unit being tested will need to be adjusted to obtain the required temperature. In most cases the flame plume developed will not expose the complete unit. A segment may be passed through the flame plume to obtain the 5 seconds exposure period and then rotated to the next segment and passed through the flame plume, etc., until the complete unit has been tested. A visual (i.e., videotape) record to this test might be useful documentation, in addition to the measured parameters.

5.3 The size of the PBE unit when donned shall allow the wearer to pass through any access appropriate to the airplane type for which approval is requested, to investigate and/or combat an inflight fire. As a generic standard, the wearer must be able to pass through 460X460 mm² opening.
5.4 The material and fabrication of the unit shall cause the unit to be puncture/tear resistant. See ASTM references for suggested methods.

6.0 References. The following may be helpful in developing a PBE design and/or obtaining FAA approval of the basic design, they are not of themselves FAA requirements and may differ from the TSO requirements, which take precedence:

SAE AS 8047 (Class 1) — Performance Standard for Cabin Crew Portable Protective Breathing Equipment for Use During Aircraft Emergencies.

SAE AS 8031 — Personal Protective Devices for Toxic and Irritating Atmospheres. Air Transport Crew Member.


FAA-AM-78-41 — A Study of Workload and Oxygen Consumption for Airline Cabin Crew Member During a Simulated Inflight Smoke/Fire Emergency.

ASTM D1149 — Accelerate Ozone Cracking of Vulcanized Rubber.

ASTM D624 — Rubber Property: Tear Resistance.

ASTM D750 — Rubber Deterioration.

ASTM D228 — Abrasion Resistance.


## Appendix 1

**MPS FOR CREWMEMBER PORTABLE PBE**

The applicable standard is SAE AS 8047, Performance Standard for Cabin Crew Portable Protective Breathing Equipment for Use During Aircraft Emergencies, dated 6/1/2002. It shall be modified as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAE AS 8047 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.1 Scope:</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 2.1 Applicable Documents:</td>
<td>The following documents shall be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AS 8026A, Crewmember Demand Oxygen Mask for Transport Category Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AS 1303A, Portable Chemical Oxygen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CS-25, Certification Specifications Large Aeroplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AS 8010C, Aviator’s Breathing Oxygen Purity Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AS 8031A, Personal Protective Devices for Toxic and Irritating Atmospheres, Air Transport Crew Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ETSO-C99a, Flight Deck (Sedentary) Crewmember Protective Breathing Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ETSO-C69c, Emergency Evacuation Slides, Ramps and Slide/Ramp Combinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASTM D1149, Standard Test Method for Rubber Deterioration - Surface Ozone Cracking in a Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASTM D624, Standard Test Method for Tear Strength of Conventional Vulcanized Rubber and Thermoplastic Elastomers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASTM D750, Standard Test Method for Rubber Deterioration Using Artificial Weathering Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASTM D228, Abrasion Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASTM D1922-REVA, Standard Test Method for Propagation Tear Resistance of Plastic Film and Thin Sheeting by Pendulum Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASTM D1004, Standard Test Method for Initial Tear Resistance of Plastic Film and Sheeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASTM D2582, Standard Test Method for Puncture-Propagation Tear Resistance of Plastic Film and Thin Sheeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1

**MPS FOR CREWMEMBER PORTABLE PBE (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAE AS 8047 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.1</td>
<td>Following paragraphs to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.1 Unit must be a self-contained device, (containing a supply or source of breathable gas) which will not increase the risk to the user or the aircraft during storage or use, and must satisfy the requirements of the applicable sections of CS 25.1439 and the required operational regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.1.1 Breathable gas source may be either oxygen or air.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.1.2 Use of a chemical oxygen generator is an acceptable alternative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.1.3 Breathable gas must meet the gas standard for purity, SAE AS8010 Rev C, Aviator’s Breathing Oxygen Purity Standard. For air, compliance with the purity standards in AS8010C, Table 2, Constituent Maximum Concentrations for Chemical Oxygen, has to be shown. Type IV chemically-generated oxygen for emergency-use shall be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.2</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.2 Portable PBE unit must adequately protect any adult (within the 5th percentile female (107 lbs, 11.1-inch neck circumference) to 95th percentile male (220 lbs, 16.4-inch neck circumference) body dimensions), including spectacle users. To demonstrate compliance with spectacles, eyeglasses must be a minimum of 152 mm (6 inches) wide by 51 mm (2 inches) high.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.2.1 Facepiece designers should consider extremes of Naison-Menton, Bizygomatic, Bigonial and Naison-Supramentale measurements and other applicable anthropometric data to provide a device with adequate fit. Sources of data are listed in paragraph 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.2.2 Limitations/recommendations shall be included in the IM/CMM (required in paragraph 5.b of this ETSO) for using portable PBE with long hair and/or beards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.2.3 The size of the portable PBE unit when donned must allow the wearer to pass through any access opening 18 inches (460 mm) × 18 inches (460 mm) to investigate and/or combat an in-flight fire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### MPS FOR CREWMEMBER PORTABLE PBE (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAE AS 8047 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.4</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.4 Failure of the unit to operate or to cease operation must be apparent to the user. This must be accomplished with aural and/or visual warning that also must activate at gas supply exhaustion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.5</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.6</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.6 Unit must not cause a hazard when stored, in use, or during inadvertent operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.8</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.8 The portable PBE unit must have a 98% minimum reliability factor at 90% confidence level during its design service life. A shelf life, operational limit and/or maintenance interval must be established and included in the CMM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.10</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.10 Portable PBE must wear comfortably in use leaving both hands free. It must not displace during normal tasks of locating and combating a fire, such as crawling, kneeling or running.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.11</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.11 Hoods, Full-Face Masks with Lenses, and/or Integral Goggles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.11.1 Range of Vision: Portable PBE must permit peripheral vision in the horizontal meridian of at least 120 degrees (60 degrees on each side of the centre point) and in the vertical meridian of at least 60 degrees (40 degrees above and 20 degrees below the centre point) when evaluated by standard arc perimeter techniques.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.11.2 Fogging: The portable PBE shall be designed to minimise moisture condensation on the inside surface, or include a means of preventing or removing any moisture that may condense on surfaces during use.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 1

### MPS FOR CREWMEMBER PORTABLE PBE (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAE AS 8047 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.12</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.12 Portable PBE must allow intelligible two-way communication, including the use of airplane interphone (handset or microphone) and megaphone. User must be able to communicate with another user or non-user at a distance of at least four meters. Use a background noise of 65db and a user communication sound level of 85db or equivalent method.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.1.15</td>
<td>New paragraph to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.15 Material used to fabricate the unit must be puncture/tear-resistant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2.1</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.1 Average inspiratory limits must be within the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Carbon dioxide concentration level at mouth/nose must not exceed 4% at sea level. Concentration may increase to 5% at sea level for a period not to exceed 2 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Carbon monoxide level must not exceed 50 ppm, time-weighted average.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chloride level must not exceed 1 ppm, time weighted-average.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2.2</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.2 When a user puts on portable PBE, the unit must be self-purging by enough breathable gas to ensure one complete dead volume displacement within 20 seconds of initial operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 3.2.3</td>
<td>To be revised:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.3 Portable PBE must protect the user against toxic fumes and smoke. The test procedures in AS 8031A shall be used. An alternative challenge gas may be used. Aerosols, such as sodium chloride (NaCl) or corn oil are not acceptable as an alternative. Component sensitivity to particle size and the potential to precipitate on the unit surface make aerosols unacceptable to measure a contaminant protection factor. User’s eyes, nose, and mouth must be protected to 0.05 mean contaminant protection factor during the work profiles specified in paragraph 3.2.4.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1

**MPS FOR CREWMEMBER PORTABLE PBE (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAE AS 8047 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Paragraph 3.2.4      | First sentence to be revised:  
3.2.4 Portable PBE must provide the minimum required protection for the following work profiles, at an ambient 70 °F (21.1 °C) for the intended population (generally 107 to 220 lb). |
| Paragraph 3.2.5      | To be revised:  
3.2.5 Internal temperature of the portable PBE must not exceed 104 °F (40 °C) wet bulb at an ambient temperature of + 70 °F (21.1 °C). |
| Paragraph 3.2.6      | To be revised:  
3.2.6 Portable PBE must function satisfactorily in a 212 °F (100 °C) environment, where the internal temperatures must not exceed 122 °F (50 °C) wet bulb for a 2-minute exposure. |
| Paragraph 3.2.9      | To be revised:  
3.2.9 Portable PBE must operate at a mean positive pressure and incorporate a relief valve(s) to prevent over-pressurisation. |
| Paragraph 3.2.10     | To be revised:  
3.2.10 Portable PBE must support peak flows of 250 liters per minute (LPM) and must be capable of supporting a minute breathing minute volume of 80 litres for a 30-second period at any time throughout its operation. |
| Paragraph 3.2.11     | To be revised:  
3.2.11 Portable PBE must be easily put on and activated, after the user gains access to the stowed unit within 15 seconds. The unit shall be designed so it can be donned and worn by users wearing eyeglasses, as specified in paragraph 3.1.2. Unit face must not displace eyeglasses or be flexible enough to allow adjustment of eyeglasses. |
| Section 4 CONSTRUCTION | To be disregarded. |
| Paragraph 6          | To be revised:  
TESTING PROCEDURES: |
# Appendix 1

**MPS FOR CREWMEMBER PORTABLE PBE (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAE AS 8047 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 6.1</td>
<td>First sentence to be revised: Manufacturer of the portable PBE is responsible for performing the required tests in paragraph 3.2 to verify its performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 6.2</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 6.2</td>
<td>New paragraph to be added:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.2 FLAMMABILITY. All materials used in the portable PBE and any stowage container/case (including insulation on electrical wires) in a typical installed arrangement must be self-extinguishing. Materials must comply with CS 25.853(a), Appendix F, Part I (a)(1)(iv).

6.2.1 Any exposed portions of the portable PBE and stowage container/case must withstand a radiant heat flux of 1.0 BTU/ft² per second for 60 seconds, and remain functional when exposed to it.

6.2.2 Radiant heat flux source must be of sufficient size so the portable PBE, any stowage container/case, and exposed parts of the unit are exposed in a manner that creates the heat flux at all the surfaces, in a typical as installed arrangement.

6.2.3 Portable PBE must protect the user’s head and neck from dripping 392 °F (200 °C) plastic materials and withstand an 1 832 °F (1 000 °C) flame for 5 seconds without material penetration while operating.

6.2.3.1 Protection from dripping plastic material may be tested by several methods. One is to ignite a polypropylene rod and allow the drops to impinge on the various external materials, seams, and transparency. Adjust the drop height so that the drop contact temperature is at least 392 °F (200 °C).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAE AS 8047 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 6.2 (continued)</td>
<td>6.2.3.2 The 5-second 1 832 °F (1 000 °C) test is meant to protect a crew member wearing the portable PBE from an unexpected flame lick. Two main concerns are failure of the unit that would injure the wearer, and leakage of the breathable atmosphere that could produce an explosion or hazard. The test rig must expose the unit, while operating, to a 1 832 °F (1 000 °C) flame envelope. One company has used German Teklu burners with a flow rate of about 21 liters per minute. The flow rate and distance of the burner to the surface of the PBE unit being tested shall be adjusted to obtain the required temperature. In most cases the flame plume developed will not expose the complete unit. A segment can be passed through the flame plume to obtain the 5-second exposure period and then the unit can be rotated to the next segment and passed through the flame plume, and so forth, until the complete unit has been tested. Making a visual (videotape) record of this test might be useful documentation, in addition to the measured parameters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.4 Heat Release and Smoke Density. Exposed panels/surfaces totalling more than one square foot in surface area must meet the heat release and smoke density requirements of CS 25.853, Appendix F, Parts IV and V. Guidance on these test requirements can be found in the Aircraft Materials Fire Test Handbook, DOT/FAA/AR-00/42, at <a href="http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/handbook.stm">www.fire.tc.faa.gov/handbook.stm</a>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.5 Battery Qualification. If the equipment uses a lithium battery as a power source, battery must meet the applicable battery standards:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.5.1 ETSO-C142a, Non-Rechargeable Lithium Cells and Batteries (see RTCA, Inc. document RTCA/DO-227, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Lithium Batteries, dated June 23, 1995), or most current revision.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1

**MPS FOR CREWMEMBER PORTABLE PBE (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAE AS 8047 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 6.3</td>
<td>New paragraph to be added:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6.3 Environmental Qualification</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6.3.1 High-Temperature Exposure:</strong> The portable PBE shall be soaked for 12 hours at not less than 160 °F (71.1 °C). Then the PBE shall be transferred to 70 °F (21.1 °C) ambient temperature. Within 30 minutes of doing this, the portable PBE shall be tested to the requirements of paragraph 3.2.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6.3.2 Low-Temperature Exposure:</strong> The portable PBE device shall be soaked for 2 hours at not greater than –65 °F (–54 °C). Then the PBE shall be transferred to 0 °F (–17.8 °C) for 2 hours to stabilise it. After this, the PBE shall be transferred to 70 °F (21.1 °C) ambient temperature. Within 30 minutes of doing this, the portable PBE shall be tested to the requirements of paragraph 3.2.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6.3.3 Operational Shock:</strong> The PBE shall comply with the test requirements in RTCA DO-160 release defined in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1, Section 7, paragraph 7.2.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6.3.4 Humidity:</strong> The PBE shall comply with the test requirements in RTCA DO-160 release defined in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1, Section 6, Category A.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6.3.5 Waterproofness:</strong> The PBE shall comply with the test requirements in RTCA DO-160 release defined in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1, Section 10, Category R.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6.3.6 Fungus Resistance:</strong> The PBE shall comply with the test requirements in RTCA DO-160 release defined in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1, Section 13, Category F.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6.3.7 Decompression (Class 2 only): Devices covered by this document must meet the requirements of paragraph 3.2 when subjected to decompression testing.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TCAS) AIRBORNE EQUIPMENT, TCAS II AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM II (ACAS II) Version 7.1 with Hybrid Surveillance

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements that new model of traffic alert and collision avoidance system airborne equipment which Airborne Collision Avoidance System II (ACAS II) Version 7.1 equipment that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — General
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in EUROCAE Document ED-143, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II), dated September 2008, as modified by Change 1 dated April 2009, Change 2 (Version 7.1) dated April 2013, and by Appendix 1 to this ETSO- and


3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
If the article includes a complex custom micro-coded component, the component must be developed according to EUROCAE ED80 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, dated April 2000. Those articles containing hardware upgraded from an original product developed before EUROCAE ED80 (RTCA DO254) was published (April 2000), need only apply the requirements in EUROCAE ED80 (RTCA/DO254) to the changed hardware and all hardware affected by the change.

3.2 — Specific resulting in misleading information
None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO resulting in misleading information is a hazardous failure condition.
Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO resulting in loss of function is a minor failure condition.
Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a hazardous/severe major failure condition. The applicant must develop the system to at least the design assurance level commensurate with this failure condition classification.

4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
APPENDIX 1

HIGH-LEVEL-PSEUDOCODE

Replace ED-143 Volume II Attachment A page 8-P16 with the following:

**PROCESS** Set_up_display_outputs;

<Determine advisory annunciation precedence>

**IF** (an RA is to be displayed this cycle)

**THEN** **IF** (increase rate RA issued)

**THEN** CLEAR reversal, maintain rate, and altitude crossing flags;

**IF** (increase rate RA was not present last cycle)

THEN indicate that RA changed to increase rate this cycle;

**ELSE** CLEAR indication that increase rate RA was present last cycle;

**IF** (RA requires maintenance of rate)

THEN SET maintain rate indication;

CLEAR sense reversal indication, if any; <announce maintain>

**ELSE** **IF** (previous cycle’s RA was dual negative AND current RA is either single negative or positive)

THEN CLEAR maintain rate indication;

**IF** (sense of previously displayed RA has been reversed)

THEN CLEAR altitude crossing flag; <Reversal needs to be announced even if the reversed RA is altitude crossing>

CLEAR maintain rate indication; <If reversing maintain RA>

**IF** (RA is preventive) <Initial preventive neg. or VSL RA or weakening>

<Note: All positive RAs are now corrective>

**THEN** **IF** (RA is dual negative) <Don’t Climb/Don’t Descend>

**THEN** SET maintain rate indication; <announce maintain>

**ELSE** CLEAR maintain rate indication;

**IF** ((positive Climb is weakening to negative Don’t Descend OR (positive Descend is weakening to negative Don’t Climb AND not weakening due to extreme low altitude condition)) AND not weakening due to multiaircraft “sandwich” encounter with both up-sense and down-sense VSLs)

**THEN** indicate that weakened RA is corrective;

<Results in green “fly to” arc plus corrective aural annunciation for initial weakening>

Set displayed model-goal rate to 0 fpm; <RA display device will use prescribed vertical rates for neg. & VSL RAs>

**ELSE** **IF** (RA is corrective negative or VSL)

**THEN** CLEAR maintain rate indication;

Set displayed model-goal rate to 0 fpm;

CLEAR clear of conflict flag;

**ELSE** CLEAR maintain rate indication; <no RA is to be displayed this cycle>

Set displayed model-goal rate to 0 fpm;

**IF** (an altitude-reporting threat became non-altitude-reporting during preceding RA)
THEN CLEAR track drop and clear of conflict flags;
ELSE IF (a threat's track was dropped during preceding RA)
    THEN CLEAR clear of conflict flag;
PERFORM Load_display_and_aural_info; <Load display information to be sent to the RA display, TA display and aural annunciation subsystem.>

END Set_up_display_outputs;

LOW-LEVEL PSEUDOCODE

Replace ED-143 Volume II Attachment A page 8-P17 with the following:

PROCESS Set_up_display_outputs;

IF (any bit in G.RA(1–10) EQ $TRUE)
    THEN IF (G.ANYINCREASE EQ $TRUE)
        THEN CLEAR G.ANYREVERSE, G.MAINTAIN, G.ANYCROSS;
        IF (G.PREVINCREASE EQ $FALSE)
            THEN SET G.ANYCORCHANG, G.PREVINCREASE;
        ELSE CLEAR G.PREVINCREASE;
    IF ((G.RA(1) EQ $TRUE AND G.ZDMODEL GT P.CLMRT AND
         G.ZDOWN GT P.CLMRT) OR (G.RA(6) EQ $TRUE AND
         G.ZDMODEL LT P.DESRT AND G.ZDOWN LT P.DESRT))
        THEN SET G.MAINTAIN;
        CLEAR G.ANYREVERSE;
    ELSE IF ((G.CLSTROLD EQ 4 AND G.DESTROLD EQ 4) AND
             (G.CLSTRONG EQ 0 OR G.DESTRONG EQ 0))
        THEN CLEAR G.MAINTAIN;
    IF (G.ANYREVERSE EQ $TRUE)
        THEN CLEAR G.ANYCROSS;
    CLEAR G.MAINTAIN;
    IF (G.CORRECTIVE_CLM EQ $FALSE AND
        G.CORRECTIVE_DES EQ $FALSE)
        THEN IF (G.RA(2) EQ $TRUE AND G.RA(7) EQ $TRUE)
            THEN SET G.MAINTAIN;
        ELSE CLEAR G.MAINTAIN;
    IF (G.CLSTRONG EQ 4 AND
        G.CLSTROLD EQ 8 AND
        G.DESTRONG EQ 0)
        THEN SET G.CORRECTIVE_CLM,
        G.ANYPRECOR;
    ELSE IF (G.DESTRONG EQ 4 AND
             G.CLSTRONG EQ 0 AND
             G.EXTALT EQ $FALSE)
            THEN SET G.CORRECTIVE_DES,
            G.ANYPRECOR;

G.ZDMODEL = 0;
ELSE IF (G.RA(1 and 6) EQ $FALSE)
    THEN CLEAR G.MAINTAIN;
    G.ZMODEL = 0;
ELSE CLEAR G.ALLCLEAR;
    CLEAR G.MAINTAIN, G.ANYINCREASE;
    G.ZMODEL = 0;
IF (ANYALTLOST EQ $TRUE)
    THEN CLEAR ANYTRACKDROP, G.ALLCLEAR;
ELSE IF (ANYTRACKDROP EQ $TRUE)
    THEN CLEAR G.ALLCLEAR;
PERFORM Load_display_and_aural_info;
END Set_up_display_outputs;
STATECHARTS

Replace ED-143, Volume II, page 125, Section 2.1.11.2, State Corrective_Climb with the following:

**Transition(s):**

Yes $$\rightarrow$$ No

**Location:** Advisory_Status $$\rightarrow$$ Corrective_Climb

**Trigger Event:** Composite_RA_Evaluated_Event

**Condition:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>OR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climb_RA_Weakened</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climb_Goal $$= 0$$ ft/min</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate $$&gt;$$ Climb_Goal</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate $$&gt;$$ 300 ft/min(HYSTERCOR)</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate $$&lt;$$ 300 ft/min(HYSTERCOR)</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descend_Goal $$= 0$$ ft/min</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not_Meeting_Descend_Goal</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descend_Goal $$&lt; 100,000$$ ft/min(HUGE)</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Output Action:** Corrective_Climb_Evaluated_Event

**Notes:**

1. **Description:** Transition out of corrective climb occurs for a weakened climb RA condition when either the own aircraft altitude rate exceeds a non-zero climb goal or the aircraft is considered level (i.e., within hysteresis) for a zero climb and descend goal. This transition also occurs whenever the aircraft is not meeting the current descend goal or there is a simultaneous opposite-sense VSL due to a multi-aircraft encounter.

2. **Pseudocode Reference:** Corrective_preventive_test, Set_up_display_outputs.
Replace ED-143 Volume II, page 127, Section 2.1.11.3, State Corrective_Descend with the following:

Transition(s): Yes → No

Location: Advisory_Status→ Corrective_Descend

Trigger Event: Corrective_Climb_Evaluated_Event→ C2

Condition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>OR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Descend_RA_Weakened</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descend_Goal_473 = 0 ft/min</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate_564 ≤ Descend_Goal_473</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate_564 ≤ 300 ft/min(HYSTERCOR)</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate_564 ≥ -300 ft/min(HYSTERCOR)</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climb_Goal_467 = 0 ft/min</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not_Meeting_Climb_Goal = 0 ft/min</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme_Alt_Check = 378</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple_Threats = 403</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climb_Goal_467 &gt; 100,000 ft/min(HUGE)</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Output Action: Corrective_Descend_Evaluated_Event→ C2

Notes:

1. **Description:** Transition out of corrective descend occurs for a weakened descend RA condition when (1) the own aircraft altitude rate is less than a non-zero descend goal, or (2) the aircraft is considered level (i.e., within hysteresis) for a zero climb and descend goal, or (3) the aircraft is not meeting the current climb goal, or (4) a descend RA is weakened to a zero climb rate goal under extreme low altitude against a single threat aircraft, or (5) there is a simultaneous opposite-sense VSL due to a multi-aircraft encounter.

2. **Pseudocode Reference:** Corrective_preventive_test, Set_up_display_outputs, Extreme_altitude_check.
APPENDIX 1

TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM II (TCAS II) VERSION 7.1

AMENDMENT TO EUROCAE ED-143 CHANGE 2 REQUIREMENTS

This Appendix lists EASA modification to MPS for Traffic Alert And Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment, TCAS II Change 2, dated April 2013.

When own ship is on the ground, clarification is required to allow the system to limit the output of TCAS intruders to the display to those within 3 000 feet of own altitude. In lieu of section ’2.2.2 System Performance’ of EUROCAE ED-143 Change 2, substitute the following:

2.2.2 System Performance

NOTE: When operating within the maximum aircraft transponder population and electromagnetic interference levels defined in subparagraph 2.2.1.2, TCAS II will provide a level of performance for active surveillance of targets-of-interest that will support the requirements for generation of collision advisory information.

Specifically, TCAS II will generate a surveillance track in range and altitude on a target-of-interest at the range and with the track probability and range accuracy specified below. This is to ensure that a correct resolution advisory can be issued in time for the pilot to maintain adequate vertical separation at closest-point-of-approach.

TCAS II will also generate, whenever possible, a surveillance track in range and altitude on a target-of-interest at the range and with the track probability and range accuracy specified below such that a correct traffic advisory can be issued as a precursor to the resolution advisory.

In addition to the surveillance requirements to support generation of resolution and traffic advisories, TCAS II will display the range and, if available, the altitude and bearing position information on targets that generate advisories. The bearing position information will be generated according to the accuracy requirement specified below.

TCAS II will also generate for display, whenever possible, surveillance range, altitude and bearing position information on Mode C and Mode S aircraft that are within the range specified below and within ± 10 000 ft altitude relative to TCAS II when airborne, and within ± 3 000 ft altitude relative to TCAS II when on the ground.

It is acceptable to limit the output of TCAS intruders to the display to those within 3 000 feet of own altitude when own aircraft is on the ground. This is permitted (but not required) so that the altitude surveillance volume for TCAS Mode C intruders can be consistent with the Mode S surveillance altitude limits modified in EUROCAE ED-143 Change 2 (section 2.2.4.6.2.2.1). This allowance to limit the display to ± 3 000 feet does not modify surveillance altitude volumes which are defined in EUROCAE ED-143, section 2.2.4.6.
The system shall use the definition of on-ground as defined in EUROCAE ED-143, Volume II, 2.1.14. Alternatively, the system may use the definition of ‘operating on Surface’ in EUROCAE ED-221, section 2.2.8, for on-ground.
This Appendix lists EASA modification to MPS for Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) Hybrid Surveillance, dated April 2013.

Text from EUROCAE ED-221 is provided here as needed to provide context. Text to be added is underlined. Text to be removed is lined through.

1. To ensure proper revalidation when own aircraft is operating on the surface, in the first paragraph of EUROCAE ED-221, section 2.2.7.5 ‘Revalidation’, insert the following new underlined text:

An established track that is under hybrid surveillance (per §2.2.7.1) shall be subject to revalidation. If a track under hybrid surveillance does not satisfy the first (altitude) condition of §2.2.6.1.4, it shall be subject to revalidation every 60th surveillance update interval; if it satisfies the first and second (altitude and range) conditions of §2.2.6.1.4 but not the third (airborne) condition, it shall be subject to revalidation every 10th surveillance update interval; if it satisfies the first condition of §2.2.6.1.4 but not the second (range) condition, it shall be subject to revalidation at intervals calculated according to the following procedure. The revalidation interval \( t \) shall be calculated at the time of the initial successful validation and at the time of each successful revalidation. It shall be used as the number of surveillance update intervals until the next revalidation attempt.

1.2 Because there is a requirement specifying creation of information which is never used, in EUROCAE ED-221, section 2.2.11 ‘Interface to the CAS Logic’, delete existing lined through text from the first paragraph as follows:

Position data for tracks under passive surveillance may be provided to the CAS logic via the interface specified in Ref. A, §2.2.4.8.1. If this is done, information shall be provided in addition to that required in Ref. A, §2.2.4.8.1(a) to distinguish a position report that resulted from a passive reception of an Airborne Position Message from one that resulted from an active interrogation.

1.3 Tests 2, 3a and 3b specified in EUROCAE ED-221, section 2.4.2.5 ‘Verification of Acquisition and Maintenance of Established Tracks Using Active Surveillance’ (§2.2.6), do not need to be performed as their expected results are incorrect. Test coverage of the input conditions associated with those tests is provided, in aggregate, by other existing tests in EUROCAE ED-221.

1.4 A new Test 11a is required in addition to the existing Test 11 specified in EUROCAE ED-221, section 2.4.2.6 ‘Verification of Maintenance of Established Tracks using Passive Surveillance’ (§2.2.7). This new test is to verify the revalidation rate when own aircraft is operating on the surface. Perform this new test in addition to the existing Test 11; the new test does not replace Test 11. Insert the following new underlined text after existing Test 11:
Test 11a (Intruder Revalidation Rate when own aircraft is operating on the surface §2.2.7.5)

This test verifies the revalidation rate when own aircraft is operating on the surface based on the altitude and range criteria for active tracking (§2.2.7.5).

(The following tests may be performed using ADS-B reports or directly decoded ADS-B messages. TIS-B and ADS-R data is not permitted.)

Scenario Description

- Intruder 1 shows that when own aircraft is operating on the airport surface and an intruder is within the altitude and range criteria for active surveillance it will be tracked using hybrid surveillance with a 10-second revalidation rate (§2.2.7.5).
- Intruder 2 shows that when own aircraft is operating on the airport surface and an intruder is within the altitude but not the range criteria for active surveillance it will be tracked using hybrid surveillance with a variable revalidation rate according to the requirements in (§2.2.7.5).

TCAS Aircraft
Altitude = 0 ft (Ground Level)
Altitude Rate = 0 FPM
Position = Sydney
Radio altitude input = 0 ft
Ground Speed is valid and at 0 knots and TCAS Air/Ground (OOGROUN) indicates on-ground.

Intruder Aircraft #1
Altitude = 2 000 ft
Altitude Rate = 0 FPM
Range = 2 NM
Relative Speed = 0 kt
At T = 100 the intruder is terminated.

Intruder Aircraft #2
Altitude = 2 000 ft
Altitude Rate = 0 FPM
Range = 8 NM
Relative Speed = 0 kt
At T = 100 the intruder is terminated.

Success Criteria

For the tests in this section, the revalidation rate for each applicable success criteria was identified using the table in §2.2.7.5. If the implementation uses the equation method, then the revalidation interval can be longer by 10 to 20 seconds. Care should be taken to verify that the success criteria matches the value expected based on the implementation.

For each intruder:
The surveillance reports to the CAS logic are present for the duration of the track. Verify that the track is under passive surveillance.
Intruder 1
Verify that revalidation interrogations are transmitted every 10 seconds.

Intruder 2
Verify that revalidation interrogations are transmitted every 30 seconds.

The revalidation rate for each applicable success criteria was identified using the table in §2.2.7.5. If the implementation uses the equation method, then the revalidation interval can be longer by up to 10 to 20 seconds. Care should be taken to verify that the success criteria matches the value expected based on the implementation.

1.5 EUROCAE ED-221 removes a provision which allowed for larger range calculation errors above ±60 degrees latitude from RTCA/DO-300, Section 2.2.7.6 (from which ED-221 is derived), but the associated tests were not updated accordingly. To account for the removal of that provision, delete the following lined through text from EUROCAE ED-221, sections 2.4.2.8 ‘Verification of Error Budget in Computing Slant Range from Passive Data’ and 2.4.2.10 ‘Verification of DF17 Decoding’, and insert as underlined below a clarifying note in Appendix A ‘Conversion of Reported Positions to Slant Range’, section A.1 ‘Overview’.

2.4.2.8 Verification of Error Budget in Computing Slant Range from Passive Data

If the test method is used to demonstrate compliance with the requirement, then this paragraph describes one potential scenario. Own aircraft and intruder aircraft are travelling towards each other at 600 kt at high latitude (near 60 degrees). If the error between the passive range estimate and active range measurement is less than 145 meters then the intent of the requirement is met. The error in range computation of tests at slower closure rates can be used to extrapolate or predict errors at the 1200 kt closure rate.

2.4.2.10 Verification of DF17 Decoding

Success Criteria

All Intruders.
For all of the Intruders with Latitudes within ±60 degrees, verify that the range for each intruder is within 145 m of the calculated range identified in Table 3.
For all of the Intruders with Latitudes within ±60 degrees, verify that the bearing for each intruder is within 3 deg of the calculated bearing identified in Table 3.
Verify that the error in range from the calculated range does not use more of the error budget allowed for range based on the completion of Test §2.4.2.8 (Verification of Error Budget in Computing Slant Range from Passive Data) Test 1.
A.1 OVERVIEW

This Appendix provides useful guidance on computing range from own and reported position data. This Appendix does not recommend a particular implementation and should be used for reference only.

Firstly, the exact conversion equations from position to slant range are given. The computational requirements for the exact conversion equations are reasonable and could be used as is for modern processors and typical TCAS traffic loads.

Secondly, several approximate conversion equations from position to slant range are presented. For circumstances where hybrid surveillance is implemented as a software upgrade to existing processors, it may be desirable to use approximations to the conversion equations to reduce the computational requirements. The errors in the approximate equations are presented and compared to the computational accuracy requirements of §2.2.7.6, which requires a maximum 145 m processing error when calculating slant range.

Note: The equations in A.2 provide an example of conversion equations which meet the accuracy requirements. The approximation equations provided in the Appendix may not provide the required accuracy.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: 406 and 121.5 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitter

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which 406 and 121.5 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters that are designed and manufactured on or after the applicability date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in the EUROCAE ED-62A, Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Aircraft Emergency Locator Transmitters 406 MHz and 121.5 MHz (Optional 243 MHz), dated February 2009.

Additionally, the use of hook and loop fasteners is not an acceptable means of attachment in complying with the Crash Safety requirements of section 4.5.7.3 of EUROCAE ED-62A for automatic fixed (AF) and automatic portable (AP) ELTs.

The shock and crash safety tests in EUROCAE ED-62A, section 4.5.7.3, require testing coincident with each orthogonal axes individually. Additionally, to better simulate more realistic aircraft crash scenarios, it is recommend that shock and crash safety testing be accomplished with simultaneous longitudinal and vertical cross-axis forces.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3
3.2 — Specific

The battery used in the Emergency Locator Transmitter authorised under this ETSO must be appropriate for the intended operational environment, not pose a hazard to the aircraft, and meet the requirements of acceptable battery standards.

If non-rechargeable lithium cells and batteries are used to power the Emergency Locator Transmitter, ETSO-C142a ‘Non-Rechargeable Lithium Cells And Batteries — Lithium Batteries’ provides MPS for such lithium batteries.

If rechargeable lithium cells and batteries are used to power the Emergency Locator Transmitter, ETSO-C179a ‘Permanently Installed Rechargeable Lithium Cells, Batteries, and Battery Systems’ provides MPS for such batteries.

If nickel-cadmium, nickel metal-hydride or lead acid batteries are used to power the Emergency Locator Transmitter, ETSO-C173a ‘Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel Metal-Hydride, and Lead-Acid Batteries’ provides MPS for such batteries.

If batteries with a different chemistry are used to power the Emergency Locator Transmitter, the applicant must propose to EASA an appropriate MPS to be used for such batteries.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

Failure of function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a minor failure condition.

Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1 resulting in signal outputs not meeting the requirements of paragraph 3 is a minor failure condition. Loss of the function defined in paragraph 3.1 is a minor failure condition.

4 — Marking

4.1 — General

Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific

None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Rotorcraft, transport aeroplane, and normal and utility small aeroplane seating systems

1 - Applicability

This ETSO prescribes the Minimum Performance Standards (MPS) that rotorcraft, transport aeroplane, and normal and utility small aeroplane seating systems of the following designated types that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

Type A — Transport Aeroplane
Type B — Rotorcraft
Type C1 — Normal & Utility Aeroplane – Crew Seats
Type C2 — Normal & Utility Aeroplane – Passenger Seats

This ETSO’s standards apply to equipment intended to be utilised as aircraft seating systems of the following classifications:

(1) Seat Type and applicable Aircraft Category:
   (a) Type A — Airplane. Aircraft Category: Transport
   (b) Type B — Rotorcraft. Aircraft Category: Transport or Normal
   (c) Type C — Small Airplane. Aircraft Category: Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, or Commuter

(2) Seat Subtype:
   (a) Subtype 1 — Passenger
   (b) Subtype 2 — Flight Attendant
   (c) Subtype 3 — Observer
   (d) Subtype 4 — Pilot/Co-pilot

(3) Seat Orientation:

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(a) Forward-Facing
(b) Rearward-Facing

Note: Seats with installation limitations of angles more than 18 degrees from the aircraft centre line are not addressed by this standard. See Appendix 1 to this ETSO amending SAE AS8049B, subsection 5.3.3.5.i.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — General
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Additions:
Additional information on the dynamic testing of seating systems is contained in Advisory Circular (AC) 20-137, „Dynamic Evaluation of Seat Restraint Systems & Occupant Restraint for Rotorcraft (Normal & Transport)“; AC 23.562-1, „Dynamic Testing of Part 23 Airplane Restraint/Systems and Occupant Protection“; and AC 25.562-1A, „Dynamic Evaluation of Seat Restraint Systems & Occupant Protection on Transport Airplanes“. Compliance with these AC’s is not necessary to receive a ETSO authorization under this ETSO. However, the applicant for a seat installation approval should be aware that any seating system may be required to meet the criteria contained in these AC’s in order to qualify for installation in an aircraft.
New models of rotorcraft, transport airplane, and small airplane seating systems identified and manufactured on or after the effective date of this ETSO must meet the requirements in the following: SAE International’s Aerospace Standard (AS) 8049B, Performance Standard for Seats in Civil Rotorcraft, Transport Aircraft, and General Aviation Aircraft, dated January 2005, as modified by Appendix 1 to this ETSO; SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 5526C, Aircraft Seat Design Guidance and Clarifications, dated May 2011, as modified by Appendix 1 to this ETSO; and Appendix 2 to this ETSO (for specific elective requirements).

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
None.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
None.
3.2 — Specific
None.

4 — Marking
4.1 — General

Marking is detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2. In addition, each seating system shall be legibly and permanently marked with the following:

(i) the applicable seat type: „Type A“ „Type B“ „Type C1“ or „Type C2“ followed by the appropriate seat facing direction designation: „FF“ forward; „RF“ rearward; or „SF“ sideward,

(ii) for Type A passenger seating systems, the approved seat pitch necessary to maintain clearance to assure an effective emergency evacuation, as defined in AC 25.562-1A, Appendix 2. Use appropriate statement as follows: „See installation limitations in component maintenance manual (CMM) or drawing number (insert number)” or „Minimum or Allowable range (if applicable) seat pitch (insert number/range).”

(iii) each separate component that is easily removable (without hand tools, except those components that are ETSO articles), each interchangeable element, and each separate sub-assembly of the article that the manufacturer determines may be interchangeable with other seating systems must be permanently and legibly marked with at least the name of the manufacturer, manufacturer’s subassembly part number, and the ETSO number.

(iv) For Type A and Type B-Transport passenger, flight attendant and observer seating systems, mark each seat cushion to be qualified with „Complies with CS 25.853(c)”, or “Complies with CS 29.853(b)”, as applicable when tested in accordance with the requirements of Section 3.4.2 of SAE AS 8049A, as revised by subparagraph 2.2.3 of Appendix 1 of this ETSO.

(v) Each separate component that is easily removable (without hand tools, except those components that are ETSO articles), each interchangeable element, and each separate sub-assembly of the article that the manufacturer determines may be interchangeable with other seating systems must...
be permanently and legibly marked with at least the name of the manufacturer, manufacturer's sub-assembly part number, and the ETSO number.
4.2 — Specific
None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
APPENDIX 1. TRANSPORT AEROPLANE, AND NORMAL AND UTILITY AEROPLANE SEATING SYSTEMS

1. Purpose. This appendix prescribes the MPS for seating systems, as modified by the FAA for reference in this TSO.

2. Requirements. The standards applicable to this TSO are set forth in the industry standard specified in paragraph 3 of this TSO, SAE AS 8049A, “Performance Standards for Seats in Civil Rotorcraft and Transport Airplanes,” dated September 1997, which is the applicable standard is modified as follows:

2.1 Exceptions.

2.1.1 The information contained in Section 1. SCOPE: and Section 2. REFERENCES: of SAE AS 8049A is duplicative and shall be disregarded.

2.1.2 Compliance with Section 3.1 Guidance: of SAE AS 8049A is not required, except for Subsections 3.1.4, 3.1.8, 3.1.11, 3.1.14 (passenger seats only), 3.1.15 and 3.1.17 through 3.1.20.

2.1.3 Compliance with the dynamic test procedures and documentation of Subsection 5.3.1 Dynamic Impact Test Parameters: through Subsection 5.3.9.2 Impact Pulse Shape: of SAE AS 8049A may be demonstrated by equivalent procedures such as those described in either AC 23.562-1 or 23.562-1A. The simplified procedures for head injury criteria (HIC) outlined in policy letter TAD-96-002 dated February 16, 1996 also may be used in lieu of the selection of test conditions described in Subsection 5.3.6.2 of SAE AS 8049A. The use of any equivalent procedures must be established by the applicant and accepted in advance by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), having geographic purview of the applicant’s facility (See subparagraph 2.2.1 of this Appendix).

2.1.4 Compliance with the dynamic impact test pass/fail criteria of Subsections 5.4.3, 5.4.4, and 5.4.9 of SAE AS 8049A for permanent deformation limits, HIC, and femur loads, respectively, is not required. However, the data must be reported, as required by subparagraph 5.a(12) of this TSO.

2.1.5 Disregard the marking requirements specified in Section 6. MARKINGS: of SAE AS 8049A. Marking of the article shall be in accordance with paragraph 4 of this TSO.

2.2 Additions.

2.2.1 As applicable, at least 30 days prior to conducting any required TSO testing and prior to submitting an application for TSO authorization per 14 CFR 21.605(a), the applicant shall submit, to the FAA ACO manager, a proposed plan for demonstrating compliance with the requirements of this TSO for the following:
2.2.1.1 Any procedures that the applicant has identified in consideration of the design guidance in the SAE AS 8049A Subsections identified in subparagraph 2.1.2 of this Appendix; and

2.2.1.2 Those equivalent procedures the applicant has proposed to use to demonstrate compliance with dynamic test requirements of subparagraph 2.1.3 of this Appendix.

2.2.2 Under Section 3.2 Requirements of SAE AS 8049A, add a new Subsection 3.2.15 to read as follows: Except for rearward facing seats, the pelvic restraint system shall be designed such that the vertical angle subtended by the projection of the pelvic restraint centerline and the seat reference point (SRP) water line shall not be greater than 55 degrees. The SRP water line is a line/plane passing through the SRP parallel to the horizon. The pelvic restraint centerline is formed by a line from the pelvic restraint anchorage to a point located 9.75 inches forward of the SRP and 7.00 inches above the SRP water line. In addition, the pelvic restraint anchorage point(s) must be located no further than 2.0 inches forward of the SRP (Ref Figure 1A of SAE AS 8049A).

2.2.3 Replace Subsection 3.4.2 of SAE AS 8049A with the following: Type A-Transport Airplane and Type B-Transport Rotorcraft passenger, flight attendant, and observer seat cushion systems shall be tested and shall meet the fire protection provisions of Appendix F, Part II of 14 CFR Part 25, as required in 14 CFR 25.853(c) effective February 2, 1995 and 14 CFR 29.853(b) effective October 26, 1984 respectively, or the equivalent shall be demonstrated by analysis (similarity) to provide equivalent protection. Type B—Normal Rotorcraft upholstery shall be self-extinguishing when tested to meet the fire protection provisions of 14 CFR 27.853(b) effective February 4, 1980. Type C1 and C2—Normal & Utility Airplane seat cushions shall be self-extinguishing when tested to meet the fire protection provisions of paragraph (c) of Appendix F of 14 CFR Part 23, as required in 14 CFR 23.853(d)(3)(ii) effective February 9, 1995.

2.2.4 The following two items shall be included in Subsection 5.3.10.3 Test Data: of SAE AS 8049A: o. Post test retrieval of life preserver; and p. Evaluation of seat egress (See adjustable features in Subsection 3.2.6 and baggage stowed under seat in Subsection 3.2.7 of SAE AS 8049A. These two items will be part of the data submittal required by subparagraph 5.a(12)(iv) of this TSO.

2.2.5 Under APPENDIX A PROCEDURES FOR EVALUATING PULSE SHAPES, revise Subsection A.6 STEP 5 (REFERENCE FIGURE 5A): of SAE AS 8049A to read: Construct a line parallel to the ideal (minimum regulatory requirement) pulse and offset by 2 g in magnitude less than the ideal during the time interval between T1 and T3. Likewise construct a line parallel to the ideal pulse and offset by 2 g in magnitude less than the ideal (minimum regulatory requirement) pulse on the trailing side of the pulse from:

\[ T_2 < t < T_2 + 1.33(T_3 - T_2) \]

If the magnitude of the acquired pulse is 2 g less than the ideal pulse shape at any point along the acquired pulse shape during the period \( T_2 < t < T_2 + 1.33(T_3 - T_2) \), the pulse is unacceptable.
FIGURE 5A
APPENDIX 2. TEST CONDITIONS

SAE AS 8049A incorporates, as a reference, the following test standards for which a more recent version of these standards may be substituted, if approved by the FAA ACO manager having geographical purview over the manufacturer’s facilities.


APPENDIX 1

MPS FOR ROTORCRAFT, TRANSPORT AEROPLANE, AND SMALL AEROPLANE SEATING SYSTEMS

1.0. This Appendix prescribes MPS for SAE International’s Aerospace Standard (AS) 8049B, Performance Standard for Seats in Civil Rotorcraft, Transport Aircraft, and General Aviation Aircraft, dated January 2005. When the SAE section recommends (or suggests, advises, etc.) something, and it is part of the MPS, the recommendation becomes a requirement.

In addition, modify AS8049B as follows:

Table 1 — SAE AS8049B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When reading AS8049B...</th>
<th>Do the following:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Disregard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Disregard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Apply all subsections unless disregarded or modified below:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Page 5, disregard subsection 3.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Page 6, replace subsection 3.2.7 to read as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.7 When an under-seat baggage restraint is incorporated in a passenger seat, it shall be designed to restrain at least 9.1 kg (20 lb) or its placarded weight of stowed items per passenger place under the dynamic and static (forward and sideward directions only) test conditions of this document in a manner that will not significantly impede rapid egress from the seat.</td>
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<td>Page 6, replace subsection 3.2.15 to read as follows:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.2.15 Except for rearward facing seats and seats equipped with multiple anchorage point pelvic restraints (e.g. Y-belts), the pelvic restraint system shall be designed such that the vertical angle between the pelvic restraint centerline and the seat reference point (SRP) waterline shall range from 35° to 55°. The SRP water line is a line/plane passing through the SRP parallel to the floor waterline. The pelvic restraint centerline is formed by a line from the pelvic restraint anchorage to a point located 250 mm (9.75 in) forward of the SRP and 180 mm (7.0 in) above the SRP water line. In addition, the pelvic restraint anchorage point(s) must be located no further than 2.0 inches forward of the SRP (ref Figure 1A). See the FAA AC 21-34 for additional guidance for acceptable seat belt geometry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When reading AS8049B...</td>
<td>Do the following:</td>
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<td>Page 6, add subsection 3.2.16 to read as follows:</td>
<td>3.2.16 All hinged armrest caps installed along an aisle must close as a result of normal movement along the aisle. Caps must not snag clothing or present any other impediment to egress when contacted by a person moving in either direction along the aisle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 6, add subsection 3.2.17, to read as follows:</td>
<td>3.2.17 Safety belt restraint systems must be equipped with a metal-to-metal latching device.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 6, add subsection 3.2.18 to read as follows:</td>
<td>3.2.18 Design seat stowage compartments to prevent the contents becoming a hazard by shifting under the load conditions identified in Table 4 and subsection 5.3.1. Specify the maximum weight of the contents allowed in each stowage compartment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 6, add subsection 3.2.19 to read as follows:</td>
<td>3.2.19 The seat reference point (SRP) must be determined using only one of the methods described in Figure 1B. The selected method shall be documented, and must be used consistently when evaluating all variations of the seat ETSOA model or future changes to the seat ETSOA model design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 10, replace subsection 3.4.1 to read as follows:</td>
<td>3.4.1 Test the materials in Type A Transport and Type B Transport seating systems, ensuring they meet the fire protection properties specified in CS-25, Appendix F, Part I, paragraph (a)(1). The material’s fire protection properties may be demonstrated using the methods provided in the FAA policy statement, PS-ANM-25.853-01-R2, Flammability Testing of Interior Materials, which may permit substantiation based on previously tested materials. The definition and use of parts that are considered small parts that would not contribute significantly to the propagation of a fire must be approved in advance by EASA. When inflatable restraints are included, the airbag material shall meet the flammability requirements of CS-25, Appendix F, Part I(a)(iv). Note: Inflatable restraints are a new and novel technology that may be subject to significant additional special conditions and certification requirements for installation approval.</td>
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</table>
When reading AS8049B...

Materials in Normal, Utility and Acrobatic category Type C seating systems must have flame-resistant properties as defined in **14 CFR Part 1**. Test the materials to meet the requirements of paragraph 8.b of the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 23-2A, Change 1, Flammability Tests. Commuter category Type C seating systems shall meet the flammability performance requirements defined in CS 23.853(d)(3), and tested as prescribed in CS-23, Appendix F, Part I.

Materials in Type B Normal Rotorcraft seating systems must have flame-resistant properties as defined in **14 CFR Part 1**. Test the materials to meet the requirements of paragraph 8.b of the FAA Advisory Circular 23-2A ‘Flammability Test’, dated May 11, 2007. The material’s fire protection properties may also be demonstrated by analysis (similarity) to provide equivalent protection.

Type A — Transport airplane insulation on electrical wire and electrical cable, and materials used to provide additional protection for the wire and cable, must be self-extinguishing when tested in accordance with the applicable portions of Appendix F, Part I of CS-25.

Type B — Rotorcraft insulation on electrical wire and cable must be self-extinguishing when tested in accordance with Appendix F, Part I(a)(3), to CS-25.

Type C seats with insulation on electrical wire and electrical cable must be self-extinguishing when tested at an angle of 60 degrees in accordance with the applicable portions of Appendix F to CS-23. The average burn length must not exceed 3 inches (76 mm) and the average flame time after removal of the flame source must not exceed 30 seconds. Drippings from the test specimen must not continue to flame for more than an average of 3 seconds after falling.

Page 10, replace subsection 3.4.2 to read as follows:

Type A Transport and Type B Transport — passenger, flight attendant, and observer seat cushion systems shall be tested to and shall meet the fire protection provisions of CS-25 Appendix F, Part II. The material’s fire protection may also be demonstrated by following the FAA AC 25.853-1 ‘Flammability Requirements for Aircraft Seat Cushions’ and, where applicable, the FAA Policy Statement ANM-115-07-002 on certification for flammability of lightweight seat cushions.

Page 12, replace subsection 3.5.7 to read as follows:
When reading AS8049B...

Do the following:

3.5.7 Deployable Items: Certain items on the seat, such as food trays, legrests, arm caps over in-arm tray tables, etc., are used by passengers in flight and are required to be stowed for taxi, takeoff and landing. Deployment of such items should be treated as ‘permanent deformation’ if the item deploys into an area that must be used by multiple passengers (in addition to the occupant of the seat) for egress. The location of the measuring point used for determining the deformation of the deployed item shall be either at the point of full deployment or at the point of the actual deployment if a partially deployed item resists further deployment upon application of a static load of 45 N (10 lb) along the direction of the inertial load path. Such deployments can be considered acceptable, even if they exceed the provisions of 3.5 and its subparagraphs, if they are readily pushed out of the way by normal passenger movement, and remain in a position that does not affect egress (i.e., when pushed out of the way it remains in that position). Normal passenger movement is the act of the seated occupant getting up out of the seat and moving to egress the airplane (i.e., unbuckling their restraint, standing, turning towards the aisle and moving into the aisle). It does not include additional movements to lift or stow items, or latching an item in place. Any items that remain in a position that would affect egress shall be reported as permanent deformation.

If the food tray table deploys as a result of being struck by the ATD head during a row-to-row HIC test and the food tray table is easily pushed out of the way, the deployment is acceptable and does not need to be considered as permanent deformation (except for seats installed where deployment may affect egress through a required exit path — see below). It is not required for the food tray table to remain in a position that does not affect egress. ‘Easily pushed out of the way’ is not required to be by normal passenger movement. Determination of the food tray deploying as a result of being struck by the ATD head during the test shall be made by evaluation of the high-speed film/video.

If the food tray table deploys as a result of being struck by the ATD head during the test and the food tray table is not easily pushed out of the way, the deployment shall be treated as permanent deformation.

Any food tray deployment on a seat that will be installed where deployment may affect egress through a required exit path, regardless of being struck by the ATD head, shall be treated as permanent deformation.

Section 4

Apply all subsections unless disregarded or modified below:

Page 16, replace note (1) in Table 4 to read as follows:

(1) The 4.0 ultimate load factor applies to the seat assembly (except for the
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<td>fittings). The highest special factor of safety (e.g. casting) applicable to any part (except for the fittings) shall be applied to the 4.0 ultimate load factor. Fittings (as defined in paragraph 4.1.3) must meet a minimum applied load factor of 4.0 g. The 4.0 applied load factor for the fittings includes the 1.33 fitting factor. If multiple special factors of safety are applicable to the fittings (e.g. fitting factor and casting factor), then as indicated in paragraph 4.1.4, the fitting shall be tested statically to the highest applicable special factor of safety. Since for the fittings the 4.0 g applied load factor already includes the 1.33 fitting factor, the 1.33 fitting factor is divided out before the highest special factor of safety is applied.</td>
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Page 16, replace note (2) in Table 4 to read as follows:

(2) Elective: Increase these load factors as necessary for reduced weight gust/flight loads or landing requirements. Loads at angles other than those prescribed by Table 4 may be tested. All seat adjustment positions and occupancy variations, including those used in flight, must be evaluated when using these increased load factors. Document the increased load factors. They must also be marked on the ETSO placard (see Appendix 2).

Page 16, replace note (4) in Table 4 to read as follows:

(4) Normal, Utility, Acrobatic and Commuter Category.

Page 16, delete note (7) in Table 4.

Explanation: The seating system’s manufacturer doesn’t control the CS-23 requirements applying to the seat installation. The manufacturer may test to load factors higher than required in Table 4 under the provisions of Appendix 2, paragraph c, to this ETSO.

Page 16, add a reference of note (8) to be applicable to the Upward load direction for Type C Seat in Table 4. Add note (8) to Table 4 to read as follows:

(8) Use a factor of 4.5 for Acrobatic Category seats.

Section 5

Apply all subsections unless disregarded or modified below:

Page 21, replace subsection 5.1.9 to read as follows:

5.1.9 The load due to any item of mass, including the seat that is not restrained
**When reading AS8049B...**

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<td>by the occupant restraint system, must be applied in a representative manner at the c.g. of the mass, or with a corrective factor applied in a conservative manner relative to the c.g. of the item of mass.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** If the retention of an item of mass attached to the seat is demonstrated (by the dynamic qualification tests of subsection 5.3), the static retention for the forward and down static conditions doesn’t need to further be demonstrated. However, the retention of items of mass for the side, up and aft static conditions must still be demonstrated.

---

Page 23, replace subsection 5.2.2 to read as follows:

5.2.2 The seat structure must be able to support ultimate loads without failure for at least 3 seconds. If it can be shown that failure of an armrest on a seat assembly does not reduce the degree of safety afforded the occupant(s) or become a hazard, such failure will not be cause for rejection.

**Note:** If the retention of an item of mass attached to the seat is demonstrated by the dynamic qualification tests of subsection 5.3, the static retention for the forward and down static conditions don’t need to further be demonstrated. However, the retention of items of mass for the side, up and aft static conditions must still be demonstrated.

---

Page 23, replace 5.3 to read as follows:

5.3 Dynamic Qualification Tests:

This section specifies the dynamic tests to satisfy the requirements of this document.

*For Type A Seats: it may be demonstrated the compliance with the dynamic test procedures and documentation of subsections 5.3.1 ‘Dynamic Impact Test Parameters’ through subsection 5.3.9.2 ‘Impact Pulse Shape’ of SAE AS 8049B by the equivalent procedures of the FAA AC 25.562-1B. The equivalent method shall be documented in the document that contains installation instructions and limitations, and must be used consistently when evaluating all variations of the seat or future changes to the seat design.*

*For Type A Seats: the simplified procedures for head injury criteria (HIC) outlined in the FAA AC 25.562-1B can also be used instead of the test conditions in AS8049B subsection 5.3.6.2.*

*Except for Hybrid III ATDs (49 CFR Part 572, Subpart E) modified in*
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<td>accordance with SAE Technical Paper 1999-01-1609, use of an equivalent ATD must be established by the applicant and accepted by EASA.</td>
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<td>Page 23, replace subsection 5.3.1.2 to read as follows:</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.3.1.2 Test 2 (Figures 6, 7A, and 7B), as a single row seat test, determines the performance of a system in a test condition where the predominant impact force component is along the aircraft longitudinal axis and is combined with a lateral impact force component. This test evaluates the structural adequacy of the seat, permanent deformation of the structure, the pelvic restraint and upper torso restraint (if applicable) behaviour and loads, and may yield data on ATD head displacement, velocity, and acceleration time histories and the seat leg loads imposed on the seat tracks or attachment fittings.</td>
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<td>For seats intended to be installed at an angle relative to the longitudinal axis of the aircraft that is greater than 2° (but less than 18°), the test yaw angle for the test that substantiates those seats shall be 10° plus or minus the intended installation angle (if more critical) depending on which yaw angle results in the most critical attachment fitting resultant loads.</td>
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<td>Page 37, replace subsection 5.3.3.5.i to read as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Side-Facing Seats: Seats with installation limitations of angles more than 18° from aircraft centerline are not addressed by this standard.</td>
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<td>Page 37, replace subsection 5.3.3.6 to read as follows:</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.3.3.6 Multiple Row Test Fixtures: In tests of passenger seats that are normally installed in repetitive rows in the aircraft, head and knee impact conditions are best evaluated through tests that use at least two rows of seats. These conditions are usually critical only in Test 2. This test allows direct measurements of the head and femur injury data.</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. The fixture shall be capable of setting the aircraft longitudinal axis at a yaw angle of –10° and +10°. The fixture should also allow adjustment of the seat pitch.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. To allow direct measurement of head acceleration for head injury assessment for a seat installation where the head of the occupant is within striking distance of structure, a representative impact surface may be attached to the test fixture in front of the front row seat at the orientation and distance from the seat representing the aircraft installation.</td>
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</table>
When reading AS8049B...

Do the following:

c. Test 2 (Figures 6, 7A, & 7B) conducted solely to collect head/knee path data should be conducted with 0° yaw and without floor deformation. The test must be conducted on the seat with the greatest overhang among the seats selected for the applicable forward longitudinal dynamic structural test. It is acceptable to use the opposite-hand part for this seat. The occupancy used in the applicable forward longitudinal dynamic structural test must be used for this test. For consistency, a floor should be used for tests used to gather head path data. It is acceptable to collect ATD head path data in the applicable forward longitudinal dynamic structural test.

d. Seats designed for seat tracks that are not in-line and parallel (track-break seats) typically require special floor attachment fittings. The installation of the seat tracks on the test fixture for these seats is unique, and depends on the intended seat location in the airplane. The test setup must represent the seat track orientation on the airplane (that is, angles, offsets, forward/aft distance, and so forth) of seat tracks under the aft attachments vs. the forward attachments.

Page 43, replace subsection 5.3.5 to read as follows:

5.3.5 Selection of Test Articles: Many seat designs comprise a family of seats that have the same basic structural design but differ in detail. For example, a basic seat frame configuration can allow for several different seat leg locations to permit installation in different aircraft. If these differences are of a nature that their effect can be determined by rational analysis, then the analysis can determine the most critical configuration. As a minimum, the most critically stressed configuration shall be selected for the dynamic tests so that the other configurations could be accepted by comparison with that configuration.

There are two factors that must be considered in selecting the critical structural test configurations. First, the seat to aircraft interface loads (undeformed seat) can be determined by rational analysis for the seat design and load configurations. The rational analysis can be based on static or dynamic seat/occupant analytical methods. The rational analysis can form the basis for selecting the most highly stressed critical configuration based on load. Additionally, the effects of seat deformation should be considered. As noted, a family of seats typically includes seat models with varied seat leg locations. The effects of floor deformation are more critical for narrowly spaced legs. Thus, a test or rational analysis of the seat model with the minimum seat leg spacing must be conducted to evaluate the most highly stressed critical configuration based on deformation.

Page 44, replace subsection 5.3.5.1 to read as follows:
When reading AS8049B...

Do the following:

5.3.5.1 In all cases, the test article must be representative of the final production article in all structural elements, and shall include the seat, seat cushions, restraints and armrests. It must also include a functioning position adjustment mechanism and correctly adjusted break over (if present).

Weights simulating luggage carried by luggage restraint bars (9.1 kg (20 lb) per passenger place) need only be representative masses.

Items 0.15 kg (0.33 lb) or greater that are part of the seat and affect the dynamic performance of the seat, including occupant injury and egress, must be representative of the production item and production means of attachment on the test article.

Items 0.15 kg (0.33 lb) or greater that are part of the seat but do not affect the dynamic performance of the seat, including occupant injury and egress, may be representative masses, but the production means of attachment must be on the test article.

Items less than 0.15 kg (0.33 lb) and their means of attachment are not required to be on the test article. However, the mass of the item must be included on the test article as ballast.

Wiring harnesses, regardless of weight, may be represented on the test article by ballast weights. The production means of attachment need not be included in the test.

Life vests must be installed on the test article, if provisions are provided, but are not required to be the production life vest. Any life vest of equivalent weight, or greater, may be included on the test article. The life vest may be ballasted to substantiate heavier life vests. The life vest must represent the size and configuration of the production life vest if its size or configuration could affect retention of the life vest.

For Type A seats, if an item of mass that does not affect the dynamic performance of the seat fails during a test that is otherwise acceptable, then the design may be validated by a 24g static test. The failed test article must be redesigned unless the failure is attributable to test setup or non-representative test article. The certified gross weight of the test article must be adjusted to account for any separation of mass due to failure. Apply the load for the 24g test in the same direction as the load vector in the dynamic test where the failure occurred. Any preload, such as due to floor warpage, of the failed article must be represented in the static 24g test.

In any case, the separation of an item of mass should not leave any sharp or injurious edges. Function of equipment or subsystems after the test is...
When reading AS8049B...

Do the following:

not required. Once it has been demonstrated that an item of mass can be retained in its critical loading case, subsequent tests may be conducted with the item secured for test purposes.

Page 45, replace subsection 5.3.6.3 to read as follows:

5.3.6.3 If a non-symmetrical upper torso restraint system (such as a single diagonal shoulder belt) is used in a system, it shall be installed on the test fixture in a position representative of that in the aircraft. For a forward-facing seat equipped with a single diagonal shoulder belt, the Test 2 yaw direction should be selected such that the belt passes over the leading shoulder.

Note: For a Type A seat, additional tests may be required with the single diagonal shoulder belt passing over the trailing shoulder in order to evaluate retention of the harness on the occupant shoulder. As applicable, test per the FAA AC-25.562-1B, paragraph 3.b.(3).

Page 50, replace subsection 5.3.9.2 to read as follows:

5.3.9.2 Impact Pulse Shape: Data for evaluating the impact pulse shape are obtained from an accelerometer that measures the acceleration in the direction parallel to the inertial response shown in Figures 6, 7A, and 7B. The impact pulses intended for the tests discussed in this document have an isosceles triangle shape. These ideal pulses are considered minimum test conditions. Since the actual acquired test pulses will differ from the ideal, it is necessary to evaluate the acquired test pulses to ensure the minimum requirements are satisfied.

The five properties of the ideal pulse that must be satisfied by the acquired test pulse are (referring to Figures 6, 7A, and 7B, and as discussed in Appendix A):

- Pulse shape: isosceles triangle
- Greq: peak deceleration required by test condition
- Treq: rise time required by test condition
- V: total velocity change required by test condition
- Vtr: velocity change required during Treq (Vtr = V/2)

A graphical technique can be used to evaluate pulse shapes that are not precise isosceles triangles. Appendix A presents the graphical method of evaluating the acquired pulse (the recorded test sled acceleration versus time).

For the acquired pulse to be acceptable, the requirements of Appendix A...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When reading AS8049B...</th>
<th>Do the following:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>shall be met.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 54, replace subsection 5.3.9.9 to read as follows:

5.3.9.9 Femur Load (Type A Seats): Data for measuring femur loads can be collected in the tests discussed in this document if the ATD’s legs contact seats or other structure. The maximum compressive load in the femur can be obtained directly from a plot or listing of each femur load transducer output. If the value of peak acceleration measured in the test exceeds the level given in Figure 6, 7A, or 7B, the femur load measured in the test may be adjusted by no more than 10% by multiplying the measured values by the ratio of the peak acceleration given in Figure 6, 7A, or 7B, divided by the measured peak acceleration, if necessary. Data need not be recorded in each individual test if rational comparative analysis is available for showing compliance. For large clearance installations (distance from seat SRP to strike target is greater than 100 cm (40 in.) nominally), no data is necessary to substantiate femur loads. However, appropriate limitations must be documented.

Extensive seat testing has shown that the femur loading criterion is not usually exceeded therefore, recording femur loads may not be necessary during the test if it can be shown compliance by rational comparative analysis using data from previous tests. However, the rational analysis must show that the testing applies to the seat design, and must include appropriate limitations which must be documented.

Page 54, replace subsection 5.3.9.11 to read as follows:

5.3.9.11 Seat Deformation: The permanent deformations affecting aircraft evacuation shall be evaluated and documented.

The floor deformation fixture may be returned to the flat floor condition for documenting seat deformation. This documentation can take the form of dimensioned scale drawings that show the seat in its deformed condition relative to a reference origin, such as a floor track fitting which can be related to the aircraft interior. If the seat deformation is not critical, still photographs of the seat (with dimensional targets or grids in place so that measurements can be made) will provide adequate documentation. Any actions necessary for proper seat functions, such as stowage of the seat when the ATD is removed, shall be observed and documented.

Safety belt restraint systems must not yield to the extent they would impede rapid evacuation of the occupant.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When reading AS8049B...</th>
<th>Do the following:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Page 56, replace subsections 5.3.10.1.1.e and 5.3.10.1.1.f to read as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. A statement confirming that the data collection was done in accordance with the requirements of this document, or a detailed description of the actual procedure used and technical analysis showing equivalence to the requirements of this document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. Manufacturer, governing specification, serial number, and test weight of ATDs used in the tests, and a description of any modifications or repairs performed on the ATDs that could cause them to deviate from the specification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 6</td>
<td>Disregard and refer to paragraph 4 of this ETSO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 7</td>
<td>Disregard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A</td>
<td>No Changes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.0. This paragraph prescribes the MPS for SAE International ARP5526C ‘Aircraft Seat Design Guidance and Clarifications’, dated May 2011. When the SAE section recommends (or suggests, advises, etc.) something, and it is part of the MPS, the recommendation becomes a requirement. In addition, modify ARP5526C as follows:

Table 2 — SAE ARP5526C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When reading ARP5526C...</th>
<th>Do the following:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Disregard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Disregard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Disregard all subsections in Section 3 not listed below. The following subsections apply as modified:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 5, replace subsection 3.2.2 to read as follows:

3.2.2 Definition and Criteria: Seatbelt misalignment is a condition where the seatbelt and/or shackle is positioned to give the impression that the belt has been properly tightened, when in fact there is slack in the system or the shackle is positioned so that it will not carry the force generated in an emergency landing or turbulence condition.

Restraint system anchorages should provide self-aligning features. If self-aligning features are not provided, the static and dynamic tests in this document should be conducted with the restraints and anchorages positioned in the most adverse configuration allowed by the design. The anchorage system shall minimise the possibility of incorrect installation or inadvertent disconnection of the restraints.

The seat belt installation should not appear to the belted occupant to be properly adjusted (snug) while there is significant (2.54 cm (one inch) or more) slack in the system which may pay out in an emergency landing situation. For example, the belt installation should not be able to be caught between seat features such that the occupant would not know there was slack in the belt which may allow the occupant to slide forward during emergency landing or turbulence. To test the installed seat belt for misalignment, the seat should be positioned in its taxi, take-off and landing condition. Installations on seats having bottom cushions that can be removed or incorrectly repositioned without tools should be evaluated with the cushions installed, removed and incorrectly repositioned. The belt and shackle combination should be manipulated with one hand in an attempt to place the restraint in a non-design configuration where it could carry the seatbelt adjustment forces. Particular effort should be made to place the restraint in a position that the restraint forces would not be applied to the hook of the shackle in the same manner as they would be applied in a straight tension pull on the belt. Attempts should be made with the restraint in its normal shape, a single twist of the webbing and/or a single fold of the webbing. Typical areas around the restraint shackle...
<table>
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<tr>
<th>When reading ARP526C...</th>
<th>Do the following:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>that should be checked are the plastic shrouding around the armrest, the hydraulic seat recline device, the seat pan, anti-rotation brackets/stops, seat pan supports and exposed fasteners. If a condition of potential misalignment is identified, the seatbelt and shackle, in that condition, should be loaded by a restorative force of 22.2 N (five pounds) applied through the belt in the direction that it would be loaded in the emergency landing or turbulence situation. If the load is carried in the misaligned condition, the design is unacceptable. The examples in Section 3.2.3 illustrate various misalignment conditions that have been found to be unacceptable, as indicated. These examples are not intended to be all-inclusive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To test the belt for inadvertent disengagement, where disengagement is defined as the separation of the restraint’s attachment fitting from the seat structure, the belt should be tested in all orientations with the seat in the taxi, take-off and landing conditions with the seat cushions installed. Interaction of belts in adjacent seats, where the belts could be inadvertently crossed and used by occupants in those adjacent seats, must be evaluated for the possibility of disengagement.

Page 9, replace subsection 3.3.2 to read as follows:

3.3.2 Definition and Criteria: The terms ‘life preserver’, ‘life vest’ and ‘life jacket’ may be used interchangeably. When life preserver stowage provisions are included as part of the seat design, the stowage provisions shall provide access to a life preserver for each seating position. The life preserver stowage shall be designed and located such that the requirements of this section are met. The installation, operating and maintenance instructions shall also reflect the requirements of this section. For example, installation instructions shall account for the allowable life preserver weight and size, marking requirements, as well as the required unobstructed area to remove the life preserver from the container. Furthermore, the operating instructions must report the detailed content of the simulated preflight briefing and any special instructions for unique aspects of the design operation that should be considered for operational use and continued performance.

a. The life preserver shall be restrained under all applicable loading conditions, i.e. the retention device shall not allow the life preserver to come free during emergency landing static and dynamic conditions, taxi, take-off, landing, turbulence, and during stowage and removal of underseat baggage.

b. Any life preserver locating placard installed on the seat shall accurately state the location of the life preserver and be adequately marked per 3.8.2
When reading ARP5526C...

Do the following:

An agency of the European Union

of this ARP5526 Revision C document (e.g. "Life preserver under center armrest"). For life preserver locations other than under the seat or under a console between the seats, mark "Life preserver" or "Life preserver inside" on the container or compartment, unless the location is identified with a pull strap. Pull straps shall be red or labelled "PULL" or "PULL FOR LIFE PRESERVER" in contrasting colour. A symbolic placard may be used in lieu of text.

For seats intended to be installed in sequential rows, a placard may be on the seat back stating the location of the life preserver for the occupant seated behind.

c. The retrieval path of the life preserver shall be free of obstructions due to life preserver container movement and/or seat or aircraft components (e.g. seat legs, cushions, baggage bars, shrouds, etc.) when the seat is in the configuration for taxi, take-off and landing.

d. The life preserver stowage shall not present any sharp edges or points that could damage the life preserver or cause injury.

e. For underseat pan storage on passenger seats (excluding center console storage):

1) A pull strap shall be connected to the life preserver, or a pull strap or latch shall be on the compartment opening, such that when the strap or latch is pulled, the preserver is presented on the strap or the occupant can reach into the compartment to retrieve the preserver (i.e. one or two motions of the occupant result in retrieval of the life preserver).

2) The life preserver shall be located no more than 3 inches aft of the front edge of the seat bottom, i.e. the seat frame or cushion, whichever is further forward.

3) Unless limited by seat cushions or structure (e.g. seat leg, floor, etc.), designs utilising a pull strap shall permit life preserver retrieval when pulled from any angle between:
   a) 45 degrees up and 50 degrees down from the horizontal,
   b) 45 degrees left and 45 degrees right from the container centerline.

4) For designs utilising a pull strap, normal seat operation or underseat baggage storage activities shall not sweep the pull strap into an unreachable location.

5) The life preserver container, or compartment, as installed on the seat shall protect the life preserver from inadvertent damage from normal passenger movement such as the stowage and removal of underseat baggage.
When reading ARP5526C...

Do the following:

f. Demonstrate that the life preserver shall be within easy reach of, and shall be readily removed by a seated and belted occupant (shoulder strap(s) may be removed prior to demonstration), for all seat orientations and installations that are intended for use during taxi, take-off and landing. In lieu of an actual life preserver, a representative object (e.g. size and weight) may be utilised for testing. The evaluation to quickly retrieve the preserver is to begin with the occupant moving their hand(s) from the seated position to reach for the preserver and to end with the occupant having the preserver in their hand(s) and fully removed from the stowage container. It does not include the time for the occupant to return to the upright position, to remove a pull strap from the preserver (if used) or to open the preserver package provided by the preserver manufacturer. Test the critical configuration(s) to demonstrate retrieval in less than 10 seconds by a minimum of 5 test subjects with a success rate of no less than 75%. The test shall evaluate three anticipated occupant test subject size categories: 5th, 50th and 95th percentile. At least one occupant from each size category shall demonstrate successful retrieval within 10 seconds. Test subjects for either the 5th or 95th percentile occupant category shall not exceed 40% of the overall test subject population.

1) For passenger seats, the test subjects shall be naïve. For the purpose of this test, naïve test subjects shall be defined as: they shall have had no experience within the prior 24 months in retrieving a life preserver. Subjects must receive no retrieval information other than a typical preflight briefing. The occupant size categories to be evaluated shall be defined as:
   a. A 5th percentile is no more than 60 in. (1.5 m) tall.
   b. A 50th percentile is at least 63 in. (1.6 m) tall but no more than 70 in. (1.8 m) tall.
   c. A 95th percentile weighs at least 244 lb (110.7 kg).

2) For flight attendant and observer seats, the test subjects do not need to be naïve. The occupant size categories to be evaluated shall be defined as:
   a. A 5th percentile is no more than 60 in. (1.5 m) tall.
   b. A 50th percentile is at least 63 in. (1.6 m) tall but no more than 70 in. (1.8 m) tall.
   c. A 95th percentile weighs at least 244 lb (110.7 kg).

3) For pilot/co-pilot seats, the test subjects do not need to be naïve. The occupant size categories to be evaluated shall be defined as:
   a. A 5th percentile is no more than 62 in. (1.57 m) tall.
   b. A 50th percentile is at least 63 in. (1.6 m) tall but no more than 70 in. (1.8 m) tall.
   c. A 95th percentile weighs at least 244 lb (110.7 kg).

3.6.2 For Type A seats, apply as written.
3.7.2 For Type A seats, apply as written.
When reading ARP5526C... Do the following:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>When reading ARP5526C...</strong></td>
<td><strong>Do the following:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Page 13, replace subsection 3.8.2 to read as follows:</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.8.2 Definition and Criteria: Safety placards on occupant seats should be permanently affixed, located such that they cannot be easily obscured and of a type that cannot be easily erased. The lettering height and colour contrast should be sufficient to allow the placard to be read by the intended occupant (e.g. placards located on the back of the seat should be designed to allow the occupant seated behind to easily read it at the anticipated installed pitch.)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.9.2 Apply as written.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.10.2 Apply as written.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.11.2 Apply as written.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Page 20, replace subsection 3.12.2 to read as follows:</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.12.2 Definition and Criteria: Edges that could cut skin during normal use (including in edges on electrical equipment) should be eliminated and for maintenance should be minimised. To be considered non-injurious, edges that are accessible (as defined in section 3.11.2.1) and could cut skin during normal use shall meet either of the standards listed below:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>In addition, the seat should not have any feature whose edges or corners are exposed when deployed, that presents an impediment to an occupant’s egress (e.g. cocktail table, seat back and in-arm video, flip-out PCU, ashtray, etc.).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.13.2 Apply as written.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.14.2 Apply as written.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.15.2 Apply as written.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.17.2 For Type A passenger seats, apply as written.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.20.2 Apply as written.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix A</strong></td>
<td><strong>Apply Appendix A as necessary to comply with the requirements of this ETSO.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix B</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disregard all subsections in Appendix B not listed below. The following subsections apply as modified:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When reading ARP5526C... | Do the following:
--- | ---
 | B.1.1.14 Apply as written.
 | B.1.1.26 Apply as written.
---
Page 46, replace subsection B.1.1.28 to read as follows:

B.1.1.28 Where seat recline could adversely affect emergency evacuation, passenger seat recline and control mechanisms should have an override feature so that the reclined seat back may be moved to the upright position without releasing the recline control button.
APPENDIX 2

ELECTIVE MPS FOR ROTORCRAFT, TRANSPORT AEROPLANE, AND SMALL AEROPLANE SEATING SYSTEMS

Complying with the MPS in these paragraphs is elective. However, the MPS must be followed for the one(s) elected to comply.

Per ETSO paragraph 3.1.1, elective MPS subparagraphs complied with must be documented and reported to receive credit under this ETSO.

In addition, see ETSO paragraph 4.1.(i).(e) for marking requirements.

a. Step Load on Baggage Bars: For seats where the baggage restraint allows application of a foot step load, apply the test criteria of ARP5526C, subsection 3.7.2. The testing must not degrade either the basic forward or side load carrying capabilities noted in AS8049B, Table 4, or result in deformation, posing a tripping hazard.

b. Flight Attendant Step Load: For seats that include a built-in flight attendant step in the seat design, demonstrate that such a step design meets expected service loads. Apply ARP5526C, Appendix B, subsection B.1.1.29, Table B1, to qualify the design.

c. Testing to Higher Static Loads: To substantiate the seat to load factors higher than those specified in Table 4 of AS8049B, or to combine load factors, the higher load factors must be reported. The higher load factors must be marked on the ETSO placard.

d. Hand Holds: For seats designed to provide a handhold for passengers moving about the airplane, apply ARP5526C, Section 3.1.2.

e. Flammability — Large Exposed Non-metallic Parts: For Type A seats incorporating large non-metallic panels in their design, test and meet the fire protection provisions of Appendix F, parts IV and part V (heat release and smoke emission) of CS-25. The material’s fire protection properties may be demonstrated using the methods provided in the FAA policy statement, PS-ANM-25.853-01-R2 ‘Flammability Testing of Interior Materials’, which may permit substantiation based on previously tested materials.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Audio Systems and Equipment

1 — Applicability

This ETSO gives the requirements which new models of aircraft audio systems and associated equipment that are manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

This ETSO cancels ETSO-C50c “Audio Selector Panels and Amplifiers”, ETSO-C57a “Headsets and Speakers” and ETSO-C58a “Aircraft Microphones”.

This ETSO provides the requirements which Audio Systems and Equipment that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures

2.1 — General

Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific

None.

3 — Technical Conditions

3.1 — Basic

3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard

Standards set forth in section 2 of the RTCA document DO-214 “Audio Systems Characteristics and Minimum Performance Standards for Aircraft Audio Systems and Equipment” dated March 2, 1993, with the following clarifications:

In sub-paragraph 2.8.2.7.1 Input-to-Output Crosstalk and Bleed-Through Levels: $V_{ref}$ will be defined as the rated output level of the monitored output in lieu of the rated input.
In sub-paragraph 2.8.2.7.2 Input-to-Input Crosstalk, $V_{\text{ref}}$ will be defined as the rated input level of the monitored input. Standards set forth in the RTCA DO-214A, Audio Systems Characteristics and Minimum Performance Standards for Aircraft Audio Systems and Equipment, dated 18 December 2013.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

3.2 — Specific
None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a major failure condition.

4 — Marking

4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

**Subject:** Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — General

3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard

Standards set forth in this paragraph and the attached Federal Aviation Administration Technical Standard Order “TERRAIN AWARENESS AND WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS)” appendices 1 through 4.

Standards set forth in the attached Appendix 1 “Minimum Performance Standard for a Terrain Awareness and Warning System for Classes A and B” and in Appendix 3 “Minimum Performance Standard for a Terrain Awareness and Warning System for Class C”.

This equipment is intended for fixed-wing aircraft only

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2. Software implementing the functions defined in this ETSO must be developed to Level C as defined in ED-12B/DO-178B. Monitoring software required by appendix 1 of this ETSO must be developed to Level C. Software in the TAWS other than the software implementing the function and monitoring requirements defined in the ETSO, such as maintenance software, should be developed to Level C also unless the applicant can demonstrate...
that the ETSO functional software and monitoring software is protected from failure of the other software by means such as developed to the highest level commensurate with its functionality and its most severe failure condition categories as determined by a system safety assessment.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

3.2 — Specific
None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
A minimum level of reliability and integrity must be built into the TAWS computer for warning functions. Therefore, the presentation of hazardously misleading information (HMI), as defined in paragraph 2.8 of appendix 1, on the terrain display, or the unannunciated loss of the terrain warning functions as a result of TAWS Computer failure is considered a major failure condition.

A false terrain warning as a result of a TAWS computer failure is also considered a major failure condition. False sensor inputs (erroneous altitude, terrain data, airport data, etc) to the TAWS computer need not be considered for compliance to these failure condition classifications.

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 due to a TAWS computer malfunction resulting in false terrain warnings, un-annunciated loss of function, or presentation of hazardously misleading information as defined in paragraph 2.12 of Appendix 1 is a major failure condition. Loss of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 is a minor failure condition.

3.2.2 — Functional Qualifications
The required performance shall be demonstrated under the test conditions specified in Appendix 2 of this ETSO for Class A and B equipment, or Appendix 3 of this ETSO for Class C equipment.

3.2.3—Fire Protection
All material used shall be self-extinguishing except for small parts (such as knobs, fasteners, seals, grommets, and small electrical parts) that would not contribute significantly to the propagation of a fire.

4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
a. At least one major component must be permanently and legibly marked with all of the information listed in Part 21 Section A Subpart Q § 21A.807(a). In addition to this information the applicable Class A, B or C must be permanently and legibly marked.

In Part 21 Section A Subpart Q § 21A.807(a)(2), the option name, type and part number must be used in lieu of the optional model number, and in Part 21 Section A Subpart Q § 21A.807(a)(3), the option date of manufacture must be used in lieu of the serial number.
b. In addition to the requirements of Part 21 Section A Subpart Q § 21A.807(a), each separate component that is easily removable (without hand tools), each interchangeable element, and each separate sub-assembly of the article that the manufacturer determines may be interchangeable must be permanently and legibly marked with at least the name of the manufacturer, manufacturer’s sub-assembly part number, and ETSO number.

c. If the component includes a digital computer, the part number must include hardware and software identification, or a separate part number may be utilized for hardware and software. Either approach must include a means for showing the modification status. Note that similar software versions, which have been approved to different software levels, must be differentiated by part number. None.

None.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
APPENDIX 1. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION MINIMUM PERFORMANCE
STANDARD (MPS) FOR A TERRAIN AWARENESS AND WARNING SYSTEM, AS AMENDED BY
JAA

1.0 Introduction.

1.1 Purpose. This standard provides the MPS for a Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS).

1.2 Scope. This appendix sets forth the standard for two Classes of TAWS equipment, Class A and Class B.

1.3 System Function and Overview. The system shall provide the flight crew with sufficient
information and alerting to detect a potentially hazardous terrain situation that would permit the
flight crew to take effective action to prevent a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) event. The basic
TAWS functions for all ETSO approved systems include the following:

— a. A Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA) function. The FLTA function looks ahead of the
aeroplane along and below the aeroplane’s lateral and vertical flight path and provides suitable
alerts if a potential CFIT threat exists.

— b. A Premature Descent Alert (PDA) function. The PDA function of the TAWS uses the aeroplane’s
current position and flight path information as determined from a suitable navigation source and
airport database to determine if the aeroplane is hazardously below the normal (typically 3 degree)
approach path for the nearest runway as defined by the alerting algorithm.

— c. An appropriate visual and aural discrete signal for both caution and warning alerts.

— d. Class A TAWS equipment must provide terrain information to be presented on a display
system.

— e. Class A TAWS equipment must provide indications of imminent contact with the ground for the
following conditions as further defined in DO-161A, Minimum Performance Standards—Airborne
Ground Proximity Warning Equipment, dated May 27, 1976, and Section 3.3 of this appendix.
Deviations from DO-161A are acceptable providing the nuisance alert rate is minimized while an
equivalent level of safety for the following conditions is provided.

(1) Excessive Rates of Descent
(2) Excessive Closure Rate to Terrain.
(3) Negative Climb Rate or Altitude Loss After Take-off
(4) Flight Into Terrain When Not in Landing Configuration
(5) Excessive Downward Deviation From an ILS Glideslope.
(6) Voice callout „Five Hundred“ when the aeroplane descends to 500 feet above the terrain
or nearest runway elevation.

NOTE: Class A equipment will be entitled to a ETSO-C92c authorization approval for the
purpose of complying with the mandatory GPWS requirements in CS-OPS 1.665, until
such time that those rules are superseded by TAWS rules.
— f. Class B equipment must provide indications of imminent contact with the ground during the following aeroplane operations as defined in Section 3.4 of this appendix.

—— (1) Excessive Rates of Descent
—— (2) Negative Climb Rate or Altitude Loss After Takeoff
—— (3) A voice callout „Five Hundred“ when the aeroplane descends to 500 feet above the nearest runway elevation.

1.4 Added Features. If the manufacturer elects to add features to the TAWS equipment, those features shall at least meet the same qualification testing and software verification and validation requirements as provided under this ETSO. Additional information such as „human-made“ obstacles may be added as long as they do not adversely alter the terrain functions.

1.5 Other Technologies. Although this ETSO envisions a TAWS based on the use of an onboard terrain and airport data base, other technologies such as the use of radar are not excluded. Other concepts and technologies may be approved under this ETSO using IR-21A.610, Approval for Deviation.

2.0 Definitions.

2.1 Alert. A visual, aural, or tactile stimulus presented to attract attention and convey information regarding system status or condition.

2.2 Aural Alert. A discrete sound, tone, or verbal statement used to announce a condition, situation, or event.

2.3 Caution Alert. An alert requiring immediate crew awareness. Subsequent corrective action will normally be necessary.

2.4 Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). An accident or incident in which an aeroplane, under the full control of the pilot, is flown into terrain, obstacles, or water.

2.5 Failure. The inability of the equipment or any sub-part of that equipment to perform within previously specified limits.

2.6 False Alert. An inappropriate alert that occurs as a result of a failure within the TAWS or when the design alerting thresholds of the TAWS are not exceeded.

2.7 Hazard. A hazard is a state or set of conditions that together with other conditions in the environment could lead to an accident.

2.8 Misleading Information (MI). An incorrect depiction of the terrain threat relative to the aeroplane during an alert condition (excluding source data).

2.9 Nuisance Alert. An inappropriate alert, occurring during normal safe procedures, that occurs as a result of a design performance limitation of TAWS.
2.10 Search Volume. A volume of airspace around the aeroplane’s current and projected path that is used to define a TAWS alert condition.

2.11 Visual Alert. The use of projected or displayed information to present a condition, situation, or event.

2.12 Warning Alert. An alert for a detected terrain threat that requires immediate crew action.

3.0 Required TAWS Functions.

3.1 Class A and Class B Requirements for Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA). The majority of CFIT accidents have occurred because the flight crews did not have adequate situational information regarding the terrain in the vicinity of the aeroplane and its projected flight path. Class A and Class B Equipment will be required to look ahead of the aeroplane, within their design search volume and provide timely alerts in the event terrain is predicted to penetrate the search volume. The FLTA function should be available during all airborne phases of flight including turning flight. The search volume consists of a computed look ahead distance, a lateral distance on both sides of the aeroplane’s flight path, and a specified look down distance based upon the aeroplane’s vertical flight path. This search volume should vary as a function of phase of flight, distance from runway, and the required obstacle clearance (ROC) in order to perform its intended function and to minimize nuisance alerts. The lateral search volume should expand as necessary to accommodate turning flight. The TAWS search volumes should consider the accuracy of the TAWS navigation source. The TAWS lateral search area should be less than the protected area defined by the United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS), FAA Handbook 8260.3B and ICAO PANOPS 8168, volume 2 to prevent nuisance alerts.

3.1.1 Reduced Required Terrain Clearance (RTC). Class A and Class B equipment shall provide suitable alerts when the aeroplane is currently above the terrain in the aeroplane’s projected flight path but the projected amount of terrain clearance is considered unsafe for the particular phase of flight. The required obstacle (terrain) clearance (ROC) as specified in TERPS and the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) have been used to define the minimum requirements for obstacle/terrain clearance (RTC) appropriate to the FLTA function. These requirements are specified in Table 3.1. The FLTA function must be tested to verify the alerting algorithms meet the test conditions specified in Appendix 3, Tables A, B, C, D, E, and F.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>TERPS (ROC)</th>
<th>TAWS (RTC) Level Flight</th>
<th>TAWS (RTC) Descending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enroute</td>
<td>1000 Feet</td>
<td>200 Feet</td>
<td>500 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminal (Intermediate Segment)</td>
<td>500 Feet</td>
<td>350 Feet</td>
<td>300 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>250 Feet</td>
<td>150 Feet</td>
<td>100 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure (See Note 1)</td>
<td>48 Feet/NM</td>
<td>100 Feet</td>
<td>100 Feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE 1:** During the Departure Phase of Flight, the FLTA function of Class A and B equipment must alert if the aeroplane is projected to be within 100 feet vertically of terrain. However,
Class A and Class B equipment should not alert if the aeroplane is projected to be more than 400 feet above the terrain.

NOTE 2: As an alternate to the stepped down reduction from the terminal to approach phase in Table 3.1, a linear reduction of the RTC as the aircraft comes closer to the nearest runway is allowed, providing the requirements of Table 3.1 are met.

NOTE 3: During the visual segment of a normal instrument approach (typically about 1 NM from the runway threshold), the RTC should be defined/reduced to minimize nuisance alerts. Below a certain altitude or distance from the runway threshold, logic may be incorporated to inhibit the FLTA function. Typical operations below Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA), Decision Height (DH), or the Visual Descent Point (VDP) should not generate nuisance alerts.

NOTE 4: The specified RTC values are reduced slightly for descending flight conditions to accommodate the dynamic conditions and pilot response times.

3.1.2 Imminent Terrain Impact. Class A and Class B equipment shall provide suitable alerts when the aeroplane is currently below the elevation of a terrain cell along the aeroplane’s lateral projected flight path and, based upon the vertical projected flight path, the equipment predicts that the terrain clearance will be less than the value given in the RTC column of Table 3.1. See appendix 3 for test conditions that must be conducted (Table G).

3.1.3 FLTA Turning Flight. Class A and Class B equipment shall provide suitable alerts for the functions specified in 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 above when the aeroplane is in turning flight.

3.2 Class A and Class B Equipment Safety Agency for Detection and Alerting for Premature Descents Along the Final Approach Segment. Class A and Class B equipment shall provide a suitable alert when it determines that the aeroplane is significantly below the normal approach flight path to a runway. Approximately one third of all CFIT accidents occur during the final approach phase of flight, when the aeroplane is properly configured for landing and descending at a normal rate. For a variety of reasons which include poor visibility, night time operations, loss of situational awareness, operating below minimums without adequate visual references and deviations from the published approach procedures, many aeroplanes have crashed into the ground short of the runway. A means to detect and alert the flight crew to this condition is an essential safety requirement of this ETSO.

There are numerous ways to accomplish the overall objectives of this requirement. Alerting criteria may be based upon height above runway elevation and distance to the runway. It may be based upon height above terrain and distance to runway or other suitable means. This ETSO will not define the surfaces for which alerting is required. It will specify some general requirements for alerting and some cases when alerting is inappropriate. See appendix 3 Table H for test requirements.

— a. The PDA function should be available for all types of instrument approaches. This includes both straight-in approaches and circling approaches. This includes approaches that are not aligned within 30 degrees of the runway heading.

— b. The TAWS equipment should not generate PDA alerts for normal VFR operations in the airport area. Aeroplanes routinely operate at traffic pattern altitudes of 800 feet above field/runway elevation for traffic pattern operations within SNM of the airport.
3.2.3.3 Class A Requirements for GPWS Alerting. In addition to the TAWS Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance and PDA functions, the equipment shall provide the GPWS functions listed below in accordance with ETSO-C92c. Some GPWS alerting thresholds may be adjusted or modified to be more compatible with the FLTA alerting functions and to minimize GPWS nuisance alerts. However, it is essential to retain the independent protective features provided by both the GPWS and FLTA functions. In each case, all the following situations must be covered. The failure of the ETSO-C92c equipment functions, except for power supply failure, input sensor failure, or failure of other common portions of the equipment, shall not cause a loss of the FLTA, PDA, or Terrain Display.

The functions described in ETSO-C92c and the referenced document DO-161A include:

1. Excessive Rates of Descent
2. Excessive Closure Rate to Terrain
3. Negative Climb Rate or Altitude Loss After Take-Off
4. Flight Into Terrain When Not in Landing Configuration
5. Excessive Downward Deviation From an ILS Glideslope

a. Flap Alerting Inhibition. A separate guarded control may be provided to inhibit GPWS alerts based on flaps being other than the landing configuration.

b. Speed. Airspeed or groundspeed shall be included in the logic that determines basic GPWS alerting time for “Excessive Closure Rate to Terrain” and “Flight Into Terrain When Not in Landing Configuration” to allow maximum time for the flight crew to react and take corrective action.

c. Voice Callouts. Voice callouts of altitude above the terrain shall be provided during non-precision approaches per ETSO-C92c but are recommended for all approaches. These advisories are normally, but are not limited to 500 feet above the terrain or the height above the nearest runway threshold elevation.

d. Barometric Altitude Rate. Class A and Class B equipment may compute Barometric Altitude Rate using an Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator (IVSI) or an inertial smoothed vertical speed indicator. An alternative means, with demonstrated equal or better accuracy, may be used in lieu of barometric altitude rate (accuracy specified in ETSO-C10b, Altimeter, Pressure Actuated, Sensitive Type, or later revisions) and/or altimeter altitude (accuracy specified in ETSO-2C87 (Low range radio altimeters) for air carrier aircraft, or later revisions) to meet the warning requirements described in RTCA Document No. DO-161A. In addition, ETSO-C106 for Air Data Computers may be used as an alternative means of compliance with this provision.

e. Sweep Tones “Whoop-Whoop”. If a two-tone sweep is used to comply with RTCA Document No. DO-161A, paragraph 2.3, the complete cycle of two tone sweeps plus annunciation may be extended from “1.4” to “2” seconds.
NOTE: Class A equipment will be entitled to a ETSO-C92c authorization approval for the purpose of complying with the mandatory GPWS requirements in CS-OPS 1.665 until such time that those rules are superseded by TAWS rules.

3.4 Class B Requirements for GPWS Alerting

— a. Class B equipment must provide alerts for excessive descent rates. The alerting envelope of DO-161A has been modified to accommodate a larger envelope for both caution and warning alerts. Height above Terrain may be determined by using the Terrain Data Base elevation and subtracting it from QNH barometric altitude (or equivalent). In addition, since the envelopes are not limited by a radio altitude measurement to a maximum of 2500 feet AGL, the envelopes are expanded to include higher vertical speeds. The equipment shall meet either the requirements set forth in appendix 3, Section 7.0 or that specified in DO-161A.

— b. Class B equipment must provide alerts for „Negative Climb Rate After Takeoff or Missed Approach” or „Altitude Loss After Takeoff” as specified in DO-161A. The alerting is identical to the alerting envelope in DO-161A except that Height above Terrain is based upon Height above Runway threshold elevation instead of radio-altitude.

— c. Class B equipment must provide a voice callout „Five Hundred” during descents for landing. This feature is primarily intended to provide situational awareness to the flight crew when the aeroplane is being operated properly per normal procedures. During a normal approach, it is useful to provide the flight crew with a 500 foot voice callout referenced to the runway threshold elevation for the runway of intended landing. This feature also has an important CFIT protection function. In the event the aeroplane is operated unintentionally close to terrain when not in the airport area or the area for which PDA protection is provided, a 500 foot voice callout referenced to Height above Terrain will alert the flight crew to a hazardous condition. The equipment shall meet the requirements specified in appendix 3, Section 9.0.

NOTE 1: Class B equipment will not require a radio altimeter. Height above Terrain may be determined by subtracting the elevation of the current position terrain cell from the current barometric altitude (or equivalent).

NOTE 2: Class B equipment should compute the voice callout for five hundred feet based upon barometric height above runway elevation. The nearest runway elevation may be used for this purpose.

3.5 Class A Equipment Requirements for a Terrain Display. Class A equipment shall be designed to interface with a Terrain Display, either color or monochromatic. Class A equipment for TAWS shall be capable of providing the following terrain related information to a display system.

— a. The terrain shall be depicted relative to the aeroplane’s position such that the pilot may estimate the relative bearing to the terrain of interest.

— b. The terrain shall be depicted relative to the aeroplane’s position such that the pilot may estimate the distance to the terrain of interest.

— c. The terrain depicted shall be oriented to either the heading or track of the aeroplane. In addition, a North-up orientation may be added as a selectable format.
— d. Variations in terrain elevation depicted relative to the aeroplane’s elevation (above and below) shall be visually distinct. Terrain that is more than 2000 feet below the aeroplane’s elevation need not be depicted.

— e. Terrain that generates alerts shall be displayed in a manner to distinguish it from non-hazardous terrain, consistent with the caution and warning alert level.

3.6 Class B Equipment Requirements for a Terrain Display. Operators required to install Class B equipment are not required to include a Terrain Display. However, Class B TAWS equipment shall be capable of driving a terrain display function in the event the installer wants to include the terrain display function.

NOTE: This ETSO does not include requirements for the display system/hardware.

4.0 Aural and Visual Alerts.

4.1 The TAWS is required to provide aural alerts and visual alerts for each of the functions described in Section 3.0 of this appendix.

4.2 The required aural and visual alerts must initiate from the TAWS system simultaneously, except when suppression of aural alerts are necessary to protect pilots from nuisance aural alerting.

4.3 Each aural alert shall identify the reason for the alert such as „too low terrain“ and „Glideslope,“ or other acceptable annunciation.

4.4 The system shall remove the visual and aural alert once the situation has been resolved.

4.5 The system shall be capable of accepting and processing aeroplane performance related data or aeroplane dynamic data and providing the capability to update aural and visual alerts at least once per second.

4.6 The aural and visual outputs as defined in Table 4-1 shall be compatible with the standard cockpit displays and auditory systems.

4.7 The aural and visual alerts should be selectable to accommodate operational commonality among fleets of aeroplanes.

4.8 The visual display of alerting information shall be immediately and continuously displayed until the situation is no longer valid.

4.9 As a minimum the TAWS shall be capable of providing aural alert messages described in Table 4-1. In addition to this minimum set, other voice alerts may be provided.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert Condition</th>
<th>Caution</th>
<th>Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced Required Terrain Clearance</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Red text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imminent Impact with Terrain</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Red text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premature Descent Alert (PDA)</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Amber text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td>Visual Alert: None Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A &amp; Class B</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>: “Too Low Terrain”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>: None Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Envelope 1, 2 or 3</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Red text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Descent Rate Class A &amp; Class B</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>: “Sink Rate”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>: ”Pull-Up”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Excessive Closure</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Red text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate (Flaps not in Landing Configuration) Class A</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>: “Terrain-Terrain”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>: ”Pull-Up”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Excessive Closure</td>
<td>Visual Alert: Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td>Visual Alert: None Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate (Landing Configuration) Class A</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>: “Terrain-Terrain”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>: None Required = for gear-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4-1**

STANDARD SET OF VISUAL AND AURAL ALERTS

**ETSO-C151bc**
Appendix 1
### TABLE 4—1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert Condition</th>
<th>Caution</th>
<th>Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Proximity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Altitude-Loss after Take-off</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A &amp; Class B</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Don’t Sink” and “Too Low Terrain”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Proximity</strong>&lt;br&gt;Envelope 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Not in Landing Configuration)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Too Low Terrain” and “Too Low Gear”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Proximity</strong>&lt;br&gt;Envelope 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient Terrain Clearance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Landing and Go-around configuration)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Too Low Terrain” and “Too Low Flaps”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Proximity</strong>&lt;br&gt;Envelope 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient Terrain Clearance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Take-off configuration)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Too Low Terrain”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Proximity</strong>&lt;br&gt;Excessive Glide Slope Deviation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Glide Slope”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Proximity</strong>&lt;br&gt;Voice Call Out (See Note 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A &amp; Class B</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Five Hundred”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE 1:** The aural alert for Ground Proximity Voice Call Out is considered advisory.

**NOTE 2:** Visual alerts may be put on the terrain situational awareness display, if this fits with the overall human factors alerting scheme for the flight deck.

This does not eliminate the visual alert color requirements, even in the case of a monochromatic display. Typically in such a scenario adjacent colored annunciator lamps meet the alerting color requirements.
4.10 Prioritization

— a. Class A Equipment. Class A Equipment shall have an interactive capability with other external alerting systems so an alerting priority can be automatically executed for the purpose of not causing confusion or chaos on the flight deck during multiply alerts from different alerting systems. Typical alerting systems that may be interactive with TAWS include Predictive Windshear (PWS), Reactive Windshear (RWS), and possibly in the future Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS). Table 4-2 includes an alert prioritization scheme. If the PWS, RWS and/or ACAS functions are provided within the TAWS, Table 4-2 also applies. The Agency will consider alert prioritization schemes other than the one included in Table 4-2.

— b. Class B Equipment. Class B Equipment does not require prioritization with external systems such as ACAS, RWS, PWS. If prioritization with those functions is provided, the prioritization scheme shall be in accordance with the Table 4-2. The Agency will consider alert prioritization schemes other than the one included in Table 4-2.

— c. Class B Equipment. Class B equipment shall establish an internal priority alerting system (scheme) for each of the functions. The priority scheme shall ensure that more critical alerts override the presentation of any alert of lesser priority. Table 4-3 is the internal priority scheme of the system. Class B equipment need only consider the TAWS functions required for Class B equipment.
### Table 4–2

#### ALERT PRIORITIZATION SCHEME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Alert Level</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reactive Windshear Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sink Rate Pull-Up Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Excessive Closure Pull-Up Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RTC Terrain Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>( V_{Y} )-Callout</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Engine Fail Callout</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>FLTA Pull-Up Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>PWS Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>RTC Terrain Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Minimums</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>FLTA Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>7± period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Too Low Terrain</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>PDA (&quot;Too Low Terrain&quot;) Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Altitude Callouts</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Too Low Gear</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Too Low Flaps</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sink Rate</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Don’t Sink</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Glideslope</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>3± period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>PWS Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Approaching Minimums</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Bank Angle</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Reactive Windshear Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode 6*</td>
<td>ACAS RA (&quot;Climb&quot;, &quot;Descend&quot;, etc.)</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode 6*</td>
<td>ACAS TA (&quot;Traffic, Traffic&quot;)</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE 1:** These alerts can occur simultaneously with TAWS voice callout alerts.

**NOTE 2:** W = Warning, C = Caution, A = Advisory, I = Informational
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Sink Rate Pull-Up Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Terrain Awareness Pull-Up warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Terrain Awareness Caution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>PDA (&quot;Too Low Terrain&quot;) Caution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Altitude Callouts „500“</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Sink Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Don’t Sink (Mode 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.11 During ILS or other localizer-based approach operations, TAWS should not cause an alert for a terrain/obstacle located outside the TERPS protected airspace. Special design considerations may be necessary to address this issue.

**NOTE 1:** Non-GPS RNAV/FMC Systems that are used for the TAWS aeroplane horizontal aeroplane information may be „Localizer Updated“ to remove cross track errors. In addition, the alerting envelope may be modified to account for the higher accuracy and closer obstacles associated with ILS conditions.

**NOTE 2:** GPS-based Systems that are used for the TAWS aeroplane horizontal aeroplane position information should be able to meet the minimum criteria found in Appendix 1, Section 5.0.

**NOTE 3:** The level off initiation height of 20 percent of the vertical speed was chosen (as a minimum standard for nuisance alarm-free operations) because it is similar to typical autopilot or flight director level off (altitude capture) algorithms whereas the technique of using 10 percent of the existing vertical speed as a level off initiation point is usually considered as a minimum appropriate only to manual operations of smaller general aviation aeroplanes. With high rates of descent, experienced pilots often use a manual technique of reducing the vertical speed by one half when reaching 1000 feet above/below the level off altitude. This technique will significantly reduce the likelihood of nuisance alerts. In the event that use of the 20 percent of vertical speed as a minimum standard for nuisance free operations is shown not to be compatible with the installed autopilot or flight director level off (altitude capture) algorithms, consideration should be given to setting the alert logic closer to the 10 percent vertical speed criteria to minimize nuisance alerts.

5.0 Aeroplane Horizontal Position Determination for Source Data

5.1 Class A equipment. Class A equipment that uses the on-board aeroplane navigation system for horizontal position information for the TAWS and that meets ETSO-C115b or follow AC90-45A for approved RNAV systems, ETSO-C129a for GPS, TSO-C145 for WAAS, or that follow the recommendations in AC 20-130a or AC 138 are considered acceptable. See note below.

5.2 Class B equipment. Class B equipment will be required to interface with an approved GPS for horizontal position information as specified in 5.1. See note below.
NOTE: Experience with these systems to date and analysis support that, as position accuracy decreases, a larger area must be considered for alerts in order for the system to perform its intended function. As the area of consideration is expanded and position accuracy is decreased the system tends to become more prone to nuisance alerts. In order to keep the system nuisance free, the TAWS must be inhibited or its operation degraded to accommodate certain types of operations. Therefore designers should be aware that at the present time only systems that use position information which provides GPS accuracy will be considered to meet this ETSO except for aircraft operated under CS-OPS-1. Operations under CS-OPS-1 provide factors that compensate for the decreased accuracy. These factors include type of operation, route structure analysis, flight crew training, route proving requirements, continued surveillance, and extensive operations into a limited number of airports.

5.3 Internal GPS Navigator Function. Class A and Class B equipment that use a GPS internal to the TAWS for horizontal position information and are capable of detecting a positional error that exceeds the appropriate alarm limit for the existing phase of flight in accordance with ETSO-C129a/ED-72A, or equivalent are considered acceptable. When this alarm limit is activated, the GPS computed position is considered unsuitable for the TAWS function, and an indication should be provided to the flight crew that the TAWS functions that require GPS for operation are no longer available.

6.0 Class A and Class B Requirements for a Terrain and Airport Database.

6.1 Minimum Geographical Considerations. As a minimum, terrain and airport information shall be provided for the expected areas of operation, airports and routes to be flown.

6.2 Development and Methodology. The manufacturer shall present the development and methodology used to validate and verify the terrain and airport information. RTCA DO-200A/EUROCAE ED 76, Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data, should be used as a guideline.

6.3 Resolution. Terrain and airport information shall be of the accuracy and resolution suitable for the system to perform its intended function. Terrain data should be gridded at 30 arc seconds with 100 foot resolution within 30 nautical miles of all airports with runway lengths of 3500 feet or greater and whenever necessary (particularly in mountainous environments) 15 arc seconds with 100 foot resolution (or even 6 arc seconds) within 6 nautical miles of the closest runway. It is acceptable to have terrain data gridded in larger segments over oceanic and remote areas around the world.

Note: Class B equipment may require information relative to airports with runways less than 3500 feet whether public or private. Small airplane owners and operators probably will be the largest market for Class B equipment. Such operators frequently use airports of less than 3500 feet. Those TAWS manufacturers who desire to sell to this market must be willing to customize their terrain databases to include selected airports used by their customers.

6.4 Updates and Continued Airworthiness. The system shall be capable of accepting updated terrain and airport information.
7.0 Class A and Class B Failure Indication. Class A and Class B equipment shall include a failure monitor function that provides reliable indications of equipment condition during operation. It shall monitor the equipment itself, input power, input signals, and aural and visual outputs. A means shall be provided to inform the flight crew whenever the system has failed or can no longer perform the intended function.

8.0 Class A and Class B Requirements for Self-Test. Class A and Class B equipment shall have a self-test function to verify system operation and integrity. It shall monitor the equipment itself, input power, input signals, and aural and visual outputs. Failure of the system to successfully pass the self-test shall be annunciated.

NOTE: Flight crew verification of the aural and visual outputs during a self-test is an acceptable method for monitoring aural and visual outputs.

9.0 Class A Equipment Requirements for a Terrain Awareness Inhibit for the FLTA function, the Premature Descent Alert function and Terrain Display.

9.1 Manual Inhibit. Class A equipment shall have the capability, via a control switch to the flight crew, to inhibit only the FLTA function, the Premature Descent Alert function, and Terrain Display. This is required in the event of a navigational system failure or other failures that would adversely affect FLTA, the Premature Descent Alert function or the Terrain Display. The basic TAWS required functions shall remain active when the inhibit function is utilized.

9.2 Automatic Inhibit. The capability of automatically inhibiting Class A functions within TAWS equipment is acceptable utilizing the conditions described in paragraph 7.0. If auto-inhibit capability is provided, the “inhibit status” must be annunciated to the flight crew.

10.0 Phase of Flight Definitions. The TAWS equipment search volumes and alerting thresholds should vary as necessary to be compatible with TERPS and other operational considerations. For that reason, a set of definitions is offered for Enroute, Terminal, Approach and Departure Phases of Flight. Other definitions for enroute, terminal and approach may be used by TAWS provided they are compatible with TERPS and standard instrument approach procedures and will comply with the test criteria specified in Appendix 3.

10.1 Enroute Phase. The Enroute Phase exists anytime the aeroplane is more than 15 NM from the nearest airport or whenever the conditions for Terminal, Approach and Departure Phases are not met.

10.2 Terminal Phase. The Terminal Phase exists when the aeroplane is 15 NM or less from the nearest runway while the range to the nearest runway threshold is decreasing and the aeroplane is at or below (lower than) a straight line drawn between the two points specified in Table 10-1 relative to the nearest runway.
10.3 Approach Phase. Distance to nearest runway threshold is equal to, or less than 5 NM; and height above the nearest runway threshold location and elevation is equal to, or less than 1900 feet; and distance to the nearest runway threshold is decreasing.

10.4 Departure Phase. The Departure Phase should be defined by some reliable parameter that initially determines that the aeroplane is "on the ground" upon initial power-up. If, for example, the equipment can determine that the aeroplane is "on the ground" by using some logic such as ground speed less than 35 knots and altitude within +/- 75 feet of field elevation or nearest runway elevation and "airborne" by using some logic such as ground speed greater than 50 knots and altitude 100 feet greater than field elevation, then the equipment can reliably determine that it is in the "Departure Phase." Other parameters to consider are climb state, and distance from departure runway. Once the aeroplane reaches 1500 feet above the departure runway, the Departure Phase is ended.

11.0 Class A and Class B Summary Requirements.
(Reserved)

---

**TABLE 10-1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance to Runway</th>
<th>Height above Runway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 NM</td>
<td>3500 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 NM</td>
<td>1900 Feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**TABLE 11-1**

(RESERVED)
APPENDIX 2. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO ENVIRONMENTAL TEST PROCEDURES

RESERVED FOR MODIFICATIONS OF OR ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS BEYOND THE TEST PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN EUROCAE/RTCA DOCUMENT ED-14D/DO-160D.
APPENDIX 3. TEST CONDITIONS

1.0 Forward looking Terrain Avoidance — Reduced Required Terrain Clearance (RRTC) Test Conditions. This condition exists, when the aeroplane is currently above the terrain but the combination of current altitude, height above terrain, and projected flight path indicates that there is a significant reduction in the Required Terrain Clearance (RTC).

1.1 Phase of Flight Definitions. For the following test conditions, refer to appendix 1, paragraph 10.0 for an expanded discussion on the definitions of the phases of flight.

1.2 Enroute Descent Requirement. A terrain alert shall be provided in time so as to assure that the aeroplane can level off (L/O) with a minimum of 500 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the aeroplane. The test conditions assume a descent along a flight path that has terrain that is 1000 feet below the expected level off altitude. If the pilot initiates the level off at the proper altitude, no TAWS alert would be expected. However, if the pilot is distracted or otherwise delays the level off, a TAWS alert is required to permit the pilot to recover to level flight in a safe manner.

a. See Table A. Column A represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the Minimum Altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their intended function. Column F represents the Maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See appendix 3, Section 4.0

b. For each of the Descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 500 feet terrain clearance is required.

c. Test Conditions for 1.2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumed Pilot response time:</th>
<th>3.0 seconds minimum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumed constant G pull-up:</td>
<td>0.25 g's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Allowed Terrain Clearance:</td>
<td>500 feet AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descent rates:</td>
<td>1000, 2000, 4000, and 6000 fpm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumed Pilot Task for Column F:</td>
<td>Level off at 1000 feet above the terrain per TERPS Required Obstacle Clearance (ROC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.

NOTE 2: Enroute operations are considered to exist beyond 15 NM from the departure runway until 15 NM from the destination airport. Use of the nearest runway logic is permissible provided suitable logic is incorporated to ensure that the transitions to the terminal logic will typically occur only when the aeroplane is in terminal airspace.

NOTE 3: The values shown in column E may be reduced by 100 feet (to permit a level off to occur at 400 feet above the obstacle) provided that it can be
demonstrated that the basic TAWS Mode 1 alert (sink rate) is issued at, or above, the altitude specified in column E for typical terrain topographies.

NOTE 4: Class B Equipment Considerations. The values shown in Column F are appropriate for Autopilot or Flight Director operations with an Altitude Capture function typical of many CS-25 certificated aeroplanes (Large Aeroplanes). The values are based upon 20 percent of the aeroplanes vertical velocity. If TAWS is installed on an aeroplane without such an Autopilot or Flight Director function, consideration should be given to computing the alerts based upon 10 percent of the vertical velocity which is more appropriate to manual flight and small general aviation aeroplane operations.

**TABLE A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VERT SPEED (FPM)</th>
<th>ALT LOST WITH 3 SEC</th>
<th>ALT PILOT DELAY</th>
<th>TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO 0.25G</th>
<th>MINIMUM ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</th>
<th>MAXIMUM CAUTION ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>-1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>-1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>-1800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Enroute Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations (vertical speed is +/- 500 feet per minute), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is within 700 feet of the terrain and is predicted to be equal to or less than 700 feet within the prescribed alerting time or distance. See Table B for Test Criteria.

NOTE 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.

**TABLE B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL (MSL)</th>
<th>TEST-RUN ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
<th>ALERT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5700 (+0/-100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5700 (+0/-100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5700 (+0/-100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5700 (+0/-100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5700 (+0/-100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.4 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Descent Requirement. A terrain alert shall be provided in time so as to assure that the aeroplane can level off (L/O) with a minimum of 300 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the aeroplane. The test conditions assume a descent along a flight path that has terrain that is 500 feet below the expected level off altitude. If the pilot initiates the level off at the proper altitude, no TAWS alert would be expected. However, if the pilot is distracted or otherwise delays the level off, a TAWS alert is required to permit the pilot to recover to level flight in a safe manner.

- a. See Table C: Column A represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the Minimum Altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their intended function. Column F represents the Maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See appendix 3, Section 4.0.

- b. For each of the Descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 300 feet terrain clearance is required.

- c. Test Conditions for 1.4:

  Assumed Pilot response time: 1.0 second minimum
  Assumed constant G pull-up: 0.25 g's
  Minimum Allowed Terrain Clearance: 300 feet AGL
  Descent rates: 1000, 2000, and 3000 fpm
  Assumed Pilot Task for Column F: Level off at 500 feet above the terrain per TERPS Required Obstacle Clearance (ROC).

NOTE 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.

NOTE 2: For Class B Equipment Considerations. The values shown in Column F are appropriate for Autopilot or Flight Director operations with an Altitude Capture function typical of many CS-25 certificated aeroplanes (Large Aeroplanes). The values are based upon 20 percent of the aeroplanes vertical velocity. If TAWS is installed on an aeroplane without such an Autopilot or Flight Director function, consideration should be given to computing the alerts upon 10 percent of the vertical velocity which is more appropriate to manual flight and small general aviation aeroplane operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VERT SPEED (FPM)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALT LOST WITH 1 SEC PILOT DELAY</td>
<td>ALT REQ'D TO L/O WITH 0.25G</td>
<td>TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO RECOVERY MANEUVER</td>
<td>MINIMUM TAWS WARNING ALERT-HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
<td>MAXIMUM TAWS CAUTION ALERT-HEIGHT (ABOVE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.5 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations (vertical speed less than ±500 feet per minute), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is less than 350 above the terrain and is predicted to be within less than 350 feet within the prescribed alerting time or distance. See Table D for Test Criteria.

NOTE 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.
### TABLE D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Speed (KT)</th>
<th>Height of Terrain Cell (MSL)</th>
<th>Test Run Altitude (MSL)</th>
<th>Alert Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6. Final Approach Segment Descent Requirement. A terrain alert shall be provided in time to assure that the aeroplane can level off (L/O) with a minimum of 100 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the aeroplane.

- a. See Table E. Column A represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the Minimum Altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their intended function. Column F represents the Maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See appendix 3, Section 4.0.

- b. For each of the Descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 100 feet terrain clearance is required.

- c. Test Conditions for 1.6:
  
  Assumed Pilot response time: 1.0 seconds minimum
  
  Assumed constant G pull-up: 0.25 g’s
  
  Minimum Allowed Terrain Clearance: 100 feet AGL
  
  Descent rates: 500, 750, 1000, and 1500 fpm
  
  Assumed Pilot Task for Column F: Level off at 250 feet above the terrain per TERPS Required Obstacle Clearance (ROC).

**NOTE 1:** The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.

**NOTE 2:** For Class B equipment Considerations. The values shown in Column E are appropriate for Autopilot or Flight Director operations with an Altitude Capture function typical of many CS-25 certificated aeroplanes (Large Aeroplanes). The values are based upon 20 percent of the aeroplanes vertical velocity. If TAWS is installed on an aeroplane without such an Autopilot or Flight Director function, consideration should be given to computing the alerts based upon 10 percent of the vertical velocity, which is more appropriate to manual flight and small general aviation aeroplane operations.
### TABLE E

#### Final Approach Descent Alerting Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERT SPEED (FPM)</td>
<td>ALT-LOST WITH 1 SEC PILOT DELAY</td>
<td>ALT REQ'D TO L/O WITH 0.25G</td>
<td>TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO RECOVERY MANEUVER</td>
<td>MINIMUM TAWS WARNING ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
<td>MAXIMUM TAWS CAUTION ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.7 Final Approach Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations at the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is within 150 feet of the terrain and is predicted to be within less than 150 feet within the prescribed alerting time or distance. See Table F for test criteria.

**NOTE 1:** The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.

### TABLE F

#### Final Approach Level Flight Alerting Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL (MSL)</th>
<th>DISTANCE TERRAIN FROM RWY (NM)</th>
<th>TEST-RUN ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
<th>ALERT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>MAY ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>MAY ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>MAY ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.0 Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance Imminent Terrain Impact Test Conditions. The following test conditions must be conducted to evaluate level flight performance during all phases of flight:

**NOTE 1:** The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.

**NOTE 2:** Based upon a one-second pilot delay and a 0.25 g incremental pull to constant 6.0 degree climb gradient, compute and record the aeroplane altitude at
the terrain cell, the positive (or negative) clearance altitude, and the aeroplane position and time (after the alert), when the alert envelope is cleared.

2.1 Test Criteria. For each of the test cases below, a positive clearance of the terrain cell of interest is required.

2.2 Additional Test Criteria. Repeat each of the test cases below with the altitude error (-100 feet or -200 feet). A positive clearance of the terrain cell of interest is required.

### TABLE G

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL (MSL)</th>
<th>DISTANCE TERRAIN FROM RWY (NM)</th>
<th>TEST RUN ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
<th>ALERT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.0 Premature Descent Alert Test Conditions. The purpose of this test is to verify that the pilot will be alerted to a “low altitude condition” at an altitude that is defined by the specific design PDA Alert surface. This ETSO will not define specific pass/fail criteria since, as stated in paragraph 3.2 of appendix 1, it does not define the surfaces for which alerting is required. The applicant must provide its proposed pass/fail criteria along with the proposed recovery procedures for the specific alerting criteria proposed by the applicant. In developing its test plan, the applicant should refer to paragraph 3.2 of appendix 1 that contain some general requirements for alerting and some cases when alerting is inappropriate. The applicant also may want to consider the recovery procedures specified in paragraphs 1.2, 1.4, and 1.6 of paragraph 1 of appendix 3. The following test conditions must be conducted to evaluate PDA performance.

3.1 Test Conditions for 3.0 Premature Descent Alerts.
Descent rates: 750, 1500, 2000, 3000 FPM
Assumed Runway Elevation: Sea Level, Level Terrain
NOTE: For each test condition listed in Table H, compute and record the PDA alert altitude and the recovery altitude to level flight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>VERT. SPEED (FPM)</th>
<th>DISTANCE FROM RWY THRESHOLD (Touchdown) (NM)</th>
<th>PDA ALERT HEIGHT (MSL)</th>
<th>RECOVERY ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.0 Nuisance Alert Test Conditions - General. The following test conditions must be conducted to evaluate TAWS performance during all phases of flight. The following general criteria apply:

4.1 4000FPM. It must be possible to descend at 4000 FPM in the enroute airspace and level off 1000 feet above the terrain using a normal level off procedure (leading the level off by 20 percent of the vertical speed) without a caution or warning alert. See Table A.

4.2 2000FPM. It must be possible to descend at 2000 FPM in the Terminal area and level off 500 feet above the terrain using the normal level off procedure described in 4.1 above, without a caution or warning alert. See Table C.

4.3 1000FPM. It must be possible to descend at 1000 FPM in the Final Approach Segment and level off at the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) using the normal level off procedure described in 4.1 above, without a caution or warning alert. See Table E.
5.0 Nuisance Test Conditions for Horizontal and Vertical Flight Technical Errors. It shall be shown, by analysis, simulation or flight testing, that the system will not produce nuisance alerts when the aeroplane is conducting normal flight operations in accordance with published instrument approach procedure. This assumes the normal range in variation of input parameters.

5.1 Test Cases. As a minimum, the following cases (1–9) shall be tested twice; one set of runs will be conducted with no lateral or vertical errors while another set of runs will be conducted with both lateral and vertical Flight Technical Errors (FTE). A lateral FTE of 0.3 NM and a vertical FTE of -100 feet (aircraft is closer to terrain) up to the FAF and a lateral FTE of 0.3 NM and a vertical FTE of -50 feet from the FAF to the Missed Approach Point (MAP) shall be simulated. For all listed VOR, VOR/DME and Localizer based approaches, from the FAF to the MAP the aeroplane will descend at 1000 FPM until reaching either MDA (run #1) or MDA-50 feet (run #2). The aeroplane will then level off and fly level until reaching the MAP. Localizer updating of lateral position errors (if provided) may be simulated.
6.0 Test Conditions Using Known Accident Cases. The aircraft configuration and flight trajectory for each case may be obtained from the Operations Assessment Division, DTS-43, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts or at the FAA web page at the following address: http://www.faa.gov/avr/air/airhome.htm or http://www.faa.gov and then select „Regulation and Certification“, select „Aircraft Certification“.

6.1 Test Report. The test report should include as many of the following parameters use to recreate the events. They are (1) latitude; (2) longitude; (3) altitude; (4) time from terrain at caution and warning alerts; (5) distance from terrain at caution and warning alerts; (6) ground speed; (7) true track; (8) true heading; (9) radio altitude; (height above terrain) (10) gear position; and (11) flap position.

6.2 Computation and Recording. In addition to the above when the warning is posted, for each test case, based upon a one-second pilot delay and a 0.25 g incremental pull to a constant 6.0 degree climb gradient, do the following. Compute and record the aeroplane altitude at the terrain cell, the positive (or negative) clearance altitude, and the aeroplane position and time (after the alert), when the alert envelope is cleared.

NOTE: The terrain cell of interest is the one associated with the accident and not necessarily the terrain cell that caused the warning.

6.3 Test Criteria. In each of the test cases below, it shall be necessary to demonstrate that the aeroplane profile clears the terrain cell of interest.
### TABLE J

#### Known Accident Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>IATA CODE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz, Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/1/85</td>
<td>N819EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat Rock, NC</td>
<td></td>
<td>8/23/85</td>
<td>N600CM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor, MA</td>
<td></td>
<td>12/10/86</td>
<td>N65TD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle, CO</td>
<td></td>
<td>3/27/87</td>
<td>N31SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegucigalpa, Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td>10/21/89</td>
<td>N88705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halawa Point, HI</td>
<td></td>
<td>10/28/89</td>
<td>N707PV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San-Diego, CA</td>
<td></td>
<td>3/16/91</td>
<td>N831LC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome, GA</td>
<td></td>
<td>12/11/91</td>
<td>N25BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriels, NY</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/3/92</td>
<td>N55000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alamogordo, NM</td>
<td></td>
<td>6/24/92</td>
<td>N1085C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Granby, CT</td>
<td></td>
<td>11/12/95</td>
<td>N566AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buga, Columbia</td>
<td></td>
<td>12/20/95</td>
<td>N651AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimitz Hill, Guam</td>
<td></td>
<td>8/6/97</td>
<td>H7468</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7.0 Class B Equipment Test Requirements for Excessive Descent Rate:

Use the following performance envelopes down to a „Height above Terrain“ value of 100 feet. Instead of using Height of Terrain as determined by a radio altimeter, determine „Height above Terrain“ as determined by subtracting the Terrain Elevation (from the Terrain Data Base) from the current QNH barometric altitude (or equivalent). The curve represents the minimum heights at which alerting must occur.

**NOTE:** Class B equipment may be designed to meet the requirements of DO-161A for Excessive Descent Rate in lieu of the requirements of 7.0.
8.0 **Class B Equipment Test Requirements for Negative Climb Rate or Altitude Loss After Takeoff.** Use the existing performance envelopes specified in DO-161A based upon a “Height above Runway” using barometric altitude (or equivalent) and runway elevation in lieu of radio altimeter inputs.

9.0 **Class B Equipment Test Requirements for the Altitude Callouts.** Instead of using Height of Terrain as determined by a radio altimeter, determine Height above runway as determined by subtracting the Runway Elevation (from the Airport Data Base) from the current barometric altitude (or equivalent). When the Height above Terrain value first reaches 500 feet a single voice alert (“Five Hundred”) or equivalent shall be provided.
APPENDIX 4. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD (MPS) FOR A TERRAIN AWARENESS AND WARNING SYSTEM FOR CLASS C, AS AMENDED BY EASA

1.0 INTRODUCTION.

1.1 This appendix describes modifications to this ETSO for TAWS Class C equipment.

1.2 This appendix contains only modifications to existing requirements in this ETSO. It is intended that Class C meet all Class B requirements that are not modified or addressed here. The paragraph numbers below relate directly to the paragraphs in appendices 1 and 3.

2.0 CLASS C.
Class C TAWS equipment must meet all the requirements of a Class B TAWS with the small aircraft modifications described herein. If the equipment is designed only to function as Class C, per these modifications, it should be appropriately marked as Class C as prescribed in paragraph 4.2 of this ETSO, so that it can be uniquely distinguished from the Class A and B TAWS equipment.
Modifications to Appendix 1.

Minimum-performance Standards, MPS

1.1 Phase of Flight Definitions. For appendix 4, the terms “takeoff,” “cruise,” and “landing” are used instead of “departure,” “enroute,” and “approach” because they are more suitable to the GA environment.

Takeoff – positive required obstacle clearance (ROC), inside traffic area, distance to nearest runway threshold is increasing, and aeroplane is below 1,000 feet.

Cruise – anytime the aeroplane is outside the airport traffic control area.

Landing – inside traffic area and distance to nearest runway threshold is decreasing, and aeroplane is below 1,000 feet.

1.2 Altitude Accuracy. A means must be provided to compute an actual MSL aircraft altitude value that is immune to temperature errors and manual correction mis-sets that would otherwise prevent the TAWS from performing its intended function. If the TAWS includes a terrain display output, this reference altitude value used for the TAWS alerts should also be output for display. Since the altitude value is necessarily based upon GPS derived MSL altitude, which is required for horizontal position in all class B & C TAWS, the displayed value must be labelled MSL/G or MSL-G, or other obvious acronym that relates to the pilot that altitude is GPS derived MSL altitude.

1.3 (f)(3) System Function and Overview. This data is pilot selectable for both “altitude” and “inhibit.”

3.1.1 Reduced Required Terrain Clearance (RTC). The required terrain clearance in the Altered Table 3.1 applies to small aircraft flying visually, and the TERPS criteria need not apply to TAWS. Thus, ROC numbers more appropriate to low level visual flight have been chosen.

Alternate Table 3.1 is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Small Aircraft ROC</th>
<th>TAWS (RTC) Level Flight</th>
<th>TAWS (RTC) Descending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cruise</td>
<td>500 Feet</td>
<td>250 Feet</td>
<td>200 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>48 Feet/NM</td>
<td>100 Feet</td>
<td>100 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing (See Note 1)</td>
<td>250 Feet</td>
<td>150 Feet</td>
<td>100 Feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE 1: During the Takeoff Phase of Flight, the FLTA function must alert if the aircraft is projected to be within 100 feet vertically of terrain. However, the equipment should not alert if the aircraft is projected to be more than 250 feet above the terrain.

3.3.c Voice Callouts. This data is pilot selectable for both “altitude” and “inhibit.”

4.0 Aural and Visual Alerts
### TABLE 4–1

**STANDARD SET OF VISUAL AND AURAL ALERTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert Condition</th>
<th>Caution</th>
<th>Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrain Awareness Reduced Required Terrain Clearance</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Red text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Minimum Selectable Voice Alert:&lt;br&gt;“Caution, Terrain; Caution, Terrain”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Minimum Selectable Voice Alert:&lt;br&gt;“Terrain; Terrain”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain Awareness Imminent Impact with Terrain</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Red text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Minimum Selectable Voice Alert:&lt;br&gt;“Caution, Terrain; Caution, Terrain”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Minimum Selectable Voice Alert:&lt;br&gt;“Terrain; Terrain”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain Awareness Premature Descent Alert (PDA)</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Too Low; Too Low”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-Proximity Excessive Descent Rate</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Red text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Sink-Rate”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Pull-Up”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-Proximity Altitude Loss after Take-off</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;Amber text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the Aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Don’t Sink”</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-Proximity Voice Call Out (See Note 1)</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;“Five Hundred” or selected altitude</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong>&lt;br&gt;None Required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE 1:** The aural alert for Ground Proximity Voice Call Out is considered advisory.

**NOTE 2:** Visual alerts may be put on the terrain situational awareness display, if this fits with the overall human factors alerting scheme for the flight deck. This does not eliminate the visual-alert color requirements, even in the case of a monochromatic display. Typically in such a scenario, adjacent colored enunciator lamps meet the alerting color requirements. Audio alerts are still required regardless of terrain display visual alerts.
Modifications to Appendix 3, Test Conditions.

**NOTE 1:** Paragraph 1.1 of the ETSO is not applicable; for small aircraft only three phases of flight are considered, take-off, cruise, and final approach to landing.

**NOTE 2:** Paragraph 1.2 of the ETSO is changed to specify altitude levels, test speeds and pull-ups more appropriate for small aircraft:

1.2 Cruise Descent Requirements. A terrain alert must be provided in time so as to assure that the aeroplane can level-off (L/O) with a minimum of 200 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the aeroplane. The test conditions assume a descent along a flight path that has terrain that is 500 feet below the expected level-off altitude. If the pilot initiates the level-off at the proper altitude, no TAWS alert would be expected. However, if the pilot is distracted or otherwise delays the level-off, a TAWS alert is required to permit the pilot to recover to level flight in a safe manner.

a. See Table A. Column A represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the Minimum Altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their intended function. Column F represents the Maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See appendix 3, section 4.0

b. For each of the Descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 200 feet terrain clearance is required.

c. Test Conditions for 1.2:

- Assumed Pilot response time: 3.0 seconds minimum
- Assumed Constant G pull-up: 1.0 g
- Minimum Allowed Terrain Clearance: 200 feet AGL
- Descent rates: 500, 1000, and 2000 fpm

Assumed Pilot Task for Column F: Level-off at 500 feet above the terrain per Appendix 4 Table 3–1 Required Obstacle Clearance (ROC).

**NOTE 1:** The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.

**NOTE 2:** Cruise operations are considered to exist beyond the airport control area until inside the destination airport control area for VFR operations. Distances may extend to 10 NM from the airport (takeoff and landing) for IFR operations. Use of the nearest runway logic is permissible provided suitable logic is incorporated to ensure that the transitions to the terminal logic will typically occur only when the aeroplane is in terminal airspace.

**NOTE 3:** The values shown in column E may be reduced by 50 feet (to permit a level-off to occur at 150 feet above the obstacle) provided that it can be demonstrated that the basic TAWS Mode 1 alert (sink rate) is issued at, or above, the altitude specified in column E for typical terrain topographies.

**NOTE 4:** The values shown in Column F are appropriate for an aeroplane without an Autopilot or Flight Director function, and are based upon 10-15 percent of the vertical velocity, which is appropriate to manual flight and small general aviation aeroplane operations.
**TABLE A**

**ENROUTE DESCENT ALERTING CRITERIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERT SPEED (FPM)</td>
<td>ALT-LOST WITH 3 SEC PILOT DELAY</td>
<td>ALT REQ'D TO L/O WITH 1G PULLUP</td>
<td>TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO RECOVERY MANEUVER</td>
<td>MINIMUM TAWS-WARNING ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
<td>MAXIMUM CAUTION ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ETSO Note:** Paragraph 1.3 in the ETSO is changed to specify altitude levels, test speeds and pull-ups more appropriate to small aircraft:

1.3 Cruise Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations (vertical speed is ± 200 feet per minute), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is within 250 feet of the terrain and is predicted to be equal to or less than 200 feet within the prescribed test criteria. See Table B for Test Criteria.

**NOTE 1:** The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.

**TABLE B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL (MSL)</th>
<th>TEST RUN ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
<th>ALERT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5340 (+0/-50)</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5340 (+0/-50)</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5340 (+0/-50)</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5240 (+0/-50)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5240 (+0/-50)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5240 (+0/-50)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Descent Requirement.
Not applicable.

1.5 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Level Flight Requirement.
Not applicable.
1.6 Final Approach Descent Requirements.
Revised to specify altitude levels, test speeds and pull-ups more appropriate to small aircraft:

a. See Table E. Column A represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the Minimum Altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their intended function. Column F represents the Maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See appendix 3, section 4.0.

b. For each of the Descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 100 feet terrain clearance is required.

c. Test Conditions for 1.6:
   Assumed Pilot response time: 1.0 seconds minimum
   Assumed constant G pull-up: 1.0 g
   Minimum Allowed Terrain Clearance: 100 feet AGL
   Descent rates: 500, 750, and 1000 fpm

Assumed Pilot Task for Column F: Level off at 250 feet above the terrain per Appendix 4, Table 3-1 Required Obstacle Clearance (ROC).

NOTE 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.

NOTE 2: The values shown in Column F are appropriate for an aeroplane without an Autopilot or Flight Director function, and are based upon 10 percent of the vertical velocity that is appropriate to manual flight and small general aviation aeroplane operations.

TABLE E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A VERT SPEED (FPM)</th>
<th>B ALT LOST WITH 1 SEC PILOT DELAY</th>
<th>C ALT REQ'D TO L/O WITH 1-G PULLUP</th>
<th>D TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO RECOVERY MANEUVER</th>
<th>E MINIMUM TAWS WARNING ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</th>
<th>F MAXIMUM CAUTION ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>-350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.7 Landing Flight Requirement.
Apply as written.

2.0 through 2.2. Forward-Looking Terrain Avoidance Imminently Impact Test Conditions.
Apply using Table G for speed cases of 100 through 250 knots, however change the incremental pull from 0.25g to 1.0g in Note 2.

3.0 and 3.1 Premature Descent Alert Test Conditions.
Apply as written.

4.0 Nuisance Alert Test Conditions — General.
Apply as written.

4.1 4000 FPM.
Not applicable.

4.2 2000 FPM. It must be possible to descend at 2000 FPM and level off 500 feet above the terrain using a normal level off procedure (leading the level off by 10 percent of the vertical speed), without a caution or warning alert.

4.3 1000 FPM. It must be possible to descend at 1000 FPM in the Final Approach Segment and level off at 250 feet using the normal level off procedure described in 4.2 above, without a caution or warning alert.

5.0 Nuisance Test Conditions for Horizontal and Vertical Flight Technical Errors.
Applicable as written.

5.1 Test Cases.
Is applicable as written however, test cases are limited to locations 3, 6, 7, and 8 in Table I.

6.0 Test Conditions Using Known Accident Cases.
Paragraphs 6.0 through 6.3 are to be determined by the applicant using actual NTSB GA accidents. Since detailed data is usually not available, reasonable constructed scenarios matching the actual known accident data may be demonstrated. Pulls of up to 1.0g may be used instead of the 0.25g as specified in 6.2, computation and Recording.

7.0 Class C Equipment Test Requirements for Excessive Descent Rate.
Apply Class B as written.

8.0 Class C Equipment Test Requirements for Negative Climb Rate or Altitude Loss after Takeoff.
Apply Class B as written.

9.0 Class C Equipment Test Requirements for the Altitude Callouts.
Apply Class B as written.
APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR A TERRAIN AWARENESS AND WARNING SYSTEM FOR CLASSES A AND B

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE. This standard provides the MPS for a Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS).

1.2 SCOPE. This Appendix sets forth the standard for two classes of TAWS equipment: Class A and Class B.

1.3 SYSTEM FUNCTION AND OVERVIEW. The system must provide the flight crew with sufficient information and appropriate alerts to detect a potentially hazardous terrain situation that, in turn, prevents a CFIT event. The basic TAWS functions for all TAWS systems approved under this ETSO include the following:

a. A forward looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) function. The FLTA function looks ahead of the aeroplane along and below the aeroplane’s lateral and vertical flight path and provides suitable alerts if a potential CFIT threat exists.

b. A premature descent alert (PDA) function. The PDA function of the TAWS uses the aeroplane’s current position and flight path information, as determined from a suitable navigation source and airport database, to determine if the aeroplane is hazardously below the normal (typically three-degree) approach path for the nearest runway as defined by the alerting algorithm.

c. An appropriate visual and aural discrete signal for both caution and warning alerts.

d. Class A TAWS equipment must provide terrain information, which is presented on a display system.

e. Class A TAWS equipment must provide indications of imminent contact with the ground for the following conditions as further defined in RTCA/DO-161A, Minimum Performance Standards - Airborne Ground Proximity Warning Equipment, dated May 27, 1976, and section 3.3 of this Appendix. Deviations from RTCA/DO-161A are acceptable providing the nuisance alert rate is minimised, the deviation is approved under the provision of Part-21, 21.A.610, and an equivalent level of safety for the following conditions is provided:

• **Mode 1:** Excessive rates of descent
• **Mode 2:** Excessive closure rate to terrain
• **Mode 3:** Negative climb rate or altitude loss after takeoff
• **Mode 4**: Flight into terrain when not in landing configuration

• **Mode 5**: Excessive downward deviation from an Instrument Landing System (ILS) glideslope, Localizer Performance and Vertical Guidance (LPV), or Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Landing System (GLS) glidepath.

  **Note**: RTCA/DO-161A glideslope requirements are incorporated for GLS and LPV glidepaths for TAWS Class A systems, reference paragraph 3.3f. It is desirable to provide a glidepath/glideslope warning function on any approach with vertical guidance.

• **Altitude Callout**: A voice callout (‘Five Hundred’) when the aeroplane descends to 500 feet above terrain or nearest runway elevation. All TAWS equipment must provide a 500 foot voice call out.

  **Note**: The altitude callout is not defined in RTCA/DO-161A but is a requirement for the TAWS system. The altitude callout requirements are defined in paragraph 3.3.c. of this Appendix.

  f. Class B equipment basic TAWS functions include functions listed in paragraphs 1.3.a through 1.3.c. and it must provide indications of imminent contact with the ground during the following aeroplane operations as defined in paragraph 3.4 of this Appendix:

  • **Mode 1**: Excessive rates of descent
  
  • **Mode 3**: Negative climb rate or altitude loss after takeoff
  
  • **Altitude Callout**: A voice callout (‘Five Hundred’) when the aeroplane descends to 500 feet above the nearest runway elevation. All TAWS equipment must provide the 500 foot voice call out.

1.4 **ADDED FEATURES.** If the manufacturer elects to add features to the TAWS equipment, those features must at least meet the same qualification testing, software verification, and validation requirements as provided under this ETSO. Additional information, such as human-made obstacles, may be added as long as they do not adversely alter the terrain functions.

1.5 **OTHER TECHNOLOGIES.** Although this ETSO envisions a TAWS based on the use of on-board terrain and airport databases, other technologies such as the use of radar are not excluded. Other concepts and technologies may be approved under this ETSO’s provisions for non-ETSO functionality.

2.0 **DEFINITIONS**
2.1 **Advisory Alerts.** The level or category of alert for conditions that require flight crew awareness and may require subsequent flight crew response.

2.2 **Alert.** A visual, aural, or tactile stimulus presented to attract attention and convey information regarding system status or condition.

2.3 **Aural Alert.** A discrete sound, tone, or verbal statement used to annunciate a condition, situation, or event.

2.4 **Caution Alert.** The level or category of alert for conditions that require immediate flight crew awareness and subsequent flight crew response.

2.5 **Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).** An accident or incident in which an aircraft, under the full control of the pilot, is flown into terrain, obstacles, or water.

2.6 **Failure.** The inability of the equipment or any sub-part of that equipment to perform within previously specified limits.

2.7 **False Alert.** An inappropriate alert that occurs as result of a failure within the TAWS or when the design alerting thresholds of the TAWS are not exceeded.

2.8 **Forward-Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA).** Looks ahead of the aeroplane along and below the aeroplane’s lateral and vertical flight path and provides suitable alerts if a potential CFIT exists.

2.9 **Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).** A world-wide position, velocity, and time determination system that includes one or more satellite constellations, receivers, and system integrity monitoring, augmented as necessary to support the required navigation performance for the actual phase of operation.

2.10 **Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) Landing System (GLS).** GLS provides precision navigation guidance for exact alignment and descent of aircraft on approach to a runway. GLS uses the Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) to augment the Global Navigation Satellite System(s) and to provide locally relevant information to the aircraft, including the definition of the approach path.

2.11 **Hazard.** A state or set of conditions that together with other conditions in the environment can lead to an accident.

2.12 **Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI).** An incorrect depiction of the terrain threat relative to the aeroplane during an alert condition (excluding source data).

2.13 **Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV).** A wide area augmentation system (WAAS) approach that provides vertical guidance to as low as 200 feet above ground level (AGL).
2.14 **Nuisance Alert.** An inappropriate alert, occurring during normal safe procedures, which is the result of a design performance limitation of TAWS.

2.15 **Required Obstacle Clearance (ROC).** Required vertical clearance expressed in feet between an aircraft and an obstruction. (Per Order 8260.3B, Change 20)

2.16 **Search Volume.** A volume of airspace around the aeroplane’s current and projected path that is used to define a TAWS alert condition.

2.17 **Terrain Cell.** A grid of terrain provided by the TAWS database which identifies the highest terrain elevation within a defined geographical area. Terrain cell dimensions and resolution can vary depending on the needs of the TAWS system and availability of data. If a supplier desires, obstacle height can be included in the terrain elevation.

2.18 **Visual Alert.** The use of projected or displayed information to present a condition, situation, or event.

2.19 **Warning Alert.** The level or category of alert for conditions that require immediate flight crew awareness and immediate flight crew response.

### 3.0 REQUIRED TAWS FUNCTIONS

3.1 **Class A and Class B Requirements for FLTA.** The majority of CFIT accidents occur because flight crews do not have adequate situational information regarding the terrain in the vicinity of the aeroplane and its projected flight path. Class A and Class B equipment is required to look ahead of the aeroplane, within the design search volume, and provide timely alerts in the event terrain is predicted to penetrate the search volume. The FLTA function should be available during all airborne phases of flight including turning flight. The search volume consists of a computed look ahead distance, a lateral distance on both sides of the aeroplane’s flight path, and a specified look down distance based upon the aeroplane’s vertical flight path. This search volume should vary as a function of phase flight, distance from runway, and the required obstacle clearance (ROC) in order to perform its intended function and to minimise nuisance alerts. The lateral search volume should expand as necessary to accommodate turning flight. The TAWS search volumes should consider the accuracy of the TAWS navigation source. The TAWS lateral search area should be less than the protected area defined by the United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS), FAA Order 8260.3B and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations (PAN-OPS) 8168, volume 2, in order to prevent nuisance alerts.

3.1.1 **Reduced Required Terrain Clearance (RTC).** Class A and Class B equipment must provide suitable alerts when the aeroplane is above the terrain in the aeroplane’s projected flight path, but the projected amount of terrain clearance is considered unsafe for the particular phase of flight. The required obstacle (terrain) clearance (ROC), as specified in TERPS and the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), has been used to define the minimum requirements for obstacle/terrain clearance (ROC) appropriate to the
FLTA function. These requirements are specified in Table 3.1.1. The FLTA function must be tested to verify that the alerting algorithms meet the test conditions specified in Appendix 2, Tables A, B, C, D, E, and F.
Table 3.1.1 — TAWS REQUIRED TERRAIN CLEARANCE (RTC) BY PHASE OF FLIGHT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>TERPS (ROC)</th>
<th>TAWS (RTC) Level Flight</th>
<th>TAWS (RTC) Descending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enroute</td>
<td>1 000 feet</td>
<td>700 feet</td>
<td>500 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminal (Intermediate Segment)</td>
<td>500 feet</td>
<td>350 feet</td>
<td>300 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>250 feet</td>
<td>150 feet</td>
<td>100 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure (See Note 1)</td>
<td>48 feet/nautical mile (NM)</td>
<td>100 feet</td>
<td>100 feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note 1:** During the departure phase of flight, the FLTA function of Class A and B equipment must alert if the aeroplane is projected to be within 100 feet vertically of terrain. However, Class A and Class B equipment should not alert if the aeroplane is projected to be more than 400 feet above the terrain.

**Note 2:** As an alternate to the stepped down reduction from the terminal to approach phase as shown in Table 3.1.1, a linear reduction of the RTC as the aircraft comes closer to the nearest runway is allowed, provided the requirements of Table 3.1.1 are met.

**Note 3:** During the visual segment of a normal instrument approach (typically about 1 NM from the runway threshold), the RTC should be defined/reduced to minimise nuisance alerts. Below a certain altitude or distance from the runway threshold, logic may be incorporated in order to inhibit the FLTA function. Typical operations below minimum descent altitude (MDA), decision altitude (DA), decision height (DH), or the visual descent point (VDP) should not generate nuisance alerts.

**Note 4:** The specific RTC values are reduced slightly for descending flight conditions to accommodate the dynamic conditions and pilot response times.

### 3.1.2 Imminent Terrain Impact

Class A and Class B equipment must provide suitable alerts when the aeroplane is below the elevation of a terrain cell along the aeroplane’s lateral projected flight path and, based upon the vertical projected flight path, the equipment predicts that the terrain clearance will be less than the value given in the RTC column of Table 3.1.1. See Appendix 2 for test conditions that must be conducted (Table G).

### 3.1.3 FLTA Turning Flight

Class A and Class B equipment must provide suitable alerts for the functions specified in paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 when the aeroplane is in turning flight.
3.2 Class A and Class B Equipment Requirements for Detection and Alerting for Premature Descent Along the Final Approach Segment. Class A and Class B equipment must provide a suitable alert when it determines that the aeroplane is significantly below the normal approach flight path to a runway. Approximately one-third of all CFIT accidents occur during the final approach phase of flight, when the aeroplane is properly configured for landing and descending at a normal rate. For a variety of reasons, which include poor visibility, night time operations, loss of situational awareness, operating below minimums without adequate visual references, and deviations from the published approach procedures, many aeroplanes have crashed into the ground short of the runway. Detection of this condition and alerting the flight crew is an essential safety requirement of this ETSO, and there are numerous ways to accomplish these overall objectives. Alerting criteria may be based upon height above runway elevation and distance to runway. It may be based upon height above the terrain and distance to runway or other suitable means. This ETSO will not define the surfaces for which alerting is required. Instead, it specifies some general requirements for alerting and some cases when alerting is inappropriate. See Appendix 2, Table H, for test requirements.

a. The PDA function must be available for all types of instrument approaches. This includes both straight-in approaches and circling approaches.

b. The TAWS equipment must not generate PDA alerts for normal visual flight rules (VFR) operations in the airport area. Aeroplanes routinely operate at traffic pattern altitudes of 800 feet above field/runway elevation when within 5 NM of the airport.

c. Aeroplanes routinely operate in VFR conditions at 1000 feet above ground level (AGL) within 10–15 NM of the nearest airport, and these operations must not generate alerts.

d. Aeroplanes routinely operate in the visual segment of a circling approach within 2 NM of the airport/runway of intended landing, with 300 feet of obstacle clearance. Operations at circling minimums must not cause PDA or FLTA alerts.

3.3 Class A Requirements for Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Alerting. In addition to the TAWS FLTA and PDA functions, the equipment must provide the Mode 1 through Mode 5 GPWS functions listed below in accordance with ETSO-C92c and the altitude callout function in accordance with paragraph 3.3.c. of this Appendix. However, it is essential to retain the independent protective features provided by both the GPWS and FLTA functions. In each case, all of the following modes must be covered. Some GPWS alerting thresholds may be adjusted or modified to be more compatible with the FLTA alerting function and to minimise GPWS nuisance alerts. Modifications to the GPWS requirements require an approved deviation in accordance with Part-21, 21.A.610. The failure of the ETSO-C92c equipment functions, except for power supply failure, input sensor failure, or failure of other common portions of the equipment, must not cause a loss of the FLTA, PDA, or terrain display.

- **Mode 1:** Excessive rate of descent
- **Mode 2:** Excessive closure rate to terrain
• **Mode 3:** Negative climb rate or altitude loss after takeoff

• **Mode 4:** Flight into terrain when not in landing configuration

• **Mode 5:** Excessive downward deviation from an ILS glideslope, LPV, and/or GLS glideslope

**Altitude Callout:** Five Hundred Foot Voice Callout

a. **Flap Alerting Inhibition.** A separate, guarded control may be provided to inhibit Mode 4 alerts based on flaps being other than landing configuration.

b. **Speed.** Airspeed or groundspeed must be included in the logic that determines basic GPWS alerting time for ‘excessive closure rate to terrain’ and ‘flight into terrain when not in landing configuration’ to allow maximum time for the flight crew to react and take corrective action.

c. **Altitude Callouts.** Class A equipment must provide a voice callout of "five hundred" or equivalent when descending through 500 feet above terrain or 500 feet above the nearest runway elevation during nonprecision approaches, but are recommended for all approaches. Additional altitude callouts, such as ‘one hundred’ or ‘two hundred’ are acceptable, but not required. This voice callout will not be made at ascent, for example on a missed approach or departure.

d. **Sweep Tones ‘Whoop-Whoop.’** If a two-tone sweep is used to comply with RTCA/DO-161A, paragraph 2.3, the complete cycle of two-tone sweeps plus annunciation may be extended from ‘1.4’ to ‘2’ seconds.

e. **Mode 5 Glidepath Deviation Alerting.** Class A TAWS equipment must provide Mode 5 alerting for localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) glidespath and GNSS landing system (GLS) glidespath, as well as the ILS glideslope. The LPV and GLS envelope, deactivation, reactivation, arming, disarming, alert requirements must follow the Mode 5 requirements in RTCA/DO-161A. The FAA recommends that the glidespath aural alert for LPV and GLS approaches say ‘glideslope’ or equivalent, but the use of ‘glideslope’ is also acceptable. Follow test guidance in RTCA/DO-161A.

### 3.4 Class B Requirements for GPWS Alerting

a. Class B equipment must provide alerts for excessive descent rates. The Mode 1 alerting envelope of RTCA/DO-161A was modified to accommodate a larger envelope for both caution and warning alerts. Height above terrain may be determined by using the terrain database elevation and subtracting it from the QNH (corrected) barometric altitude, or GNSS altitude (or equivalent). In addition, since the envelopes are not limited by a radio altitude measurement to a maximum of 2,500 feet AGL, the envelopes are expanded to include higher vertical speeds. The equipment must meet either the requirements set forth in Appendix 2, paragraph 7.0, or those specified in RTCA/DO-161A.
b. Class B equipment must provide alerts for “negative climb rate after takeoff or missed approach” or “altitude loss after takeoff,” as specified in RTCA/DO-161A. The alerting envelopes are identical to the Mode 3 alerting envelopes in RTCA/DO-161A. Height above terrain may be determined by comparison of aircraft altitude (GNSS or barometric) with runway threshold elevation or by radio altimeter.

c. This feature also has an important CFIT protection function. In the event the aeroplane is operated unintentionally close to terrain when not in the airport area or the area for which PDA protection is provided, this voice callout will alert the flight crew to hazardous conditions. The equipment must meet the requirements specified in Appendix 2, section 9.0. Class B TAWS equipment must provide a 500 foot voice call out when descending through 500 feet above the runway threshold elevation for landing. This feature is primarily intended to provide situational awareness to the flight crew when the aeroplane is being operated properly, per normal procedures. During a normal approach, it is useful to provide the flight crew with a voice callout at 500 feet, relative to the runway threshold elevation for the runway of intended landing. The Class B TAWS equipment must also provide a 500 foot voice call out above terrain when not landing. This 500 foot voice call out above terrain when not landing is an important CFIT protection function. In the event the aeroplane is operated unintentionally close to terrain when not in the airport area or the area for which PDA protection is provided, this voice callout will indicate hazardous conditions to the flight crew.

3.5 Class A Equipment Requirements for a Terrain Display. Class A equipment must be designed to interface with a colour terrain display, and may be designed to also interface to a monochromatic terrain display. Class A equipment for TAWS must also be capable of providing the following terrain-related information to a display system:

a. The terrain must be depicted relative to the aeroplane’s position such that the pilot can estimate the relative bearing to the terrain of interest.

b. The terrain must be depicted relative to the aeroplane’s position such that the pilot may estimate the distance to the terrain of interest.

c. The terrain depicted must be oriented to either the heading or the track of the aeroplane. In addition, a north-up orientation may be added as a selectable format.

d. Variations in terrain elevation must be depicted relative to the aeroplane’s current or projected elevation (above and below) and be visually distinct. Terrain that is more than 2 000 feet below the aeroplane’s elevation can be excluded.

e. Terrain that generates alerts must be displayed in a manner to distinguish it from non-hazardous terrain, consistent with the caution and warning alert level.

3.6 Class B Equipment Requirements for a Terrain Display. Operators required to install Class B equipment are not required to include a terrain display. However, Class B TAWS equipment must be capable of driving a terrain display function in the event the installer wants to include the terrain display function.
4.0 AURAL AND VISUAL ALERTS

4.1 The TAWS is required to provide aural and visual alerts for each of the functions described in section 3.0 of this Appendix.

4.2 The TAWS must provide the required aural and visual alerts in a manner that clearly indicates to the flight crew that they represent a single event. The TAWS may accomplish the entire alerting function, or provide alert inputs to an external aircraft alerting system. Exceptions to this requirement are allowed when suppression of aural alerts is necessary to protect pilots from nuisance aural alerting, but a visual alert is still appropriate.

4.3 Each aural alert must identify the reason for the alert, such as “too low terrain,” “glideslope,” or another acceptable annunciation.

4.4 The system must remove the visual and aural alert once the situation has been resolved.

4.5 The system must be capable of accepting and processing aeroplane performance-related data or aeroplane dynamic data and providing the capability to update aural and visual alerts at least once per second.

4.6 The aural and visual outputs as defined in Table 4-1 must be compatible with the standard cockpit displays and auditory systems.

4.7 The aural and visual alerts should be selectable to accommodate operational commonality among aeroplane fleets.

4.8 The visual display of alerting information must be immediately and continuously displayed until the situation is resolved or no longer valid.

4.9 At a minimum, the TAWS must be capable of providing aural alert messages described in Table 4-1. In addition to this minimum set, other voice alerts may be provided.
### Table 4-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert Condition</th>
<th>Caution</th>
<th>Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FLTA Functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced Required Terrain Clearance and Imminent Impact with Terrain Class A &amp; Class B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aural Alerts</strong> Minimum selectable voice alerts; 'Caution, Terrain; Caution, Terrain' and 'Terrain Ahead; Terrain Ahead'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Red text message that is obvious, concise and must be consistent with the aural message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong> 'Too Low Terrain'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Premature Descent Alert (PDA)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A &amp; Class B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong> 'Sink Rate'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Proximity Envelope 1, 2, or 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive Descent Rate Mode 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A &amp; Class B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong> 'Pull-Up'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Proximity Excessive Closure Rate (Flaps not in Landing Configuration)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode 2A Class A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong> 'Terrain, Terrain'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Proximity Excessive Closure Rate (Flaps not in Landing Configuration)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode 2A Class A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong> 'Pull-Up'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert Condition</th>
<th>Caution</th>
<th>Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Excessive Closure Rate (Landing Configuration) Mode 2B Class A</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message. <strong>Aural Alert</strong> ‘Terrain, Terrain’</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> Red text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message for gear up. <strong>Aural Alert</strong> ‘Pull-Up’—for gear up None Required—for gear down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Altitude Loss after Takeoff Mode 3 Class A &amp; Class B</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message. <strong>Aural Alerts</strong> ‘Don’t Sink’ and ‘Too Low Terrain’</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> None Required <strong>Aural Alert</strong> None Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Envelope 1 (Gear and/or flaps other than landing configuration) Mode 4 Class A</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message. <strong>Aural Alerts</strong> ‘Too Low Terrain’ and ‘Too Low Gear’</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> None Required <strong>Aural Alert</strong> None Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Envelope 2 Insufficient Terrain Clearance (Gear and/or flaps other than landing configuration) Mode 4 Class A</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message. <strong>Aural Alerts</strong> ‘Too Low Terrain’ and ‘Too Low Flaps’</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> None Required <strong>Aural Alert</strong> None Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## STANDARD SET OF VISUAL AND AURAL ALERTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert Condition</th>
<th>Caution</th>
<th>Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Envelope 3 Insufficient Terrain Clearance (Gear and/or flaps other than landing configuration) Mode 4 Class A</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> None Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Excessive Glideslope or Glidepath Deviation Mode 5 Class A</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message.</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> None Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Proximity Altitude Callout (See Note 1)</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> None Required</td>
<td><strong>Visual Alert</strong> None Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A &amp; Class B (See Note 3)</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong> ‘Five Hundred’</td>
<td><strong>Aural Alert</strong> None Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note 1:** The call out for ground proximity altitude is considered advisory.

**Note 2:** Visual alerts may be put on the terrain situational awareness display, if doing so fits with the overall human factors alerting scheme for the flight deck. This does not eliminate the visual alert color requirements, even in the case of a monochromatic display. Typically in such a scenario, adjacent colored annunciator lamps meet the alerting color requirements.

**Note 3:** Additional callouts can be made by the system, but the system is required to make the 500 foot voice callout.

### 4.10 Prioritisation

**a. Class A Equipment.** Class A Equipment must have an interactive capability with other external alerting systems so that an alerting priority can be executed automatically. This prevents
confusion or chaos on the flight deck during multiple alerts from different alerting systems. Typical alerting systems that may be interactive with TAWS include predictive windshear (PWS), reactive windshear (RWS), and traffic alert collision and avoidance system (TCAS). The TAWS system must include an alert prioritisation scheme for Class A equipment. Table 4-2 provides an example prioritisation scheme for Class A equipment. If the PWS, RWS, or TCAS functions are provided within TAWS, the alert prioritisation scheme in Table 4-2 also applies. The FAA will consider alert prioritisation schemes other than the one included in Table 4-2.

b. Class B Equipment

1. Class B Equipment does not require prioritisation with external systems such as TCAS, RWS, and PWS. If prioritisation with those functions is provided, the prioritisation scheme should be in accordance with the scheme in Table 4-2.

2. Class B Equipment must establish an internal priority alerting system (scheme) for each of the functions. The priority scheme must ensure that the more critical alerts override alerts of lesser priority. Table 4-3 provides an example internal priority scheme for Class B equipment. Class B Equipment need only consider the TAWS functions required for Class B Equipment.
Table 4-2

Legend:  W = Warning,  C = Caution,  I = Non-Alert Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reactive Windshear Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sink Rate Pull-Up Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Excessive Closure Pull-Up Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RTC Terrain Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>( V_1 ) Callout</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Engine Fail Callout</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>FLTA Pull-up Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>PWS Warning</td>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>RTC Terrain Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Minimums</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>FLTA Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>7 s period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Too Low Terrain</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>PDA (&quot;Too Low Terrain&quot;) Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Altitude Callouts</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Too Low Gear</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Too Low Flaps</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sink Rate</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Don't Sink</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>&quot;Glideslope&quot; or &quot;Glidepath&quot;</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>3 s period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>PWS Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Approaching Minimums</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Bank Angle</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Reactive Windshear Caution</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode 6</td>
<td>TCAS RA (‘Climb,’ ‘Descend,’ etc.)</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode 6</td>
<td>TCAS TA (‘Traffic, Traffic’)</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** These alerts can occur simultaneously with TAWS voice callout alerts.
**Table 4-3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sink Rate Pull-Up Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Terrain Awareness Pull-Up Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Terrain Awareness Caution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>PDA ('Too Low Terrain') Caution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Altitude Callout '500'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sink Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Don’t Sink (Mode 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.11 During ILS glideslope, LPV, GLS glidepath, or other localizer-based approach operations, TAWS should not cause an alert for a terrain/obstacle located outside the TERPS-protected airspace. Special design considerations may be necessary to address this issue.

5.0 TAWS Position Requirements. TAWS relies on horizontal position, vertical position, velocity, and vertical rate information. This information can be generated internally to the TAWS, or acquired by interfacing to other installed avionics on the aircraft.

5.1 External Sources. When the TAWS interfaces to external sources for position, velocity, or rate information, the TAWS installation manual must define the performance requirements for the interface.

5.2 Internal Sources. When the TAWS includes internal sources for position, velocity, or rate information, these sources must meet the performance requirements in the applicable ETSO, if an applicable ETSO exists. The performance of the internal source must be sufficient for the TAWS to meet its intended function. Examples of applicable ETSOs include:


- **b. Barometric altitude equipment:** ETSO-C10b Altimeter, Pressure Actuated, Sensitive Type, or ETSO-C106 Air Data Computer.

- **c. Radio altimeter equipment:** ETSO-C87a Airborne Low-Range Radio Altimeter (or subsequent), ETSO-2C87 Low Range Radio Altimeters, or RTCA/DO-155 Minimum Performance Standards Airborne Low-Range Radar Altimeters.

- **d. Vertical velocity equipment:** ETSO-C8 Vertical Velocity Instruments (or subsequent), or ETSO-C106 Air Data Computer (or subsequent).
5.3 Primary Horizontal Position Sources. Horizontal position for TAWS must come from a GNSS source meeting ETSO-C129a or any revision of ETSO-C145, ETSO-C146, or ETSO-C196 (or subsequent). As an exception, TAWS equipment limited to installation in aircraft where the EU Regulation on Air Operations does not require such equipment may be configurable to operate solely on a non-GNSS position source.

5.4 Alternate Horizontal Position Sources. Retaining TAWS functionality during GNSS outage or unavailability provides a safety benefit. It is acceptable and recommended to incorporate a secondary, non-GNSS position source, to provide horizontal position when the GNSS is not available or reliable.

5.5 Vertical Position Sources. Vertical position for TAWS may come from a barometric source, such as an altimeter or an air data computer, or from a geometric source, such as GNSS. GNSS vertical accuracy, at a minimum, must meet RTCA/DO-229D, section 2.2.3.3.4. Designs that cross check barometric and geometric altitude are recommended. Class A TAWS also requires a radio altimeter.

5.6 Position Source Faults. If a position source generates a fault indication or any flag indicating the position is invalid or does not meet performance requirements, the TAWS must stop utilizing that position source. The TAWS may revert to an alternate position source, and must provide indications, as appropriate, regarding loss of function associated with the loss of the position source. The TAWS must inhibit FLTA and PDA alerts when the position source in use is faulted or invalid.

6.0 CLASS A AND CLASS B REQUIREMENTS FOR A TERRAIN AND AIRPORT DATABASE

6.1 Minimum Geographical Consideration. At a minimum, terrain and airport information must be provided for the expected areas of operation, airports, and routes flown.

6.2 Development and Methodology. The manufacturer must present the development methodology used to validate and verify the terrain and airport information. RTCA/DO-200A/ED-76 Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data should be used as a guideline.

6.3 Resolution. Terrain and airport information must be accurate and of acceptable resolution in order for the system to perform its intended function. Terrain data should be gridded at 30 arc seconds with 100-foot resolution within 30 NM of all airports with runway lengths of 3,500 feet or greater, and whenever necessary (particularly in mountainous environments), 15 arc seconds with 100-foot resolution (or even 6 arc seconds) within 6 NM of the closest runway. It is acceptable to have terrain data gridded in larger segments over oceanic and remote areas around the world.

Note: Class B equipment may require information relative to airports with runways less than 3,500 feet whether public or private. Small aeroplane owners and operators will likely be the largest market for Class B equipment and they frequently use airports of less than 3,500 feet. Those TAWS manufacturers who desire to sell to this market must be willing to customize their terrain databases to include selected airports used by their customers.
6.4 Continued Airworthiness Updates. The system must be capable of accepting updated terrain and airport information. Updating of terrain, obstacle, and airport databases does not require a change to the ETSO authorization.

7.0 CLASS A AND CLASS B FAILURE INDICATION. Class A and Class B equipment must include a failure monitor function that provides reliable indications of equipment condition during operation. It must monitor the equipment itself, input power, input signals, and aural and visual outputs. A means to inform the flight crew whenever the system has failed or can no longer perform the intended function must be provided.
8.0 CLASS A AND CLASS B REQUIREMENTS FOR SELF-TEST. Class A and Class B equipment must have a self-test function to verify system operation and integrity. It must monitor the equipment itself, input power, input signals, and aural and visual outputs. Failure of the system to successfully pass the self-test must be annunciated.

   Note: Flight crew verification of the aural and visual outputs during a self-test is an acceptable method for monitoring aural and visual outputs.

9.0 CLASS A EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR INHIBITING THE FLTA FUNCTION, THE PREMATURE DESCENT ALERT FUNCTION, AND THE TERRAIN DISPLAY

9.1 Manual Inhibit. The TAWS system must have a capability (e.g. a control switch to the flight crew) to manually inhibit the TAWS (FLTA/PDA) aural alerts, visual alerts, and the terrain display. The switch must not inhibit any of the GPWS alerts defined in section 1.3.e. If the TAWS system incorporates an automatic inhibit function that automatically inhibits TAWS (FLTA/PDA) aural alerts, visual alerts, and terrain display when a position source is faulted or unavailable, then the manual inhibit may be designed to only inhibit aural and visual alerts. This alternate manual inhibit functionality will allow pilots to disable the TAWS (FLTA/PDA) alerting without removing the terrain display when landing at a site not included in the database or landing at a site that generates known nuisance alerts. Inhibit status must be annunciated to the flight crew.

9.2 Automatic Inhibit. The capability of automatically inhibiting Class A functions within TAWS equipment is acceptable when utilizing the conditions described in paragraph 7.0. If auto inhibit capability is provided, the “inhibit status” must be annunciated to the flight crew.

10.0 CLASS A AND B PHASE OF FLIGHT DEFINITIONS. The TAWS equipment search volumes and alerting thresholds should vary as necessary in order to be compatible with TERPS and other operational considerations. For this reason, a set of definitions is offered for enroute, terminal, approach and departure phases of flight. Other definitions for enroute, terminal, and approach may be used by TAWS provided they are compatible with TERPS and standard instrument approach procedures and comply with the test criteria specified in Appendix 2. If other definitions for enroute, terminal, and approach are used by TAWS, they must be submitted to EASA in the form of a deviation as per Part 21 21.A.610.

10.1 Enroute Phase. The enroute phase exists when the aeroplane is more than 15 NM from the nearest airport or whenever the conditions for terminal, approach, and departure phases are not met.

10.2 Terminal Phase. The terminal phase exists when the aeroplane is 15 NM or less from the nearest runway while the range to the nearest runway threshold is decreasing and the aeroplane is at or lower than a straight line drawn between the two points specified in Table 10 relative to the nearest runway.

   Note: If the aircraft is accomplishing a procedure turn as part of an instrument approach procedure, the system may remain in the terminal phase, even though the distance to the runway threshold may be temporarily increasing and the conditions for the approach phase may be temporarily met.
**Table 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance to Runway</th>
<th>Height above Runway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 NM</td>
<td>3,500 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 NM</td>
<td>1,900 Feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**10.3 Approach Phase.** The approach phase exists when the distance to the nearest runway threshold is equal to or less than 5 NM; and the height above the nearest runway threshold location and elevation is equal to or less than 1,900 feet; and the distance to the nearest runway threshold is decreasing.

**10.4 Departure Phase.** The departure phase should be defined by some reliable parameter that initially determines that the aeroplane is on the ground upon initial power-up. If, for example, the equipment can determine that the aeroplane is “on the ground” by using some logic such as ground speed less than 35 knots and altitude within ± 75 feet of field elevation or nearest runway elevation and “airborne” by using some logic such as ground speed greater than 50 knots and altitude 100 feet greater than field elevation, then the equipment can reliably determine that it is in the “Departure Phase.” Other parameters to consider are climb state and distance from departure runway. Once the aeroplane reaches 1,500 feet above the departure runway, the departure phase is ended.

**10.5 Nearest Airport or Runway.** The enroute phase considers distance to the nearest airport, and the terminal and approach phases consider distance to the nearest runway in determining the appropriate phase of flight, and thus the appropriate terrain alerting requirements. The phase of flight may also be determined by basing the phase of flight on the intended landing airport or runway, if the TAWS has the intended landing airport or runway information available. The phase of flight determination may also exclude airports or runways which are unsuitable for landing of a particular type of aircraft. For example, the TAWS could be configurable at installation on a large transport category aircraft to only change the phase of flight based on runways of a certain minimum length.

**11.0 CLASS A AND CLASS B SUMMARY REQUIREMENTS**

(Reserved)

**Table 11**

(reserved)
APPENDIX 2

TEST CONDITIONS

1.0 FORWARD-LOOKING TERRAIN AVOIDANCE — REDUCED REQUIRED TERRAIN CLEARANCE (RTC) TEST CONDITIONS. These conditions exist when the aeroplane is currently above the terrain, but the combination of current altitude, height above terrain, and projected flight path indicates that there is a significant reduction in the RTC.

1.1 Phase of Flight Definitions. For the following test conditions, refer to Appendix 1, paragraph 10.0, for an expanded explanation of the definitions of the phases of flight.

1.2 En route Descent Requirement. A terrain alert must be provided in time to ensure that the aeroplane can level off (L/O) with a minimum of 500 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the aeroplane. The test conditions assume a descent along a flight path with terrain that is 1 000 feet below the expected L/O altitude. If the pilot initiates the L/O at the proper altitude, no TAWS alert is expected. However, if the pilot is distracted or otherwise delays the L/O, a TAWS alert is required to permit the pilot to recover to level flight in a safe manner.

Note: The L/O initiation height of 20 % of the vertical speed was chosen (as a minimum standard for nuisance alarm-free operations) because it is similar to typical autopilot or flight director L/O (altitude capture) algorithms. In contrast, the technique of using 10 % of the existing vertical speed as a L/O initiation point is usually considered a minimum, appropriate only to manual operations of smaller general aviation (GA) aeroplanes. With high rates of descent, experienced pilots often use a manual technique of reducing the vertical speed by one half when reaching 1 000 feet above/below the L/O altitude. This technique will significantly reduce the likelihood of nuisance alerts. In the event that using 20 % of the vertical speed as a minimum standard for nuisance-free operations is shown not to be compatible with the installed autopilot or flight director L/O (altitude capture) algorithms, consideration should be given to setting the alert logic closer to the 10 % vertical speed criteria to minimize nuisance alerts.

a. Table A, column A, represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their intended function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See Appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.

b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 500 feet terrain clearance is required.
c. Test conditions for enroute descent requirement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumed pilot response time</td>
<td>3.0 seconds (minimum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumed constant G pull-up</td>
<td>0.25 g's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum allowed terrain clearance</td>
<td>500 feet AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descent rates</td>
<td>1 000, 2 000, 4 000, and 6 000 feet per minute (FPM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumed pilot task for column F</td>
<td>L/O at 1 000 feet above the terrain per TERPS ROC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.

Note 2: Enroute operations are considered to exist beyond 15 NM from the departure runway until 15 NM from the destination airport. Use of the nearest runway logic is permissible provided suitable logic is incorporated to ensure that the transitions to the terminal logic will typically occur only when the aeroplane is in terminal airspace.

Note 3: The values shown in column E may be reduced by 100 feet (to permit a L/O to occur at 400 feet above the obstacle) provided that it can be demonstrated that the basic TAWS Mode 1 alert (sink rate) is issued at or above the altitude specified in column E for typical terrain topographies.

Note 4: Class B Equipment Considerations. The values shown in Column F are appropriate for autopilot or flight director operations with an altitude capture function typical of many CS-25-certified aeroplanes (Transport Category Aircraft). The values are based upon 20 percent of the aeroplane’s vertical velocity. If TAWS is installed on an aeroplane without such an autopilot or flight director function, consideration should be given to computing the alerts based upon 10 percent of the vertical velocity, which is more appropriate to manual flight and small, GA aeroplane operations.
TABLE A

ENROUTE DESCENT ALERTING CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERT SPEED (FPM)</td>
<td>ALT LOST WITH 3-SEC PILOT DELAY</td>
<td>ALT REQ'D TO L/O WITH 0.25G</td>
<td>TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO RECOVERY MANEUVER</td>
<td>MINIMUM TAWS WARNING ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
<td>MAXIMUM TAWS CAUTION ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>1 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>1 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>1 800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Enroute Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations (vertical speed is ± 500 FPM), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is within 700 feet of the terrain and is predicted to be equal to or less than 700 feet within the prescribed alerting time or distance. See Table B for test criteria.

Note 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.

TABLE B

ENROUTE LEVEL FLIGHT ALERTING CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL MEAN SEA LEVEL (MSL)</th>
<th>TEST RUN ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
<th>ALERT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 800</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 800</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 700 (+ 0/- 100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 700 (+ 0/- 100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 700 (+ 0/- 100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 700 (+ 0/- 100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 700 (+ 0/- 100)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Descent Requirement. A terrain alert must be provided in time to ensure that the aeroplane can L/O with a minimum of 300 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the aeroplane. The test conditions assume a descent along a flight path with terrain that is...
500 feet below the expected L/O altitude. If the pilot initiates the L/O at the proper altitude, no TAWS alert is expected. However, if the pilot is distracted or otherwise delays the L/O, a TAWS alert is required to permit the pilot to recover to level flight in a safe manner.

a. Table C, column A, represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their intended function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See Appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.

b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 300 feet terrain clearance is required.

c. Test conditions for terminal area descent requirement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumed pilot response time</th>
<th>1.0 second (minimum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumed constant G pull-up</td>
<td>0.25 g’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum allowed terrain clearance</td>
<td>300 feet AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descent rates</td>
<td>1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 FPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumed pilot task for column F</td>
<td>L/O at 500 feet above the terrain per TERPS ROC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.

Note 2: For Class B Equipment Considerations. The values shown in Column F are appropriate for autopilot or flight director operations with an altitude capture function typical of many CS-25-certificated aeroplanes (Transport Category Aircraft). The values are based upon 20 percent of the aeroplanes vertical velocity. If TAWS is installed on an aeroplane without such an autopilot or flight director function, consideration should be given to computing the alerts upon 10 percent of the vertical velocity, which is more appropriate to manual flight and small, GA aeroplane operations.

Table C

| TERMINAL DESCENT AREA ALERTING CRITERIA |
| A | B | C | D | E | F |

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VERT SPEED (FPM) | ALT LOST WITH 1SEC PILOT DELAY | ALT REQ’D TO L/O WITH 0.25G | TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO RECOVERY MANEUVER | MINIMUM TAWS WARNING ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN) | MAXIMUM TAWS CAUTION ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1 000 | 17 | 17 | 34 | 334 | 700
2 000 | 33 | 69 | 102 | 402 | 900
3 000 | 50 | 156 | 206 | 506 | 1 100

1.5 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations (vertical speed less than ± 500 feet per minute), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is less than 350 feet above the terrain and is predicted to be within less than 350 feet within the prescribed alerting time or distance. See Table D for test criteria.

**Note:** The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.

**Table D**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL (MSL)</th>
<th>TEST RUN ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
<th>ALERT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 350</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 350</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 350</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 350</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6 Final Approach Segment Descent Requirement. A terrain alert must be provided in time to ensure that the aeroplane can L/O with a minimum of 100 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the aeroplane.

a. Table E, column A, represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their intended function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.
b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 100 feet terrain clearance is required.

c. Test conditions for final approach segment descent requirement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumed pilot response time</th>
<th>1.0 seconds (minimum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumed constant G pull-up</td>
<td>0.25 g's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum allowed terrain clearance</td>
<td>100 feet AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descent rates</td>
<td>500, 750, 1 000, and 1 500 FPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumed pilot task for column F</td>
<td>L/O at 250 feet above the terrain per TERPS ROC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note 1:** The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.

**Note 2: For Class B Equipment Considerations.** The values shown in column F are appropriate for autopilot or flight director operations with an altitude capture function typical of many CS-25-certificated aeroplanes (Large Aeroplanes). The values are based upon 20 percent of the aeroplanes vertical velocity. If TAWS is installed on an aeroplane without such an autopilot or flight director function, consideration should be given to computing the alerts based upon 10 percent of the vertical velocity, which is more appropriate to manual flight and small, GA aeroplane operations.

**Table E**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td><strong>D</strong></td>
<td><strong>E</strong></td>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERT SPEED (FPM)</td>
<td>ALT LOST WITH 1SEC PILOT DELAY</td>
<td>ALT REQ’D TO L/O WITH 0.25G</td>
<td>TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO RECOVERY MANEUVER</td>
<td>MINIMUM TAWS WARNING ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
<td>MAXIMUM TAWS CAUTION ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>750</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>450</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.7 Final Approach Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations at the minimum descent altitude (MDA), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is within 150 feet of the terrain and is predicted to be within less than 150 feet within the prescribed alerting time or distance. See Table F for test criteria.

Note: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.

Table F

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL (MSL)</th>
<th>DISTANCE TERRAIN FROM RWY (NM)</th>
<th>TEST RUN ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
<th>ALERT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>MAY ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>MAY ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>MAY ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.0 FORWARD-LOOKING TERRAIN AVOIDANCE IMMINENT TERRAIN IMPACT TEST CONDITIONS. The following test conditions must be conducted to evaluate level flight performance during all phases of flight:

Note 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.

Note 2: Based upon a one-second pilot delay and a 0.25g incremental pull to constant 6.0-degree climb gradient, compute and record the aeroplane altitude at the terrain cell, the positive (or negative) clearance altitude, and the aeroplane position and time (after the alert), when the alert envelope is cleared.

2.1 Test Criteria. For each of the test cases below, a positive clearance of the terrain cell of interest is required.
2.2 Additional Test Criteria. Repeat each of the test cases below with the altitude error of – 200 feet.
A positive clearance of the terrain cell of interest is required.

Table G

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL (MSL)</th>
<th>DISTANCE TERRAIN FROM RWY (NM)</th>
<th>TEST RUN ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
<th>ALERT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9 000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9 000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9 000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8 000</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.0 PDA TEST CONDITIONS. The purpose of this test is to verify that the pilot will be alerted to a “low altitude condition” at an altitude defined by the specific design PDA alert surface. This ETSO does not define specific pass/fail criteria since, as stated in paragraph 3.2 of appendix 1, it does not define the surface for which alerting is required. The applicant must provide the proposed pass/fail criteria along with the proposed recovery procedures for the specific alerting criteria proposed by the applicant. In developing the test plan, the applicant should refer to paragraph 3.2 of appendix 1 for general requirements for alerting (if alerting is applicable). The applicant may also want to consider the recovery procedures specified in paragraphs 1.2, 1.4, and 1.6 of paragraph 1 of appendix 2. The following test conditions must be conducted to evaluate PDA performance:

Descent rates (FPM) | 750, 1 500, and 2 000, 3 000
Assumed runway elevation | Sea level, Level terrain

Note: For each test condition listed in table H, compute and record the PDA alert altitude and the recovery altitude to level flight.
### Table H

**PREMATURE DESCENT ALERTING CRITERIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>VERT. SPEED (FPM)</th>
<th>DISTANCE FROM RWY THRESHOLD (TOUCHDOWN) (NM)</th>
<th>PDA ALERT HEIGHT (MSL)</th>
<th>RECOVERY ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1500</td>
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<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>750</td>
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<td>1500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>160</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>750</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>1500</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>750</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>140</td>
<td>1500</td>
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<td>120</td>
<td>750</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.0 NUISANCE ALERT TEST CONDITIONS — GENERAL. The following test conditions must be conducted to evaluate TAWS performance during all phases of flight. The following general criteria apply:

4.1 4 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 4 000 FPM in the enroute airspace and pilots must be able to L/O 1 000 feet above the terrain using a normal L/O procedure (leading by 20 percent of the vertical speed) without a caution or warning alert. See Table A.

4.2 2 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 2 000 FPM in the terminal area and pilots must be able to L/O 500 feet above the terrain using the normal L/O procedure described in paragraph 4.1 above, without a caution or warning alert. See Table C.

4.3 1 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 1 000 FPM in the final approach segment and pilots must be able to L/O at the MDA using the normal L/O procedure described in paragraph 4.1 above, without a caution or warning alert. See Table E.

5.0 NUISANCE TEST CONDITIONS FOR HORIZONTAL AND Vertical FLIGHT TECHNICAL ERRORS. It must be shown by analysis, simulation, or flight testing, that the system will not produce nuisance alerts when the aeroplane is conducting normal flight operations in accordance with published instrument approach procedures. This assumes the normal range in variation of input parameters.

5.1 Test Cases. At a minimum, the following cases listed in Table I must be tested twice: one set of runs conducted with no lateral or vertical errors while another set is conducted with both lateral and vertical flight technical errors (FTE). Certain conditions must be simulated, such as: a lateral FTE of 0.3 NM and a vertical FTE of – 100 feet (such as when the aircraft is closer to terrain) up to the final approach fix (FAF), as well as a lateral FTE of 0.3 NM and a vertical FTE of – 50 feet from the FAF to the missed approach point (MAP). For all listed VHF omni-directional range navigation system (VOR), VOR/distance measuring equipment (DME) and localizer-based approaches, from the FAF to the MAP, the aeroplane descends at 1 000 FPM until reaching either MDA (run #1) or MDA – 50 feet (run #2). The aeroplane then levels off and flies level until reaching the MAP. Localizer updating of lateral position errors (if provided) may be simulated.
6.0 TEST CONDITIONS USING KNOWN ACCIDENT CASES. The aircraft configuration and flight trajectory for each case may be obtained from the FAA Regulatory and Guidance Library site. Click “Technical Standards and Orders and Index,” click “Current,” and then click “TSO-C151c.”

6.1 Test Report. The test report should include as many of the following parameters as possible used to recreate the events: (1) latitude; (2) longitude; (3) altitude; (4) time from terrain at caution and warning alerts; (5) distance from terrain at caution and warning alerts; (6) ground speed; (7) true track; (8) true heading; (9) radio altitude (height above terrain); (10) gear position; and (11) flap position.

6.2 Computation and Recording. In addition to the parameters above, when the warning is posted for each test case, based upon a one second pilot delay and a 0.25 g incremental pull to a constant 6.0 degree climb gradient, do the following: compute and record the aeroplane altitude at the terrain cell, the positive (or negative) clearance altitude, and the aeroplane position and time (after the alert) when the alert envelope is cleared.

Note: The terrain cell of interest is the one associated with the accident and not necessarily the terrain cell that caused the warning.

6.3 Test Criteria. For each of the test cases below in table J, demonstrate that the aeroplane profile clears the terrain of interest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Quito, Ecuador</td>
<td>VOR ‘QIT’-ILS Rwy 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Katmandu, Nepal</td>
<td>VOR-DME Rwy 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Windsor Locks, CT</td>
<td>VOR Rwy 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Calvi, France</td>
<td>LOC DME Rwy 18/Circle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tegucigalpa, Honduras</td>
<td>VOR DME Rwy 1/Circle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Eagle, CO</td>
<td>LOC DME-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Monterey, CA</td>
<td>LOC DME Rwy 28L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Juneau, AK</td>
<td>LDA-1 Rwy 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chambery, France</td>
<td>ILS Rwy 18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table J

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz, Bolivia</td>
<td>1/1/1985</td>
<td>N819EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat Rock, NC</td>
<td>8/23/1985</td>
<td>N600CM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor, MA</td>
<td>12/10/1986</td>
<td>N65TD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle, CO</td>
<td>3/27/1987</td>
<td>N315K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegucigalpa, Honduras</td>
<td>10/21/1989</td>
<td>N88705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halawa Point, HI</td>
<td>10/28/1989</td>
<td>N707PV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego, CA</td>
<td>3/16/1991</td>
<td>N831LC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriels, NY</td>
<td>1/3/1992</td>
<td>N55000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alamogordo, NM</td>
<td>6/24/1992</td>
<td>N108SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Granby, CT</td>
<td>11/12/1995</td>
<td>N566AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buga, Columbia</td>
<td>12/20/1995</td>
<td>N651AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimitz Hill, Guam</td>
<td>8/6/1997</td>
<td>H7468</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7.0 CLASS B EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR EXCESSIVE DESCENT RATE

Use the following performance envelopes down to a “height above terrain” value of 100 feet. If a radar altimeter input is unavailable, determine the height of terrain by subtracting the terrain elevation (as obtained from the terrain database) from the current QNH (corrected) barometric altitude, the GNSS altitude, or an equivalent source. GNSS vertical accuracy must meet RTCA/DO-229D section 2.2.3.3.4. The curve in figure 1 represents the minimum heights at which alerting must occur.

**Note:** Class B equipment may be designed to meet the requirements of RTCA/DO-161A, Mode 1, for excessive descent rate in lieu of the requirements of paragraph 7.0.
8.0 CLASS B EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR NEGATIVE CLimb RATE OR ALTIITUDE LOSS AFTER TAKEOFF. Use the existing performance envelopes specified in RTCA/DO-161A based upon a “height above runway” using barometric altitude, GNSS altitude, or equivalent, and runway elevation in lieu of radio altimeter inputs, if radio altimeter inputs are unavailable.

9.0 ALTITUDE CALLOUT TEST REQUIREMENTS

9.1 CLASS A EQUIPMENT ALTITUDE CALLOUT TEST REQUIREMENTS. With the landing gear in landing configuration test for approach to an airport with a 1 500 FPM descent rate. Ensure the TAWS provides a single aural callout of “Five Hundred” or equivalent within one second of the aircraft descending through 500 feet above terrain or the runway threshold elevation (when comparing the aircraft’s barometric or geometric altitude against the database runway elevation).

9.2 CLASS B EQUIPMENT ALTITUDE CALLOUT TEST REQUIREMENTS. Instead of using height of terrain as determined by a radio altimeter, determine height above runway by subtracting the runway elevation (from the airport database) from the current barometric altitude, GNSS altitude, or equivalent, if a radio altimeter input is unavailable. When the height above the runway value first reaches 500 feet, a single voice callout (“Five Hundred”) or equivalent must be provided.
APPENDIX 3

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD (MPS) FOR A TERRAIN AWARENESS AND WARNING SYSTEM FOR CLASS C

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 This Appendix describes modifications to this ETSO for the GA category of aircraft that is not required to have TAWS equipment installed. Class C equipment is intended for small GA aeroplanes that are not required to install Class B equipment.

1.2 This Appendix contains only modifications to existing requirements in this ETSO. It is intended that Class C meet all Class B requirements that are not modified or addressed here. The paragraph numbers below relate directly to the paragraphs in Appendices 1 and 2.

2.0 Class C TAWS equipment must meet all of the requirements of a Class B TAWS with the modifications described herein. If the equipment is designed only to function as Class C, per these modifications, it should be appropriately marked as Class C so that it can be uniquely distinguished from the Class A and Class B TAWS required by the EU Regulation on Air Operations.

MODIFICATIONS TO APPENDIX 1 FOR CLASS C TAWS.

Minimum Performance Standards, MPS

1.1 Phase of Flight Definitions. For Appendix 3, the terms “takeoff,” “cruise,” and “landing” are used instead of “departure,” “enroute,” and “approach” because they are more suitable to the GA environment.

- **Takeoff**—positive ROC, inside traffic area, distance to nearest runway threshold is increasing, and aeroplane is below 1000 feet.

- **Cruise** — anytime the aeroplane is outside the airport traffic control area.

- **Landing** — inside traffic area and distance to nearest runway threshold is decreasing, and aeroplane is below 1000 feet.

1.2 Altitude Accuracy and Display. A means must be provided to compute an actual MSL aircraft altitude value that is immune to temperature errors and manual correction mis-sets that would otherwise prevent the TAWS from performing its intended function. This type of altitude is derived primarily from geometric sources such as GPS, and referenced to MSL typically via a database correction. If the TAWS includes a terrain display, this reference altitude value used for the TAWS alerts should also be indicated to the pilot on the display. The altitude value should be labelled according to AC 20-163, *Displaying Geometric Altitude Relative to Mean Sea Level*, which recommends "GSL."

1.3 (f)(3) System Function and Overview. This data is pilot selectable for both “altitude” and “inhibit.”
3.1.1 Reduced Required Terrain Clearance (RTC). The required terrain clearance in the alternate table 3.1.1 applies to small aircraft flying visually, and the TERPS criteria need not apply to TAWS. Thus, ROC numbers that are more appropriate to low level flight have been chosen.

Alternate Table 3.1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Small Aircraft ROC</th>
<th>TAWS (RTC) Level Flight</th>
<th>TAWS (RTC) Descending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cruise</td>
<td>500 Feet</td>
<td>250 Feet</td>
<td>200 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>48 Feet/NM</td>
<td>100 Feet</td>
<td>100 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing (See Note 1)</td>
<td>250 Feet</td>
<td>150 Feet</td>
<td>100 Feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: During the takeoff phase of flight, the FLTA function must alert if the aircraft is projected to be within 100 feet vertically of terrain. However, the equipment should not alert if the aircraft is projected to be more than 250 feet above the terrain.

3.3.c Voice Callouts. This data is pilot selectable for both “altitude” and “inhibit.”

4.0 Aural and Visual Alerts
### Table 4-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert Condition</th>
<th>Caution</th>
<th>Warning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FLTA Functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Terrain Awareness Reduced Required Terrain Clearance and Terrain Awareness Imminent Impact with Terrain | **Visual Alert**
Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and consistent with the aural message. | **Visual Alert**
Red text message that is obvious, concise, and consistent with the aural message. |
| | **Aural Alert**
Minimum selectable voice alert: “Caution, Terrain; Caution, Terrain” | **Aural Alert**
Minimum selectable voice alert: “Terrain; Terrain” |
| **Terrain Awareness Premature Descent Alert (PDA)** | | |
| | **Visual Alert**
Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message. | **Visual Alert**
None Required |
| | **Aural Alert**
“To Low; Too Low” | **Aural Alert**
None Required |
| **Ground Proximity Excessive Descent Rate** | | |
| | **Visual Alert**
Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message. | **Visual Alert**
Red text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message. |
| | **Aural Alert**
“Sink Rate” | **Aural Alert**
“Pull-Up” |
| **Ground Proximity Altitude Loss after Takeoff** | | |
| | **Visual Alert**
Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and must be consistent with the aural message. | **Visual Alert**
None Required |
| | **Aural Alert**
“Don’t Sink” | **Aural Alert**
None Required |
| **Ground Proximity Voice Callout (See Note 1)** | | |
| | **Visual Alert**
None Required | **Visual Alert**
None Required |
| | **Aural Alert**
“Five Hundred” or selected altitude | **Aural Alert**
None Required |
Note 1: The aural alert for ground proximity voice callout is considered advisory.

Note 2: Visual alerts may be put on the terrain situational awareness display, if this fits with the overall human factors alerting scheme for the flight deck. This does not eliminate the visual alert color requirements, even in the case of a monochromatic display. Typically in such a scenario, adjacent colored enunciator lamps meet the alerting color requirements. Audio alerts are still required regardless of terrain display visual alerts.

MODIFICATIONS TO APPENDIX 2, TEST CONDITIONS.

Note 1: Paragraph 1.1 of this ETSO is not applicable; for small aircraft, only the “takeoff,” “cruise,” and “final approach to landing” phases of flight are considered.

Note 2: Paragraph 1.2 of this ETSO is changed to specify altitude levels, test speeds, and pull-ups more appropriate for small aircraft.

1.2 Cruise Descent Requirements. A terrain alert must be provided in time to ensure that the aeroplane can L/O with a minimum of 200 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the aeroplane. The test conditions assume a descent along a flight path with terrain that is 500 feet below the expected L/O altitude. If the pilot initiates the L/O at the proper altitude, no TAWS alert is expected. However, if the pilot is distracted or otherwise delays the L/O, a TAWS alert is required to permit the pilot to recover to level flight in a safe manner.

a. Table A, column A, represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted in order to perform their intended function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See Appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.

b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 200 feet terrain clearance is required.
c. Test Conditions for cruise descent requirements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumed pilot response time</th>
<th>3.0 seconds (minimum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumed constant G pull-up</td>
<td>1.0 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum allowed terrain clearance</td>
<td>200 feet AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descent rates</td>
<td>500, 1,000, and 2,000 FPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumed pilot task for column F</td>
<td>L/O at 500 feet above the terrain per appendix 3, table 3.1.1 (ROC Column)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note 1:** The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted, and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.

**Note 2:** Cruise operations are considered to exist beyond the airport control area until inside the destination airport control area for VFR operations. Distances may extend to 10 NM from the airport (takeoff and landing) for IFR operations. Use of the nearest runway logic is permissible provided suitable logic is incorporated to ensure that the transitions to the terminal logic will typically occur only when the aeroplane is in terminal airspace.

**Note 3:** The values shown in column E may be reduced by 50 feet (to permit a L/O at 150 feet above the obstacle) provided that it demonstrates that the basic TAWS Mode 1 alert (sink rate) is issued at or above the altitude specified in column E for typical terrain topographies.

**Note 4:** The values shown in column F are appropriate for an aeroplane without an autopilot or flight director function, and are based upon 10–15 percent of the vertical velocity, which is appropriate to manual flight and small, GA aeroplane operations.
### Table A

**ENROUTE DESCENT ALERTING CRITERIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERT SPEED (FPM)</td>
<td>ALT LOST WITH 3SEC PILOT DELAY</td>
<td>ALT REQ'D TO L/O WITH 1 G PULLUP</td>
<td>TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO RECOVERY MANEUVER</td>
<td>MINIMUM TAWS WARNING ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
<td>MAXIMUM CAUTION ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Paragraph 1.3 in this ETSO is changed to specify altitude levels, test speeds, and pull-ups more appropriate to small aircraft.

1.3 Cruise Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations (vertical speed is ± 200 feet per minute), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is within 250 feet of the terrain and is predicted to be equal to or less than 200 feet within the prescribed test criteria. See Table B for test criteria.

**Note:** The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.
Table B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND SPEED (KT)</th>
<th>HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL (MSL)</th>
<th>TEST RUN ALTITUDE (MSL)</th>
<th>ALERT CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 340 (+ 0/- 50)</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 340 (+ 0/- 50)</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 340 (+ 0/- 50)</td>
<td>NO ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 240 (+ 0/- 50)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 240 (+ 0/- 50)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 240 (+ 0/- 50)</td>
<td>MUST ALERT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Descent Requirement. Not applicable.

1.5 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Level Flight Requirement. Not applicable.

1.6 Final Approach Descent Requirements. Revised to specify altitude levels, test speeds, and pull-ups more appropriate to small aircraft:

   a. Table E, column A, represents the test conditions. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only. Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted in order to perform their intended function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See Appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.

   b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 100 feet terrain clearance is required.

   c. Test conditions for 1.6:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumed pilot response time</th>
<th>1.0 seconds (minimum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumed constant G pull-up</td>
<td>1.0 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum allowed terrain clearance</td>
<td>100 feet AGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descent rates</td>
<td>500, 750, and 1,000 FPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumed pilot task for column F</td>
<td>L/O at 250 feet above the terrain per appendix 3, table 3.1.1 (ROC Column)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted, and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.
Note 2: The values shown in column F are appropriate for an aeroplane without an autopilot or flight director function, and are based upon 10 percent of the vertical velocity that is appropriate for manual flight and small, GA aeroplane operations.

Table E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERT SPEED (FPM)</td>
<td>ALT LOST WITH 1SEC PILOT DELAY</td>
<td>ALT REQ'D TO L/O WITH 1 G PULLUP</td>
<td>TOTAL ALT LOST DUE TO RECOVERY MANEUVER</td>
<td>MINIMUM TAWS WARNING ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
<td>MAXIMUM TAWS CAUTION ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE TERRAIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.7 Landing Flight Requirements. Applies as written.

2.0 through 2.2 FORWARD-LOOKING TERRAIN AVOIDANCE IMMINENT IMPACT TEST CONDITIONS. Apply using Table G for speed cases of 100 through 250 knots; however, change the incremental pull from 0.25g to 1.0g as described in note 2.

3.0 through 3.1 PREMATURE DESCENT ALERT TEST CONDITIONS. Apply as written.

4.0 NUISANCE ALERT TEST CONDITIONS — GENERAL. Apply as written.

4.1 4 000 FPM. Not applicable.

4.2 2 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 2 000 FPM and pilots must be able to L/O at 500 feet above the terrain using a normal L/O procedure (leading by 10 percent of the vertical speed), without a caution or warning alert.

4.3 1 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 1 000 FPM in a final approach segment and pilots must be able to L/O at 250 feet using the normal L/O procedure described in 4.2 above, without a caution or warning alert.

5.0 NUISANCE TEST CONDITIONS FOR HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL FLIGHT TECHNICAL ERRORS. Applicable as written.

5.1 Test Cases. Is applicable as written; however, test cases are limited to locations 3, 6, 7, and 8 in Table I.
6.0 TEST CONDITIONS USING KNOWN ACCIDENT CASES. Paragraphs 6.0 through 6.3 of Appendix 2 are to be determined by the applicant using actual National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) or national equivalent entity GA accidents. Since detailed data is usually not available, reasonable constructed scenarios matching the actual known accident data may be demonstrated. Pulls of up to 1.0g may be used instead of the 0.25g as specified in paragraph 6.2, computation and recording.

7.0 CLASS C EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR EXCESSIVE DESCENT RATE. Apply Class B as written.

8.0 CLASS C EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR NEGATIVE CLIMB RATE OR ALTITUDE LOSS AFTER TAKEOFF. Apply Class B as written.

9.0 CLASS C EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ALTITUDE CALLOUTS. Apply Class B as written.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Avionics Supporting Next Generation Satellite Systems (NGSS) Equipment — Airborne Iridium Satellite Transceiver for Voice or Data

1 — Applicability
This ETSO gives the requirements which Avionics Supporting Next Generation Satellite Systems (NGSS) — Airborne Iridium Satellite Transceiver for Voice or Data that are manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

The ETSO Authorisation does not include the verification of aspects (e.g. quality and continuity of electric power) which shall be assessed at aircraft level, but it includes verification of the system behaviour in presence of such failure conditions.

This ETSO provides the requirements which Next Generation Satellite Systems (NGSS) Equipment that is designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard


Standards set forth in the RTCA DO-262B ‘Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Avionics Supporting Next Generation Satellite Systems (NGSS)’, dated June 17, 2014; except that...
the article is not required to meet any requirement of RTCA DO-326, ‘Airworthiness Security Process Specification’, in Normative Appendix D or E (as applicable) of RTCA DO-262B where referenced.

Note: There are no MPS security requirements for the NGSS equipment. However, a security risk assessment may be required at the time of installation, and if needed, security controls may be implemented in connected aircraft systems or addressed by flight crew procedures.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

3.2 — Specific
The MPS allows for different equipment classes and subclasses as defined by RTCA DO-262B. There are 6 applicable equipment classes and 13 equipment subclass components identified (see RTCA DO-262B, Appendix D and Appendix E). The manufacturer must declare the equipment class requirements from those identified in the applicable appendix. The equipment configuration shall satisfy the relevant requirements of RTCA DO-262B ‘Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)’ as identified in Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix 1 to this ETSO.

This ETSO standard applies to equipment intended for long-range communication services, aeronautical mobile satellite (route) services (AMS(R)S) by means of satellite communications between AES, corresponding satellites, and ground earth stations (GES). The NGSS supports data communications, or data and voice communications, between aircraft users and ground-based users, such as air navigation service providers (ANSP) and aircraft operators. Equipment class AES1 supports data communications only. All other equipment classes support both data and voice communications.

(1) The functionality of NGSS supports four categories of communication service. Two are in the safety of flight category: air traffic services (ATS) and aeronautical operational control (AOC). The other two are in the non-safety of flight category: aeronautical administrative communication (AAC) and aeronautical passenger communication (APC).

(2) NGSS equipment is intended for procedural airspace area operations. The failure conditions specified in paragraph 3.2.1 of this ETSO have been determined based on NGSS equipment operating as an approved Long-Range Communication System (LRCS) in oceanic airspace area environments. Use of NGSS equipment in other operating environments (for example, high-density terminal/en route airspace) may impact equipment performance and safety considerations.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a minor failure condition.
Failure resulting in an erroneous behaviour of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is a minor failure condition. Loss of the function as defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is a minor failure condition.

4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
None.
The NGSS class and subclass markings should include the complete equipment identifier reference (such as AES1, AES4, or AES7). An example subclass component (such as HGA, Transceiver, or DLNA) marking would display AES6-2/HGA, Type A Transceiver AES7-7/MA, or Type F Diplexer AES6-3/DF, etc. For valid combinations of system component marking, see Table 3 of Appendix 1 to this ETSO.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
### Table 1: Equipment Class Identifiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Class Identifier</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES1</td>
<td>AES using a single channel Satellite Data Unit (SDU) that contains one transceiver for data only applications. AES1 is a Short Burst Data (SBD)-only transceiver and cannot support voice calling. A passive Low Gain Antenna (LGA) is required for use with the AES1.</td>
<td>Appendix D, Section 2.2.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES2</td>
<td>AES2 is capable of multiple services using a single or dual channel SDU that contains one or two transceivers for data and/or voice applications. A passive LGA is required for use with the AES2.</td>
<td>Appendix D, Section 2.2.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES3</td>
<td>AES using two or more transceivers for multiple data and/or voice applications. Passive or active (powered) antennas may be configured such as an LGA Omni, Intermediate Gain Antenna (IGA) switched beam or IGA/High Gain Antenna (HGA) phased steering array.</td>
<td>Appendix D, Section 2.2.1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES4</td>
<td>AES using an Enhanced Low Gain Antenna (ELGA). AES4 is configured as a complete system.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES6</td>
<td>AES using an HGA, transceiver, and Diplexer Low Noise Amplifier (DLNA).</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2: Equipment Sub-Class Identifiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Class Identifier</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Passive LGA for use with AES1, AES2 or AES3.</td>
<td>Appendix D, Section 2.2.3.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Active IGA for AES3.</td>
<td>Appendix D, Section 2.2.3.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGA</td>
<td>Active HGA for AES3.</td>
<td>Appendix D, Section 2.2.3.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGA</td>
<td>HGA for AES6.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.3.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>IGA for AES7.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.3.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6MA</td>
<td>Transceiver, SDU, Modified Type A (DMA) DLNA, and HGA for use with AES6.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7MA</td>
<td>Transceiver, SDU, SCM, DMA DLNA, and IGA for use with AES7.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6D</td>
<td>Transceiver and DLNA combination includes SDU, High Power Amplifier (HPA), DLNA, SCM, and HGA functions for use with AES6.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7D</td>
<td>Transceiver and DLNA combination includes SDU, HPA, DLNA, SCM, and IGA functions for use with AES7.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6F</td>
<td>Transceiver and Type F (DF) DLNA includes SDU, HPA, SCM, and IGA functions for use with AES6.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F</td>
<td>Transceiver and DF DLNA includes SDU, HPA, SCM, and IGA functions for use with AES7.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>DLNA with standard Transmitter (Tx) filter configures with 6MA transceiver and HGA for use with AES6, or 7MA transceiver and IGA for use with AES7.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>DLNA with enhanced Tx filter configures with 6MA or 6F transceiver and HGA for use with AES6, or with 7MA or 7F transceiver and IGA for use with AES7.</td>
<td>Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Valid Combinations of System Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid Combinations</th>
<th>System</th>
<th>Transceiver</th>
<th>Transceiver &amp; DLNA</th>
<th>DLNA</th>
<th>Antenna</th>
<th>Complete System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AES1</td>
<td>Appendix D</td>
<td>SBD</td>
<td>LBT</td>
<td>6MA</td>
<td>6F</td>
<td>7MA</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Appendix E</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Appendix E</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Appendix E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 1
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: EXTENDED SQUITTER AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE-BROADCAST (ADS-B) AND TRAFFIC INFORMATION SERVICES-BROADCAST (TIS-B) EQUIPMENT OPERATING ON THE RADIO FREQUENCY OF 1090 MEGAHERTZ (MHz)

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services-Broadcast (TIS-B) Equipment Operating on the Radio Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz) that are manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum performance standard

This ETSO supports two major classes of 1090 MHz ADS-B and TIS-B equipment:
(a) Class A equipment, consisting of transmit and receive subsystems; and
(b) Class B equipment, containing a transmit subsystem only.

Class A equipment includes Classes A0, A1, A1S, A2 and A3. This standard requires 1090 MHz airborne Class A equipment to include the capability of receiving both ADS-B and TIS-B messages and delivering both ADS-B and TIS-B reports, as well as transmitting ADS-B messages. A receive-only Class of equipment is allowed.

Class B equipment includes Classes B0, B1, and B1S. Classes B0, B1, and B1S are the same as A0, A1, and A1S, except they do not have receive subsystems. Note that Classes B2 and B3 are not for aircraft use.
3.1.2 — Environmental standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1. The required performance under test conditions is defined in RTCA/DO-260B EUROCAE ED-102A, section 2.4.

3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Airborne electronic hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

3.2 — Specific

3.2.1 — Failure condition classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a major failure condition. Failure of the function resulting in misleading information is a hazardous failure condition. Failure of the function resulting in loss of function is a major failure condition.

Note: The major failure condition for transmission of incorrect ADS-B messages is based on use of the data by other aircraft or Air Traffic Control for separation services.

4 — Marking

4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
Transmitting and receiving components must be permanently and legibly marked.
The following table explains how to mark components.

RTCA/DO-260B EUROCAE ED-102A provides the equipment class in section 2.1.11, and the receiving equipment type in section 2.2.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If component can:</th>
<th>Mark it with:</th>
<th>Sample marking pattern:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transmit and receive</td>
<td>Equipment class it supports, and Receiving equipment type</td>
<td>Class A0/Type 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmit, but not receive</td>
<td>Equipment class it supports</td>
<td>Class B1, or Class A3-Transmitting only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive, but not transmit</td>
<td>Equipment class it supports, and Receiving equipment type</td>
<td>Class A2/Type 2-Receiving only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 — Availability of referenced document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel Metal-Hydride, and Lead-Acid Batteries

1 — Applicability

This ETSO provides the requirements which Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel Metal-Hydride, and Lead-Acid Batteries that are designed and manufactured on or after the effective applicability date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures

2.1 — General

Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific

None.

3 — Technical Conditions

3.1 — Basic

3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard

Standards set forth in the RTCA Standard DO-293A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MPS) for Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel Metal-Hydride, and Lead-Acid Batteries, (from 29 July 2004) dated 12/2/2009, as amended according to Appendix 1 to this ETSO.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard

Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel Metal-Hydride, and Lead-Acid Batteries must be tested according to the conditions specified in RTCA DO-293A.

Where in RTCA/DO-293, the information references to ED-14D (RTCA DO-160D) "Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment", from July 29,1997, ED-14E (RTCA DO-160E) from March 2005 must be used instead of ED-14D (RTCA DO-160D).

Where the RTCA DO-293A quotes the RTCA DO-160 standard, the applicable DO-160 standard revision is defined in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Computer Software

None. See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

3.2 — Specific

None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

4 — Marking

4.1 — General

Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific

Each Nickel Cadmium and Lead Acid Battery must be permanently and legibly marked according to information provided in RTCA/DO-293, Section 1.10.

At least one major component shall be marked permanently and legibly with all the information in RTCA DO-293A, section 1.10, as modified by Appendix 1.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR NICKEL-CADMIUM, NICKEL METAL-HYDRIDE, AND LEAD-ACID BATTERIES

AMENDMENT TO RTCA DO-293A REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RTCA/DO-293A section and title:</th>
<th>Amendment:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.10.1, Battery Marking</td>
<td>It shall be added to the bottom of the list of Manufacturer’s markings: 11. End Point Voltage (EPV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1, Rapid Discharge Capacity at 23 °C</td>
<td>It shall be deleted at the end of the paragraph and the Test Method: “or the manufacturer recommended cutoff voltage”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2, Rapid Discharge Capacity at – 30 °C</td>
<td>It shall be deleted at the end of the paragraph and the Test Method: “or the manufacturer recommended cutoff voltage”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.12, Electrolyte Resistance</td>
<td>It shall be applied ONLY to heater blankets of this section the following: Testing method and evaluation criteria of MIL-PRF-8565 can be utilised in lieu of the testing method and evaluation criteria stipulated in paragraph 3.12 of RTCA/DO-293A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
European Aviation Safety Agency

European Technical Standard Order

Subject: Attitude and Heading Reference Systems (AHRS)

1 — Applicability

This ETSO provides the requirements which Attitude and Heading Reference Systems (AHRSs) that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures

2.1 — General

Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific

None.

3 — Technical Conditions

3.1 — Basic

3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard


This ETSO applies to solid state strap-down AHRS intended to output pitch and roll attitude that does not use gimbaled sensors. It also addresses the optional functions of heading, turn, slip and the display of information provided by an AHRS.

When the article provides heading, turn and slip, degraded mode, uses aiding, includes a display, or provides information generated by the AHRS to a stand-alone display, it must, in particular, meet the requirements as listed in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optional Functions/Mode/Source</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heading</td>
<td>2.2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn and Slip</td>
<td>2.2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Optional Functions/Mode/Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optional Functions/Mode/Source</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degraded Mode</td>
<td>2.2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiding</td>
<td>2.2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.

#### 3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.

#### 3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.

#### 3.2 — Specific
None.

#### 3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

#### 4 — Marking

##### 4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

##### 4.2 — Specific
None.

#### 5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
Subject: Cargo Stopper Devices

1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Cargo Stopper Devices that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.

3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
Standards set forth in the SAE Document No AS6554 ‘Cargo Stopper Devices’, dated 6.7.2011 except as modified by Appendix 1 of this ETSO

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See Section 3.8 of AS6554.

3.1.2.1 Specific:
Consideration shall be given to available data regarding potential environmental degradation for the component straps and filling materials.

(1) Environmental degradation due to aging, ultra-violet (UV)-exposure, weathering, etc., for any
materials used in the construction of cargo stopper devices shall be considered.

(2) Textile Performance: See SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) 1490B, Environmental Degradation of Textiles, dated December 2007, for available data for textile performance when exposed to environmental factors. These data shall be taken into account for consideration of the effects of environmental degradation on cargo stopper devices with the expected storage and service life.

Note: Environmental degradation data other than that documented in AIR 1490B may be used if substantiated by the applicant and approved by EASA.

3.1.3 — Software
n/a

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification
n/a

3.2 — Specific
None.

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.

4 — Marking

4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.

4.2 — Specific
In addition the following marking shall be applied:
- The rated ultimate load in daN and lbf;
- The Expiration date in the format ‘EXP YYYY-MM’

5 — Availability of Referenced Document
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
### APPENDIX 1

The applicable standard is SAE AS6554 'Cargo Stopper Devices', dated 6.7.2011. It shall be modified as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS6554 section:</th>
<th>Action:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3.7</td>
<td>To be replaced:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Fire Protection. The materials used in</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>the cargo stoppers shall not have</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>an average burn rate greater than 2.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>inches per minute when tested</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>horizontally in accordance with the</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>applicable portions of CS-25, Appendix</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>F, part I, paragraph (b).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4.3</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 6</td>
<td>To be disregarded.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subject: Aircraft Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher

1 — Applicability

This ETSO provides the requirements which an Aircraft Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher that is designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.

2 — Procedures

2.1 — General

Applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.

2.2 — Specific

None.

3 — Technical Conditions

3.1 — Basic

3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard

Standards set forth in the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Standard (AS) 6271 'Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher', issued in January 2013, as modified by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.

3.1.2 — Environmental Standard

Refer to the environmental qualification requirements specified in ANSI/UL2129.

3.1.3 — Computer Software

None

3.1.4 — Electronic Hardware Qualification

None

3.2 — Specific

3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification

Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a minor failure condition.
4 — Marking

4.1 — General

Marking as detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.4.2 — Specific

The fire extinguisher type, as specified in paragraph 3.1 of AS6271, shall be marked on the article. In addition, the fire extinguisher rating, as specified in ANSI/UL 711, shall be marked on the article.

5 — Availability of Referenced Document

See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
APPENDIX 1

Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher

This Appendix prescribes the Minimum Performance Standards (MPS) for aircraft handheld fire extinguishers. The applicable standard is SAE AS6271 ‘Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher’, issued in January 2013. EASA did revise it as follows:

1. On page 4, replace paragraph 3.2 with the following:

Halocarbon clean agents shall be registered according to REACH\(^5\) for use in a fire extinguisher to be sold in the European Union (EU). REACH is the EU Regulation on chemicals and their safe use. REACH applies to substances manufactured or imported into the EU in quantities of 1 ton or more per year (see 2.1.7).

2. On page 5, replace paragraph 4.1.1 with the following:

The fire extinguisher/mounting bracket assembly shall be shown to withstand without failure the highest ultimate inertia force/load, applied to all on-axis (X, Y, Z) orientations, specified in the Certification Specifications (CS) applicable to the specific aircraft type or types on which the fire extinguisher is suitable to be installed. The ultimate inertia forces/loads shall be increased, if necessary, to meet the aircraft manufacturer’s specifications for flight and ground loads accordingly. A fitting factor of 1.33 as specified in C2X.561 shall be included to address wear and tear through frequent removal of the fire extinguisher from its mounting bracket. In addition, the manufacturer shall provide an Interface Control Drawing (ICD) specifying for the fire extinguisher/mounting bracket assembly:
   - the ultimate inertia force/loads shown during qualification,
   - the mounting orientations (X, Y, Z) for installation,
   - the interface loads and the specified means of attachment for installation,
   - the Certification Specification(s) (e.g. CS 25.561) including the amendment for which the assembly is demonstrated to be compliant.

3. Page 5, add a note to paragraph 5.2.2:

**Note:** If the proposed agent was already proven to pass the seat/toxicity test of the MPS in combination with another fire extinguisher, that test would not need to be repeated for the proposed fire extinguisher/agent combination.

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APPENDIX 2

Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher

This Appendix prescribes the Minimum Performance Standards (MPS) for aircraft handheld fire extinguishers. As referred to in SAE AS6271, the applicable standard is ANSI/UL 2129 ‘Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher’, issued in February 2005. EASA did revise it as follows:

1. Page 9, replace paragraph 6.8 with:
   An extinguisher shall operate as intended at temperatures from \(-40^\circ C\) to \(49^\circ C\) as required per UL2129. Ground survival temperature of the unit shall be \(-54^\circ C\) up to \(85^\circ C\) (refer to RTCA DO-160 release defined in CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1, ground survival temperature).

2. Page 12, replace the first phrase of paragraph 12.4 with:
   The maximum indicated gauge pressure shall be between 150 and 250 per cent of the indicated charging pressure specified by the manufacturer (at either \(20^\circ C\) or \(21^\circ C\)).

3. Page 12, replace paragraph 12.5 with:
   The mark used to indicate the charging pressure at the charging temperature (at either \(20^\circ C\) or \(21^\circ C\)) as specified by the manufacturer shall be a minimum 0.6 mm and not more than 1.0 mm wide.

4. Page 12, disregard paragraph 12.6 and 12.7